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TERRITORIAL TRADEMARK RIGHTS 
AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 
Richard F. Dole, Jr.* 
INTRODUCTION 
Trademarks are devises used by business men to distinguish 
their goods from those of others.1 The utility of trademarks to pur-
chasers lies in the identification of different lines of merchandise by 
different trademarks.2 On the other hand, perhaps the greatest ad-
vantage of trademarks to business derives from the connotations as-
sociated with marks by skillful advertising.3 Legal protection of 
trademark rights thus has a dual aspect: preventing others from copy-
ing marks both guards the identification function of trademarks and 
maintains exclusive rights in the commercial value of trademarks 
created by advertising. A Senate committee described the hybrid 
nature of trademark protection as follows: 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law. For-
merly Cook Fellow and Legislative Analyst, Legislative Research Center, 
The University of Michigan Law School, 1962-64. A.B., Bates College, 
1958; LL.B., Cornell University, 1961; LL.M., Cornell University, 1963. 
1. See Restatement (Second), Torts § 715 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963). A 
mark used to distinguish services is called a service mark. This com-
paratively recent refinement of terminology does not materially affect 
the applicable legal principles. See id. at comment g. 
2. See Brown, "Advertising and the Public Interest," 57 Yale L.J. 1165, 
1185-87 (1948). Trademarks historically identified the origin of com-
mercial goods. Medieval craft guilds, for instance, required members 
to affix distinctive marks to their goods so that poor workmanship 
could be traced, and the goods of nonmembers excluded from the area 
of the guild monopoly. See Schechter, Historical Foundations of Trade-
Mark Law 62-63 (1925). The evolution of a national economy charac-
terized by labyrinthine channels of distribution has, however, stripped 
marks of this capacity. Marks seldom identify a known source today. 
Instead, if consumers have no experience with a product, trademarks 
initially identify like goods by connoting that every article that bears 
the same mark is alike and comes from, or is approved by, a single 
"anonymous" source. Once consumers have tried a product, trademarks 
identify known goods, permitting avoidance of brands that have not proved 
satisfactory. 
3. Mr. Justice Frankfurter has written: "The protection of trade-marks 
is the law's recognition of the psychological function of symbols. If it 
is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true that we purchase 
goods by them. A trade-mark is a merchandising short-cut which in-
duces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has been led to 
believe he wants. The owner of a mark exploits this human propensity 
2 TERRITORIAL TRADEMARK RIGHTS 
The purpose underlying any trade-mark statute is 
two-fold. One is to protect the public so it may be con-
fident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular 
trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the prod-
uct which it asks for and wants to get. Secondly, where 
the owner of a trade-mark has spent energy, time, and 
money in presenting to the public the product, he is pro-
tected in his investment from its misappropriation by 
pirates and cheats. This ts the well-established rule of 
law protecting both the public and the trade-mark owner.4 
The development of the law of trademark protection has been 
characterized by tension between the public and private reasons for 
protection. Proponents of liberal protection have stressed the import-
ance of the identification function of trademarks in urging extensive 
protection for private interests,5 whereas opponents of strong pro-
tection have characterized trademarks as "monopolies, immunities 
from competition116 and minimized their social value.7 Controversy 
has raged over both the goods and the geographical area for which 
protection should be accorded. 8 
A dramatic confrontation of the opposing viewpoints was initia-
ted in 1938 when advocates of liberal protection prevailed upon Con-
gressman Lanham to introduce a bill to revise the federal trademark 
laws. 9 The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, motivated 
by evidence that international cartels were utilizing trademarks to 
(Footnote continued) 
by making every effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the market 
with the drawing power of a congenial symbol. Whatever the means 
employed, the aim is the same-to convey through the mark, in the 
minds of potential customers, the desirability of the commodity upon 
which it appears. Once this is attained, the trade-mark owner has 
something of value." Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. s. 
Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942). The advertising value of 
trademarks has been hailed and condemned as their predominant role. 
Compare Schechter, "Rational Basis of Trademark Protection," 40 Harv. 
L. Rev. 813, 818-19 (1927) with Brown, note 2 .!!!E!, at 1187-91. 
4. S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. at 3 (1946). 
5. E.g., Rogers, "The Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trade-Marks, 
14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 173, 175-77 (1949); "The Democracy of Trade-
Marks," 34 Trademark Rep. 57 (1944). 
6. Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 957 (2d 
Cir.) (Frank, J.), cert. den., 320 U.S. 758 (1943). 
7. E.g., Auerbach, "Quality Standards, Informative Labeling and Grade 
Labeling as Guides to Consumer Buying," 14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 
362 & n. 1 (1949). 
8. E.g., Schechter, "Rational Basis of Trademark Protection," 40 Harv. 
L. Rev. 813, 819-24 (1927); Comment, "The Anti-Competitive Aspects 
of Trade Name Protection and the Policy Against Consumer Deception," 
29 U. Chi. L. Rev. 371 (1962). 
9. H.R. 9041, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938). 
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implement their schemes,10 and by exaggerated fears that trademarks 
could equal patents as major instruments of anticompetitive abuse,11 
became the protagonist of the opposition.12 The passage of the Lan-
ham Act in 1946,13 replete with amendments intended to assuage the 
Justice Department,14 transferred the controversy over the act's pro-
tectionist features to the courts, where the opposing viewpoints have 
continued to clash.15 
Though the Justice Department contended that the Lanham Bill 
bristled with objectionable features,16 the principal documentation 
related to division of territorial markets among competitors through 
use of common trademarks. 17 This evidence was drawn on to illus-
trate how provisions of the Lanham Bill dealing with concurrent reg-
istration, 18 assignment,19 and licensing20 could be used to cloak con-
spiratorial division of trade territory by competitors.21 Although these 
are selected aspects of the Antitrust Division's position, the subject of 
territorial trademark rights with respect to competing goods affords 
a manageable microcosm in which to analyze competitive and non-
competitive aspects of trademark protection. Despite the fulminations 
of the Antitrust Division, it is the contention of the author that the 
Lanham Act provisions dealing with territorial trademark rights on 
balance permit a more procompetitive. demarcation of territorial 
trademark rights with respect to competing goods than common-law 
principles. This contention will be developed by survey of the terri-
torial scope of trademark rights with respect to competing goods be-
fore and after the passage of the Lanham Act, analysis of the argu-
ments for and against strong protection of these rights, and consider -
ation of the relationship of these territorial trademark rights to the 
antitrust laws. 
10. See, e.g., Diggins, "Trade-Marks and Restraints of Trade," 32 Geo. 
L.J. 113 (1944). 
11. 1942 Senate Hearings at 35 (remarks of Ernest S. Meyers). 
12. The Justice Department's hypersensitivity to the abuses of trademark 
protection was no doubt partially due to the elan imparted to the An-
titrust Division by then Assistant Attorney General Thurman Arnold. 
13. 60 Stat. 427 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1051-1127 (1964). 
14. These amendments originated in the Senate. Sen. Rep. 1333, 79th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1946). 
15. E.g., s. C. Johnson & Son v. Johnson, 175 F.2d 176 (2d Cir.), cert. 
den., 338 U.S. 860 (1949); California Fruit Growners Exch. v. Sunkist 
Baking Co., 166 F .2d 971 (7th Cir. 1947); see Callmann, "The 'Sunkist' 
Decision: Trade-Marks at the Crossroads," 38 TrademarkRep.304(1948). 
16. 1944 Senate Hearings at 58-71 (statement of the Department of Justice). 
17. See Timberg, "Trade-Marks, Monopoly, and the Restraint of Trade," 
14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 323, 360 (1949). 
18. See Chapter II infra for discussion of concurrent registration. 
19. See Chapter III infra for discussion of assignments. 
20. See Chapter III infra for discussion of licensing. 
21. See 1944 Senate Hearings at 63-64. 
L WHAT PRICE TRADEMARK PROTECTION? 
A. Nature and Extent of Common-Law Trademark Rightsl 
Judicially cognizable trademark rights do not spring from 
conception of an idea for a mark but are derived from "use, "2 a 
term of art which refers to commercial distribution of goods3 
identified by the mark.4 Temporal priority of use is a factor in 
1. Since trademark rights depend on legal protection for their existence, 
it is imprecise to speak of "property in" or "ownership of'' a trade-
mark. See Cohen, "Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Ap-
proach," 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809, 814-17 (1935); Goble, "Where and 
What a Trade-Mark Protects," 22 Ill. L. Rev. 379-80 (1927). 
2. E.g., United States v. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82 (1879); accord, Rolley, Inc. 
v. Younghusband, 204 F .2d 209 (9th Cir. 1953); Russell v. Caroline-
Becker, Inc., 336 Mass. 161, 142 N.E.2d 899 (1957). There have been 
proposals to permit reservation of trademark rights prior to use. See 
Symposium, "Proposed Intention to Use Legislation," 53 Trademark 
Rep. 963 (1963). 
3. The distribution must be in the ordinary course of business and not 
for the purpose of acquiring trademark rights. Eg., Gordon, Inc. v. 
Handicraft Pub. Inc., 206 Misc. 1087, 136 N. Y.S.2d 558 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. 
County 1954), aff'd mem., 286 App. Div. 809, 143 N, Y,S,2d 620 (1st 
Dep1t 1955). 
4. At common law physical affixation of a trade identifier to goods or to 
containers in which goods were sold was a sine gua non of trademark 
protection. E.g., Hazelton Boiler Co. v. Hazelton Tripod Boller Co., 
142 Ill. 494, 30 N.E. 339 (1892). Unaffixed terms could only be pro-
tected as trade names which required evidence, dispensed with in 
trademark cases, that purchasers associated the unaffixed terms with 
the plaintiff's business. E.g., Johnson v. Hitchcock, 3 N.Y. Supp. 680 
(Sup. Ct. N. Y. County 1888). This common-law distinction between 
trademarks and trade names is retained in modified form by the Lan-
ham Act which makes "use in commerce'' a condition of registrability 
as a trademark § 1, 60 Stat. 427 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1051 
(1964). "Use in commerce" is defined as including display of trade 
identifiers in association with goods as well as physical affixation of 
trade identifiers to goods or to the containers in which goods are sold, 
§ 45, 60 Stat. 444 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1127 (1964). Trade 
identifiers which are not used in commerce within this definition are 
regarded as unregistrable trade names. E.G., In re Lyndale Farm, 
38 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 825, 186 F .2d 723 (1951). Despite the continu-
ing technical distinction between trademarks and trade names the com-
mon-law principles applicable to both are similar, see Restatement 
(Second) Torts § 717 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963), and cases involving 
both trademarks and trade names will be cited hereafter although tex-
tual discussion will refer to trademarks. 
4 
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determining which of two or more concurrent users of the same 
mark will prevail, but priority alone is not conclusive.5 Trade-
mark protection is a traditional equitable subject matter and the 
principles of equity, including the concept of "balancing equities," 
have conditioned its development. The respective interests of the 
parties are invariably considered in order to ascertain whether 
protection should be granted in a particular instance.6 The iden-
tification function of trademarks means that the social interest in 
avoidance of purchaser deception is also involved, but the courts 
principally utilize the presence or absence of probable purchaser 
deception as a gauge in measuring the substantiality of the parties1 
interests. This is evidenced by the fact that courts generally in-
quire only whether probable purchaser deception will occur, not 
whether purchasers will be harmed if they are in fact misled. 7 
The core of the interests . for which a senior user is able 
to obtain protection is an interest in avoiding loss of sales to a 
junior user because of purchaser confusion, an interest in avoid-
ing tarnishment of his reputation as a result of the character of 
the junior use, and an interest in avoiding curtailment of the area 
in which, or the goods on which, the senior user can use the 
mark.8 The principal coordinate interest of a junior user lies 
in retaining the expectation of future patronage which he has cre-
ated through advertisement of his brand and sales made to satis-
fied customers.9 These interests of senior and junior users do 
not, however, exhaust the range of factors considered by the court1: 
in determining whether to grant trademark protection. The nature 
of the word or words used as markslO and the reason for the 
5. Chandon Champagne Corp. v. San Marino Wine Corp., 335 F .2d 531 
(2d Cir. 1964). 
6. See ibid., Restatement (Second), Torts § § 729, 731, 732 (Tent. Draft 
No. 8, 1963). 
7. Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 37-43 (2d Cir. 1945) 
(conclurring opinion); see "Trademarks and the 'Free Ride' Doctrine," 
16 Stan. L. Rev. 736, 740-41 (1964). It has been questioned whether 
the courts could successfully administer a test for trademark infringe-
ment which required evaluation of the quality of the defendant's and 
the plaintiff's products. Comment, "Misrepresentation and the Lindsay 
Bill," 70 Yale L.J. 406, 432-33 (1961). But see Avon Shoe Co. v. 
David Crystal, Inc., 279 F .2d 607 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 364 U.S. 909 
(1960) (considering the respective reputations of the parties' products). 
8. S. C. Johnson & Son v. Johnson, 175 F2d 176 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 
338 U.S. 860 (1949). 
9. Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal, Inc., note 7 supra. 
10. Trademarks may consist of variegated combinations of words, names, 
symbols, devices, letters, numerals, or pictures, see Restatement 
(Second), Torts § 715 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963), but words are most 
common and discussion will focus on word-marks. 
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adoption of a particular mark are also important considera-
tions. 
Distinctive nondescriptive language, often referred to as a 
common-law or technical trademark,11 qualifies for protection as 
soon as use commences.12 On the other hand, because of reluct-
ance to recognize exclusive rights in the ordinary meaning of 
words, or in words in common use as marks, descriptive language 
adopted to distinguish goods, and even nondescriptive language 
which is in common use as a mark, is not customarily protected 
unless there is evidence that purchasers associate the particular 
word or words with the plaintiff. 13 Descriptive language and 
words in common use as marks that have attained significance 
as an indicia of source are said to have acquired secondary mean-
ing.14 
It is not always easy to ascertain whether secondary mean-
ing is a prerequisite to trademark rights. The initial inquiry is 
whether a term is a "weak" mark, in the sense of being a word 
in common use as a mark. If it is, secondary meaning will gen-
erally be required even if the term originated as a coined word. 
However, if the term is a "strong" mark, a term that has seldom 
been used as a mark, attention should next be directed to whether 
the term was coined for use as a mark or had a pre-existing 
11. At common law a "trade name" was a descriptive term used to dis-
tinguish goods whereas a nondescriptive word used for the same pur-
pose was referred to as a "trademark." Common-law trade names 
were not protected unless there was evidence that the descriptive lan-
guage had acquired "secondary meaning' through purchaser recognition 
of its function of source identification; common-law trademarks were 
protected regardless of secondary meaning. See Handler & Pickett, 
"Trade-Mark and Trade Names," 30 Colum. L. Rev. 168-70 (1930). 
In modern-parlance any word used to distinguish goods is a trademark 
whether the word is descriptive or nondescriptive. See Restatement 
(Second), Torts § 715, comment .£ (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963). However, 
this distinction between common-law trade names and common-law 
trademarks persists in another form: a word which requires second-
ary meaning to function as a trademark is referred to as a secondary-
meaning mark, and a word that does not require secondary meaning 
is referred to as a common-law or technical trademark. 
12. E.g., Waldes v. International Mfrs' Agency, 237 Fed. 502 (S.D.N.Y. 
1916). 
13. E.g., Arrow Distilleries, Inc. v. Globe Brewing Co., 117 F.2d 347 (4th 
Cir. 1941) (word in common use as mark); American Waltham Watch 
Co. v. United States Watch Co., 173 Mass. 85, 53 N.E. 141 (1899) 
(descriptive term). 
14. Use of "secondary meaning" to refer to the primary commercial con-
notation of words has been called "a triumph of unintended obfuscation." 
Kaplan & Brown, Cases on Copyright, Unfair Competition, and other 
Topics 490 (1960). 
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meaning. Coined words are protected regardless of secondary 
meaning because other businessmen are unlikely to coincidentally 
adopt them as marks. On the other hand, words with pre-existing 
meanings may or may not require secondary meaning for protec-
tion depending on the probability that others might accidentally 
adopt them. If the words describe qualities of the goods, e.g., 
"Allwite" for white shoe polish, or a geographical area pertaining 
to the goods, e.g., "Elgin" for watches manufactured in Elgin, 
Illinois, or the personal name of the manufacturer of the goods, 
e.g., "Ford" cars, secondary meaning is usually requisite. But, 
if words with a descriptive denotation are arbitrarily used wtth 
respect to goods unrelated to that denotation, e.g., "Brilliant" 
peas, "The Atlantic" magazine; "Dickie" trousers, or merely ima-
ginatively suggest qualities of the goods, e.g., "Coppertone" sun-
tan lotion, secondary meaning is usually held to be unnecessary. 
The superficial intricacy of the secondary meaning concept 
should not be allowed to obscure its function as an aid in deter-
mining whether the interests for which a senior user claims pro-
tection overbalance the interests of a junior user. The presence 
of secondary meaning with respect to a weak mark or descriptive 
language used to distinguish goods indicates that a senior user's 
interests in avoiding loss of sales, tarnishment of his reputation, 
and confinement of his operations are more substantial than if the 
public did not recognize his mark as a source-symbol. Further-
more, the presence of secondary meaning decreases to some ex-
tent the possibility that a junior user inadvertantly selected a sub-
stantially similar mark. In weighing the respective interests of 
a junior and a senior user, the courts have always given careful 
consideration to the circumstances surrounding the development 
of concurrent use.15 Judicial solicitude for a junior user's in-
terests is markedly cooled by evidence that the junior user in-
tended to capitalize on the reputation of the senior user and some-
times even by evidence that the junior user had notice of prior 
rights when he selected his mark.16 This is a reflection of the 
equitable principle that allocation of the responsibility for hard-
ship is a major factor in determining whether the harm to the 
plaintiff's interests justifies the harm which an injunction will in-
flict on. the defendant's interests.17 Judicial distaste for junior 
users who have deliberately copied the senior user's mark is 
15. E.g., Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal, Inc., note 7 supra. 
16. Compare Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid, Inc., 319 F .2d 830, 833-36 (7th 
Cir. 1963) with Triumph Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Triumph Internat'l 
Corp., 308 F .2d 196 (2d Cir. 1962). 
17. See 4 Restatement, Torts § 941, comment!?, (1939), 
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so great that some courts have enjoined such junior use where 
descriptive language was involved despite an avowed absence of 
proof of secondary meaning.IS 
There are four principal situations in which the courts may 
have to balance the interests of senior and junior users: (1) a 
junior user may sell competing goods-goods which satisfy the 
same purchaser needs that the senior user's goods satisfyl9-in 
the senior user's trade territory; (2) a junior user may sell non-
competing goods in the senior user's trade territory; (3) a junior 
user may sell competing goods in a different trade territory; or 
(4) a junior user may sell noncompeting goods in a different trade 
territory. A senior user will have difficulty in obtaining relief in 
situation 4 because of the relatively slight effect that the junior 
use can have on the senior user's interests.20 The chances for 
relief in situation 2 are greater because the presence of a com-
mon trade territory measurably increases the probability of pur-
chaser confusion and the senior user has a significant interest in 
preserving his reputation from tarnishment and his ability to di-
versify the goods on which he uses his mark in his actual market. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the concurrent use is on noncompeting 
goods means that the senior user's interest in avoiding loss of 
sales is not directly involved. If actual extension of the senior 
use to competing goods is improbable in situation 2 and the junior 
user sells high quality goods so that the danger of tarnishment is 
likewise slight, the junior use may be allowed to continue despite 
likelihood of purchaser confusion-provided that the junior user 
has not prejudiced his case by deliberately copying the senior 
user's mark. 21 On the other hand, in situation 1 the senior user 
can almost always obtain relief as long as he has a protectible 
interest in his mark. The senior user's interests in avoiding loss 
of sales and tarnishment of his reputation are so directly affected 
by a junior use on competing goods in the same trade territory 
that relief may be available regardless of the junior user's good 
faith in adoption of his mark and regardless of the actual quality of 
the junior user's goods. 22 In situation 3, like situation 4, the 
18. Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexitized Corp., 335 F .2d 774 (2d Cir. 
1964) cert. den., 380 U.S. 913 (1965); ~. Lincoln Restaurant Corp. 
v. Wolfies Restaurant, Inc., 291 F .2d 302 ( 2d Cir.), cert. den., 368 U.S. 
889 (1961). 
19. See "Development in the Law-Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition," 
68 Harv. L. Rev. 814, 843-44 (1955). 
20. E.g., El Chico, Inc. v. El Chico Cafe, 214 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1954). 
21. E.g., Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal, Inc., note 7 supra. 
22. E.g., LaTouraine Coffee Co. v. Lorraine Coffee Co., 157 F .2d 115 (2d 
Cir. cert. den., 329 U.S. 771 (1946); see Harold F. Ritchie, Inc. v. 
Chesebrough-Pond's, Inc., 281 F.2d 755 (2d Cir. 1960). 
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senior .. user's ability to obtain relief is in doubt because the dif-
ference in trade territories weakens the impact of the junior use 
on the senior user's interests. Nevertheless, because the con-
current use in situation 3 is on competing goods, the senior user's 
int~ests are sufficiently involved to make situation 3 more analo-
gous. to situation 2 than to situation 4. Indeed, a senior user may 
actually obtain relief more often in situation 3 than in situation 2. 
Because a senior user is more likely to be expanding the area in 
which he uses a mark than the goods on which he uses a mark, 
it is often easier to establish substantial injury to the interest in 
avoiding territorial curtailment of use than to the interest in avoid-
. ing curtailment of the goods on which the mark can be used. 23 
Insofar as situation 3, the principal subject of analysis, is 
concerned, two leading Supreme Court decisions struck a balance 
between the interests of senior and junior users in a fashion that 
is still customarily followed at common law today. In the 1916 
decision of Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 24 the Court held 
that the prior user of "Tea Rose" for flour could not enjoin junior 
use in a separate trade territory where the junior user had adopted 
the mark without knowledge of the prior use and the senior user's 
mark was unknown in the junior user's territory. Two years later 
in United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co.,25 a case with simi-
lar facts, the Court reaffirmed Hanover despite the apparent pres-
ence of likelihood of purchaser confusion in denying an injunction 
to a sen~or user whose selling zone had gradually extended to the 
periphery of a good faith junior user's trade territory. Dictum in 
the Hanover and Rectanus cases suggested that a senior user might 
be able to enjoin a junior use on competing goods despite a dif-
ference in selling zones if the junior user adopted his mark with 
the intention of benefiting from the senior user's reputation26 or, 
regardless of the junior user's intent, if at the time that the jun-
ior user adopted his mark, the senior use was known in the junior 
23. This ls not necessarily true with respect to "housemarks," trademarks 
used on a number of different products each generally bearing a sepa-
rate individual trademark. See "Trademarks in the Marketplace," 53 
Trademark Rep. 687, 697-98 (1963). 
24. 240 U.S. 403 (1916). 
25. 248 u.s. 90 (1918). 
26. "But where two parties independently are employing the same mark 
upon goods of the same class, but in separate markets wholly remote 
the one from the other, the question of prior appropriation is legally 
insignificant, unless at least it appear that the second adopter has 
selected the mark with some design inimical to the interests of the 
first user, such as to take the benefit of the reputation of his goods, 
to forestall the extension of his trade, or the like." Hanover Star 
Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 415 (1916). 
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user's marketing area27 or that area was within the senior user's 
probable zone of expansion. 28 
Although the doctrine of concurrent territorial trademark 
rights elaborated in the Hanover and Rectanus cases was part of 
the federal common law disavowed by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,29 
the doctrine has persisted after Erie due to reception into state 
law30 and the tendency of the federal courts to apply "indetermin-
ant general law" to claims of nonstatutory trademark infringe-
ment.31 Subsequent adjudications have confirmed the implications 
that a senior user's trademark rights may be protected in areas 
beyond his actual selling zone where his goods are advertized32 
or known by reputation33 or to which the senior user can demon-
strate a probable imminent extension of his operations.34 A line 
27. "Mrs. Regis and her firm, having during a long period of years con-
fined their use of the "Rex" mark to a limited territory wholly re-
mote from that in controversy, must be held to have taken the risk 
that some innocent party might in the meantime hit upon the same 
mark, apply it to goods of similar character, and expend money and 
effort in building up a trade under it ••.. " United Drug Co. v. Theo-
dore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 103 (1918). 
28. "We are not dealing with a case where the junior appropriator of a 
trade-mark is occupying territory that would probably be reached by 
the prior user in the natural expansion of his trade, and need pass 
no judgment upon such a case." Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 
240 u.s. 403, 420 (1916). 
29. 304 u.s. 64 (1938). 
30. See Direct Service Oil Co. v. Honzay, 2il Minn. 361, 2 N.W.2d 434 
(1941); Ambassador Hotel Corp. v. Hotel Sherman Co., 226 Ill. App. 
247 (1922); Brady v. Servisoft, Inc., 338 s. W.2d 189 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1960). 
31. Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F .2d 538, 
540 n. l (2d Cir. 1956). But see Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexitized 
Corp., 335 F. 2d 774 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. den., 380 U.S. 913 (1965). 
32. Western Oil Ref. Co. v. Jones, 27 F.2d 205 (6th Cir. 1928); accord, 
Adam Hat Stores, Inc. v. Scherper, 45 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Wis. 1942) 
(alternative holding). See also Huber Baking Co. v. Stroehmann Bros. 
Co., 252 F.2d 945, 955 (2d Cir.) (dictum), cert. den., 358 U.S. 829 
(1958). But see Shoppers Fair, Inc. v. Sanders Co., 328 F.2d 496 
(8th Cir. 1964). 
33. Lincoln Restaurant Corp. v. Wolfies Restaurant, Inc., note 18 supra; 
accord, Ambassador East, Inc. v. Orsatti, Inc., 257 F .2d 79 {3d Cir. 
1958); Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F .2d 348 (9th Cir. 1948); 
Seegmiller v. Hunt, 391 P.2d 298 (Utah 1964); see Yarbrough, "Pro-
tection of Territorial Rights in Corporate Names and Trade Names," 
19 Bus. Law 925, 927-28 (1964). 
34. Nielsen v. American Oil Co., 203 F. Supp 473 (D. Utah 1962); accord, 
J. A. Dougherty's Sons, Inc. v. Kasko Distillers Prods. Corp., 35F\ 
Supp. 561 (E.D. Pa. 1940); see Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Lakeland 
Grocery Corp., 301 F.2d 156 (4th Cir.), cert. den., 371 U.S. 817 (1962); 
Tampa Wholesale Co. v. Foodtown, U.S.A., Inc., 166 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 
App. 1964). 
watf' PRICE TRADEMARK PROTECTION? 11 
. o(. ~ority following comments in Mr. Justice Holmes• concurring 
opini9n in Hanover35 indicates that a senior trademark user who 
can ~stabliSh territorial rights through any of the above circum-
. stances.-is prima facie entitled to statewide rights;36 but there is 
a co~licting tendency to limit territorial rights in secondary-
meaning marks to the area of secondary meaning37 unless the 
junior 1J5er adopted his mark with the intention of capitalizing on 
·-.·;tbe reputation of the senior user or with the knowledge that the 
·,senior user would soon expand into his trade area. Absent laches 
·,. or acquiescence on the part of the senior user, a junior user who 
- -deliberately or recklessly initiates concurrent use on competing 
goods iS seldom given any consideration regardless of the nature 
of the mark or the location of his use. 38 
· ·B. The Validity of Strong Trademark Protection 
The common-law decisions which determine that the impact 
~91 junior use upon the senior user is not sufficient to justify 
35. Hanover Star Mllling Co. v. Metcalf 240 U.S. 403, 424 (1916). 
36. Federal Glass Co. v. Loshin, 224 F .Zd 100 (2d Cir. 1955); accord, 
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Oil City Refiners, Inc., 136 F .2d 470 (6th 
Cir.), cert. den. 320 U.S. 798 (1943); Western Oil Ref. Co. v. Jones, 
27 F.2d 205 (6th Cir. 1928); Blanchard & Co. v. Charles Gilman & 
;1 - Son, 145 U.S.P.Q. 62 (D, Mass 1965); Forzly v. American Distilling 
h'. Co., 142 F. Supp. 210 (E.D.N.Y. 1956); Younker v. Nationwide Mut. 
I:ns. Co,, 175 Ohio St. 1, 191 N.E.2d 145 (1963). But see Yarbrough, 
note 33 ~ at 929-30. Territorial rights beyond the area of actual 
use may,ol' course, be forfeited by laches. Jacobs v. Iodent Chem. 
Co., 41 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1930). 
37. See Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Square Deal Market Co,, 206 F .2d 482 
(D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. den., 346 U.S. 937 (1954); Applebaum v. Senior, 
154 Cal. App. 2d 371, 316 P.2d 410 (1957); Zimmerman v. B. & C. 
Motel Corp., 401 Pa. 278, 163 A.2d 884 (1960); cf., O'Hara v. Lance, 
77 Ariz. 84, 267 P.2d 725 (1954) (term in common use); Seegmiller 
v. Hunt, 391 P.2d 298 (Utah 1964) (term in common use). See also 
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Bavarian Brewing Co., 264 F .2d 88 (6th Cir. 
1959). 
ap. White Tower System, Inc. v. White Castle System Corp., 90 F.2d 67 
(6th Cir.), cert. den., 302 U.S. 720 (1937); accord, Fry v. Layne-
Western Co., 282 F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1960); Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. 
Lakeland Grocery Corp., 301 F .2d 156 (4th Cir.), cert. den., 371 U.S. 
817 (1962). But see Yellow Cab Co. v. 8achs, 191 Cal. 238, 216 Pac. 
33 (1923). Sachs was termed unique in ."Developments in the Law-
Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition," 68 Harv. L. Rev. 814, 858 & 
n.326 (1955). A fortiori, the junior user is invariably enjoined when 
his adoption of the mark was intended to forestall expansion by the 
senior user. Sweet Sixteen Co. v. Sweet 11 1611 Shop, Inc., 15 F .2d 920 
(8th Cir. 1926); accord. Triangle Pub. Inc. v. Central Pub. Co., 117 
F. Supp. 824 (W.D. Mo. 1954); Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc. v. 
Dunkin' Donuts, Inc., 8 App, Div. 2d 228, 188 N. Y.S.2d 132 (3d Dep1t 
1959). 
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enjoining the junior user permit some junior users to benefit gra-
tuitously from the reputation of established marks. It is the priv-
ileged existence of these junior users that underlines much of 
the dispute concerning the validity of strong trademark protection. 
1. The Cry of Monopoly 
The hue for strong trademark protection has long been coun-
tered with the cry of monopoly. This imprecise word, charged as 
it is with negative connotations, has generated far more heat than 
light on the validity of trademark protection.39 In 1742 after hear 
ing the first recorded attempt to obtain equitable relief for trade-
mark infringement, Lord Hardwicke correctly dismissed the bill 
on the ground that to grant protection would be to enforce an il-
legal monopoly. 40 This ratio decidendi was fully justified because 
the plaintiff's right to his mark derived from an exclusive charter 
for the manufacture of playing cards granted in defiance of Parlia-
ment by Charles the First.41 In 1936 Harvard economist Edward 
Chamberlin was equally warranted in pointing out that trademarks 
have monopolistic characteristics in terms of economic theory be-
cause the existence of marks impairs the product homogeneity 
characteristic of theoretical pure competition. 42 But the cry of 
monopoly is also raised by defendants in trademark infringement 
suits in an effort to cloud the issues and to create a specious aura 
of illegality. In this context the cry of monopoly is usually used 
as a counterpoise to a claim of exclusive rights in words or in 
an effort to trade on the condemnation of certain monopolies by 
the antitrust laws. · 
a. Trademarks as Word Monopolies 
Now and again a judge will fervently denounce an attempt 
to "monopolize" words through the assertion of trademark 
39. See Pattishall, "Trade-Marks and the Monopoly Phobia," 42 Trademark 
Rept. 588 (1952). 
40. Blanchard v. Hill, 2 Atk. 484, 26 Eng. Rep. 692 (Ch. 1742) (alternative 
holding). 
41. Darcy v. Allein, 11 Co. Rep 846, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1602), the 
celebrated "Case of Monopolies," had invalidated a similar royal dis-
pensation. See Fox, Monopolies and Patents 128 & n.21 (1947). 
42. In economic terms "monopoly'' means control over supply and there-
fore control over price. See Chamberlin, Theory of Monopolistic Com· 
petition 7 (1st ed. 1936). Theoretical pure competition postulates that 
no producer has control over price because all producers supply iden-
tical goods for an identical market. Ibid. Trademarks are according-
ly monopolistic because they differentiate producers' goods creating 
an opportunity for producers to acquire some control over the price 
of their goods. Id. at 56-70. 
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rights.43 This is seldom a flash of insight, however, for the quint-
essence of trademark protection is the creation of a degree of 
exclusivity in the use of words. 44 A more fundamental question 
is ''When and to what extent should trademark rights be recog-
nized?" 
The courts have traditionally answered this question by re-
stricting the ambit of exclusive rights to commercial uses which 
materially affect a senior user's interests and by denying com-
plete exclusivity within the area of significant impact if this is 
necessary to preserve competition. A noncommercial use by 
another of a word used as a mark, for example, reference to the 
term in a magazine article or news report, is not actionable, 45 
nor is a good faith commercial use by another which is unlikely 
to be confused by purchasers with a prior use. 46 Moreover, ex-
clusive rights are recognized solely in distinctive nondescriptive 
language used to distinguish goods.47 No rights are recognized 
in descriptive language unless purchasers associate the descrip-
tive language with a particular tradesman and even then the de-
gree of protection varies. Only limited rights can be acquired in 
common descriptive names like "chair" or "bread" because com-
petition would be unreasonably hampered if competitors could not 
use these familar terms in describing their wares. 48 Highly de-
scriptive language which is in fact commercially necessary for 
competitors to use is similarly treated. For example, if the 
senior user's mark is "Spanish Tile" for tile arches of Spanish 
design, a junior user may be permitted to use "Spanish Tile" to 
describe his goods accompanied by explanatory matter differenti-
ating the users. 49 In view of the number of words available for 
43. E.g., General Motors Corp. v. Cadillac Marine &. Boat Co., 226 F. 
Supp. 716 (W.D. Mich. 1964). 
44. Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955 (2d Cir.), 
cert. den., 320 U.S. 758 (1943), 
45. See Derenberg, "The Problem of Trademark Dilution and the Antldilu-
tion Statutes," 44 Calif. L. Rev. 439, 463-69 (1956), 
46. See Restatement (Second), Torts §§ 717, 731, 732 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 
1963). 
47. s. C. Johnson & Son v. Johnson, 175 F,2d 176, 180 (2d Cir,),~ 
~., 338 U.S. 860 (1949) (dictum). 
48. See Restatement (Second), Torts § 720, comment ,Q (Tent. Draft No. 
8, 1963); cf. In re Deister Concentrator Co., 48 C,C,P,A, (Patents) 
952, 289 F.2d 496 (1961). Product names may serve as components 
of II composite trademarks, 11 e,g ., 11 Bond Bread." See Restatement 
(Second), Torts supra, at § 724. The user of a composite mark only 
acquires rights in his distinctive use of the common descriptive name, 
e.g., the user of "Bond Bread'' might be able to prevent another from 
marketing "Band Bread" especially if both marks are in similar script, 
but he could not prevent the sale of "stroehmann's Bread," 
49. R, Guastavino Co. v. Comerma, 184 Fed. 549 (C,C,S,D,N,Y, 1911). 
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adoption as marks,50 and the truncated scope of protection, a cry 
of "word monopoly" is devoid of import as long as the common-
law limitations on trademark rights are properly applied. 
b. Trademarks as Antitrust Monopolies 
An intimation that trademarks are in any way akin to the 
monopolies condemned by the antitrust laws is even more unwar-
ranted. The basic antimonopoly provision of the antitrust laws is 
section 2 of the Sherman Act which declares: 
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to mo-
nopolize, or combine or conspire to monopolize any part 
of the trade or commerce among the several States, or 
with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a mis-
deameanor. . . . 51 
As is apparent from the fact of the statute, section 2 condemns 
not monopoly but monopolization, which has been defined as the 
possession by a single enterprise of the power to fix prices or 
exclude competition within a relevant market plus purposeful use 
or preservation of this power.52 A trademark "monopoly" is pa-
tently not a violation of the Sherman Act in and of itself. 
It is possible, however, that the use of trademarks could 
indirectly result in violation of section 2. The market within 
which monopoly power is measured is delineated both in terms 
of area and products53 so that trademarks are significant to the 
extent that they affect product market determination. If the mere 
existence of a trademark ever justified definition of the relevant 
product market in terms of a trademark user's brand of goods, 
the trademark user would ipso facto possess "monopoly power" 
in every relevant geographical market because of his "general 
right" to sell his goods to vendees of his choice at prices of his 
own determination,54 and it would follow that a trademark user 
who deliberately perpetuated this "monopoly power," for example, 
by refusing to license a competitor to use the mark on the com-
petitor's goods, would be engaging in illegal "monopolization."55 
Since this interpretation of section 2 would naturally tend to induce 
50. Courts some times refer to the "infinity" of terms available as marks. 
E.g., stork Restaurant v. Sahati, 166 F .2d 348, 361 (9th Cir. 1948). 
51. § 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 2 (1964). 
52. Att1y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 43 (1955). 
53. Indiana Farmer's Guide Pub. Co. v. Prairie Farmer Pub. Co., 293 
u.s. 268, 279 (1934). 
54. Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 625 (1953). 
55. Cf. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F .2d 416 (2d Cir. 
1945). 
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accession to a competitor's request for a trademark license, it 
is interesting to note that Justice Department representatives have 
pointed out with some justification that the sharing of marks by 
competitors is an open invitation to collateral antitrust violations:'>6 
In any event, the Supreme Court has rendered untenable an ass er -
tion that a trademark "monopoly" necessarily creates monopoly 
power by making it abundantly clear that the relevant product 
market must constitute a meaningful economic market. In Brown 
Shoe Co. v. United States, Chief Justice Warren summarized the 
pertinent considerations as follows: 
The outer boundaries of a product market are deter-
mined by the reasonable interchangeability of use or the 
cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and 
substitutes for it. However, within this broad market, well-
defined submarkets may exist which, in themselves, consti-
tute product markets for antitrust purposes. • • . The 
boundaries of such a submarket may be determined by ex-
amining such practical indicia as industry or public recog-
nition of the submarket as a separate economic entity, the 
product• s peculiar characteristics and uses, unique produc-
tion facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitiv-
ity to price changes, and specialized vendors.57 
In view of the inquiry into substitute products required by Brown 
Shoe, it is inconceivable that a single brand of a generic product 
could constitute a product submarket under section 2 unless the 
trademark user in fact monopolized the generic product market 
itself,58 Though a celebrated trademark may offer some shelter 
56. E.g., Timberg, "Trade-marks, Monopoly, and the Restraint of Compe-
tition," 14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 323, 356 (1949); see United States 
v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N,J. 1949), 
57. 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962). Although Brown Shoe involved § 7 of the 
Clayton Act, § 7, 38 stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 18 
(1964), which forbids stock or asset acquisitions if the effect may be 
to substantially lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly, 
the Court has indicated that the same general principles apply to prod-
uct market determination under § 2 of the Sherman Act. International 
Boxing Club v. United states, 358 U.S. 242, 249-52 & n. 8 (1959). The 
variances that do exist in product market determination under§§ 2 and 
7 are not material to the point made in the text. See, e.g., United 
States v. Continental Can Co., 378 u.s. 441, 447-58 (1964) (§ 7 rele-
vant product market includes products in different industries which 
have the same uses); United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 
351 U.S. 377, 393 (1956) (dictum) (§ 2 relevant product market does 
not include all products in different industries which have the same 
end uses), 
58. E.g., United States v. Klear Flax Linen Looms, 63 F. Supp. 32 (D. 
Minn. 1945). 
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from competitive pressures, it would be paying an unwarranted 
(and unwanted) compliment to Madison Avenue to conclude that 
consumer hypnosis foreclosed competition from other brands. 59 
Yet this is precisely what a lower federal court concluded in 
United States v. Guerlain, Inc. 60 Needless to say, the facts were 
unusual. 
The defendant, the exclusive American distributor for a 
French toilet goods manufacturer, had obtained American trade-
mark registrations for his supplier's marks61 and filed copies 
with the Secretary of the Treasury. This enabled the defendant 
to take advantage of section 526 of the Tariff Act 62 which directs 
customs officials to bar importation of foreign merchandise bear-
ing marks that infringe registered American trademarks. The 
Justice Department charged that the defendant's resort to section 
526 constituted both monopolization and an attempt to monopolize. 
Before reaching the Sherman Act question, the court held that 
section 526 did not immunize the defendant's actions because the 
statute was not available to an American business that was con-
tractually controlled by a foreign manufacturer. The court then 
determined that the relevant market was the trademarked toilet 
goods sold by the defendant in the United States. Since the de-
fendant's exclusive distributorship established the existence of 
monopoly power within this relevant market, use of the Tariff Act 
to prevent other persons from importing the trademarked goods 
was held to constitute monopolization. The Supreme Court noted 
probable jurisdiction in Guerlain,63 but before the Court heard 
argument the government obtained leave to vacate the judgments.64 
59. See Chamberlin, Theory of Monopolistic Competition 62 (8th ed. 1962). 
60. 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). Three consolidated cases with simi-
lar facts were involved. A fourth case was terminated by consent 
decree. United States v. Empro Corp., 1954 Trade Cas. ,r 67778 
(S.D.N.Y. 1954) (consent decree). The conclusion had previously been 
discredited. See United States v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 Fed. 499, 
506-07 (N.D. Ill. 1916) (dissenting opinion), appeal dismissed, 253 U.S. 
499 (1920) and Hale & Hale, Market Power: Size and Shape Under 
the Sherman Act 97-98 (1958). 
61. An exclusive distributor who has an assignment of his supplier's 
American trademark rights can obtain registration. E. Leitz, Inc., 
v. Commissioner of Patents, 152 F. Supp. 631 (D.D.C. 1957), a.ff' cl. 
254 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1958); accord, Roger & Gallet v. Janmarie, 
Inc., 44 c.c.P.A. (Patents) 965, 245 F .2d 505 (1957). 
62. § 526, 46 Stat. 741 (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1964). 
63. Guerlain, Inc. v. United States, 355 U.S. 937 (1958); Parfums Corday, 
Inc. v. United States, 355 U.S. 951 (1958). 
64. Guerlain, Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 915 (1958). The district 
court subsequently dismissed the suit with prejudice. United States 
v. Guerlain, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). 
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The Justice Department dropped the suits at the last minute be-
cause. of intragovernmental conflict, the Bureau of Customs being 
constr;i.ined by the Tariff Act to abet the controverted conduct. 65 
The crucial and •vulnerable aspect of Guerlain is its deter-
mination of the relevant product market. The defendant advisedly 
argued that all reasonably interchangeable toilet goods should have 
been included.66 Although agreeing that the defendant's evidence 
suggested the objective interchangeability of several brands of high-
ly advertised toilet goods, the district judge stated that the signif-
icance of objective interchangeability was negated by "lack of ob-
jectivity in consumer demand. 1167 He drew this inference from 
the defendant's evidence that highly exploited trademarks sold more 
perfume than quality content did, and from defendant's failure to 
introduce evidence of the responsiveness of sales of one brand to 
changes in the price of another. This was unjustified. Under the 
applicable precedents the government bore both the risk of non-
persuasion and the burden of going forward with evidence to coun-
ter objective interchangeability. 68 The district judge sought to 
· buttress his position by contending that the defendant's obvious 
intent to exclude competition made a limited market determination 
appropriate.69 This was equally untenable insofar as the defend-
ant was charged with single-firm monopolization. The ban on mo-
nopolization forbids misuse of actual economic power not improper 
intent alone. 70 It is not surprising that the Guerlain theory of 
65. See Stern, "Solicitor General's Office," 46 A.B.A.J. 154, 157 (1960). 
At the same time the government futilely sponsored legislation to make 
§ 526 of the Tariff Act inapplicable if a "branch-factory, parent-subsid-
iary, agency, licensee, partnership, or similar relationship" existed 
between an American trademark registrant and foreign business units. 
H.R. 9476, § 501 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). See Derenberg, "The 
Seventh Year," 44 Trademark Rep. 991, 996-1000 (1954). 
66. The "reasonably interchangeable" text was enunciated in the Cellophane 
case, United States v. E. L du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 
(1956) and reaffirmed in Brown Shoe. See text accompanying note 5 7 
supra. 
811. 155 F. Supp. 77, 85. 
68. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., note 66 supra, at 
381, 404; accord, United States v. International Boxing Club, 150 F. 
Supp. 397, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'cl. 358 U.S. 242 (1959); see Turner, 
"Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case," 70 Harv. L. Rev. 281, 303 
(1956); Note, 67 Yale L. J. 1110, 1116 n. 16 (1958); 56 Mich. L. Rev. 
309, 310 (1957). 
&g~ 155 F. Supp. 77, 85-86. 
70. See United States v. E. I. du Pont .de Nemours & Co., note 66 supra, 
at 394-95 & n. 23; Handler, "Trademarks-Assets or Liabilities?" 48 
Trademark Rep. 661, 669-70 (1958). On the other hand, the defendant 
was also charged with an attempt to monopolize. If the district judge 
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market determination has met the same fate as the decision it-
self. The only specific citation to the opinion is in a dissent to 
the Sixth Circuit decision in Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal 
Co. 71 with respect to a point not considered by the Supreme Court 
in its subsequent disposition of Tampa Electric. A few lines from 
the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. E. L du Pont de 
Nemours & Co. that have endured portray the true relationship of 
trademarks to section 2 of the Sherman Act wherever product 
market definition is material to establishing the offense charged: 
One can theorize that we have monopolistic competition72 
in every nonstandardized commodity with each manufacturer 
having power over the price and production of his own prod-
uct. However, this power that, let us say, automobile or 
soft-drink manufacturers have over their trade-marked prod-
ucts is not the power that makes an illegal monopoly. Il-
legal power must be appraised in terms of the competitive 
market for the product. 73 
One of the subtleties of innuendoes that trademarks are akin 
to monopolies condemned by the antitrust laws is the fact that 
market definition is not a prerequisite of all section 2 offenses 
so that in some instances it may superficially appear that a brand 
of goods constituted the relevant product market. In addition to 
monopolization, section 2 condemns combinations, conspiracies, 
and attempts to monopolize.74 Combinations to monopolize are 
(Footnote continued) 
was right in holding that section 526 of the Tariff Act did not im-
munize the defendant's conduct, the judge was correct in finding an 
attempt to monopolize, the difference being that market determination 
is superfluous at least when an attempt to monopolize results in actual 
exclusion of competition. See Smith, "Attempt to Monopolize," 27 
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 227, 237-38 (1958). See also note 87 infra and 
accompanying text. 
71. Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 276 F .2d 766, 780 (6th 
Cir. 1960) (dissenting opinion), rev'd on other grounds, 365 U.S. 320 
(1961). 
72. This is Professor Chamberlin's term for the economic effect of prod-
uct differentiation. Chamberlin, Theory of Monopolistic Competition 
6-9 (8th ed. 1962). 
73. United states v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., note 66 supra, at 
393. This language was cited with approval in Nelligan v. Ford Motor 
Co., 262 F2d 556 (4th Cir. 1959); Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster 
Motor Car Co., 243 F .2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. den., 355 U .s. 822 
(1957), Miller Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 149 F. Supp. 790 (M.D. 
N.C. 1957), aff'd on other grounds, 252 F .2d 441 (4th Cir. 1958). See 
also A-1 Business Mach. Co. v. Underwood Corp., 216 F. Supp 36 
(E.D. Pa. 1963). 
74. § 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964). 
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permanent amalgamations of businesses which result in the attain-
ment of monopoly power75 whereas conspiracies and attempts to 
monopolize refer respectively to group and individual conduct mo-
tivated by a specific intent to monopolize regardless whether mo-
nopoly power is actually achieved. 76 Since deliberately anticompet-
itive group action poses considerable danger to competition, con-
spiracies to monopolize are unlawful wherever an appreciable 
amount of commerce is involved. 77 In contrast, combinations to 
monopolize, which involve more equivocal conduct, require greater 
attention to the relevant market. The principal views are that the 
product mark.et should consist of any distinctive commodity with 
qualitatively distinct substitutes prima facie excluded 78 and that 
reasonably interchangeable substitutes should be prima facie in-
cluded as in the case of monopolization. 79 The dispute is largely 
academic because the government currently tests combinations 
under the more rigorous legal standards of section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act and section 1 of the Sherman Act, 80 but reconciliation is 
possible. The narrow view of product market determination is 
predicated upon horizontal combination cases. 8l On the other hand, 
in a vertical combination case 82 decided under section 1 of the 
Sherman Act 83 the Supreme Court concluded that all products that 
75. See Turner, note 68 supra, at 305. 
76. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946) (conspiracy 
to monopolize); United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 
531-32 (1948) (attempt to monopolize). 
77. United states v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 
1961); see United states v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., note 66 
supr11, at 395 n. 23; Reliable Volkswagen Sales & Service Co. v. World-
Wide Automobile Corp., 34 F .R.D. 134 (D.N.J. 1963). But see Packard 
Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., note 73 supra; United States 
v. Johns-Manville Corp., ATRR 157: A-13 (7/14/64). See Smith. "At-
tempt to Monopolize," 27 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 227, 240-41 (1958); Tur-
ner, note 68 supra, at 304-05. See contra, Handler & Robinson, "A 
Decade of Administration of the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act," 61 
Colum. L. Rev. 629, 645 (1961). 
78. See Turner, note 68 supr~ at 304-07. 
79. See Whipple, "Problems of Combination-Integration, Intra-Corporate 
Conspiracy and Joint Ventures," 1958 CCH Antitrust Symp. 34, 36. 
80. E.g., United states v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 
(1964) (§ 1); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 
(1963) (§ 7). 
81. See Turner, note 75 ~ at 286-89, 305-07. Horizontal combina-
tions involve competitors. 
82. Vertical combinations involve businesses on different levels of produc-
tion or distribution, i.e., a supplier and a customer. 
83. § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1 (1964). § 1 forbids 
contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in unreasonable restraint of 
trade. 
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could be conveniently manufactured by the same production facil-
ities were within the relevant market.84 Although Brown Shoe 
makes clear that product market determination is primarily a 
question of fact, 85 a distinction between the factual inquiries neces-
sary in vertical and horizontal combination cases has continued 
theoretical validity under section 2. 86 The extent to which at-
tempts to monopolize require consideration of the relevant prod-
uct market is presently unclear. 87 The Supreme Court recently 
denied certiorari of a holding that product market definition is 
irrelevant. 88 
Review of the relationship of trademarks to section 2 of the 
Sherman Act makes clear that trademarks are unrelated to the 
monopolies condemned by the Sherman Act. If product market 
definition is material to a section 2 offense, the market deline-
ated must be a meaningful economic market for a generic prod-
uct or products. On the other hand, if product market determi-
nation is not integral to a section 2 offense, the existence of 
trademarked goods is likewise immaterial. The cry of monopoly 
has little legitimate antitrust content. 
c. Trademarks as Sources of Economic Monopoly 
Abjuring misleading and discredited charges of antitrust mo-
nopoly and word monopoly, modern critics of liberal trademark 
84. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948). The com-
bination in Columbia Steel also had a horizontal posture which the 
Court found nonviolative of § 1. Although the Court has recently re-
stricted the Columbia Steel decision to its "special facts" with regard 
to horizontal combinations, United states v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust 
Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964), the aspect of the decision dealing with the 
product market in vertical combinations was cited with approval in 
Brown Shoe. Brown Shoe Co. v. United states, 370 U.S. 294, 325 n.42 
(1962). 
85. See Handler, "Fifteenth Annual Review of Antitrust Developments," 17 
Record of A.B.C.N. Y. 411, 435 (1962). 
86. Though the production flexibility test of Columbia Steel is subject to 
criticism, see Note, "Product Market Definition Under the Sherman 
and Clayton Acts," 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 861, 867-68 (1962), more lee-
way should be permitted vertical combinations because they are not 
as patently anticompetitive. Cf. Handler, "Recent Antitrust Develop-
ments," 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 159, 176-77 (1963). 
87. Compare Handler & Robinson, "A Decade of Administration of the 
Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act," 61 Colum. L. Rev. 629, 645 (1961); 
Turner, "Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case," 70 Harv. L. Rev. 
281, 304-05 (1956); Smith, "Attempt to Monopolize," 27 Geo. Wash. L. 
Rev. 227, 233-38, 243-44 (1958). 
88. Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. den., 377 
U.S. 993 (1964). But see United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., ATRR 
157: A-13 (7/14/64). 
\ 
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protection condemn trademarks for producing economic monopoly. 
In economic terms monopoly entails control over the supply of a 
product with consequent control over its price.89 Trademarks 
were accordingly classified as having monopolistic consequences 
by Harvatd economist Edward Chamberlin because the differenti-
, ation of a generic product into various brands gives each seller 
an economic monopoly over his own brand with control over price 
realizable to the extent that consumer preference can be estab-
lished for a brand. 90 Chamberlin pointed out that regardless 
whether sellers of competing brands succeeded in gaining signifi-
cant control over price, the apparent opportunity to do so led to 
vigorous sales promotion, increased costs, and higher industry 
prices.91 Although trademarks only constituted an example of 
product differentiation in Chamberlin's general analysis of the 
need for a new economic theory of value, he went on in an ap-
pendix to suggest that trademark protection might be ill-advised.92 
Chamberlin noted, for example, that repudiation of trademark pro-
tection would allow competitors to whittle away the product dif-
ferentiation caused by trademarks, pro tanto, restoring the prod-
uct homogeneity characteristic of pure competition, and that any 
diversion of trade accompanying the copying of established marks 
would merely siphon off monopoly profits attributable to product 
differentiation. 93 
Chamberlin's economic theory has gained far more accept-
ance than his suggestions concerning abolition of trademark pro-
tection. 94 This was not altogether unexpected for Chamberlin 
himself has indicated unwillingness to convert his suggestions into 
recommendations.95 One of the reasons for his reluctance is un-
doubtedly that the abandonment of trademark protection which he 
89. Chamberltn, Theory of Monopolistic Competition 7 (8th ed. 1962). 
90. Id. at 65-68. 
91. This aspect of Chamberlin's thesis is neatly summarized in Bain, 
Pricing, Distribution, and Employment 367-68 (rev. ed. 1953). 
92. Chamberlin, note 89 !!!I?!:!, at 270-74. 
93. These analytical arguments seem principally intended to provoke re-
examination of the premises of trademark protection. See Chamber-
lin "Product Heterogeneity and Public Policy," 40 Am. Econ. Rev. 
85-86 (1950); ~- Cohen, 11 Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional 
ApProach,11 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809, 814-17 (1935). 
94. Compare Borden, Advertising in our Economy 40-42 (1945); Brown, 
"Advertising and the Public Interest," 57 Yale L. J. 1165, 1171 n. 
29 (1948) with Comment, "The Anti-Competitive Aspects of Trade 
Name Protection and the Policy Against Consumer Deception," 29 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 371, 380 (1962). 
95. See Chamberlin, note 93 supra. For an inference that Chamberlin 
overstressed the disadvantages of product differentiation see Bain, 
note 91 supra, at 366-74. 
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proposed was linked to the concomitant adoption of large-scale 
government grade labeling. 96 Since the latter has not come to 
pass, Chamberlin's analysis indicates that he concedes trademark 
protection is justifiable at least where purchaser deception is 
probable and the junior user is selling an inferior product. 97 
2. The Cry of Restriction 
Chamberlin's economic analysis, in league with a skepticism 
toward trademark protection fueled by the T.N.E.C. hearings and 
hostility to the excesses of advertising, has produced demands for 
a restrictive attitude toward trademark protection.98 If there is 
any doubt whether a claim of trademark rights is in the public 
interest, restrictionists contend that protection should be denied. 
The cardinal tenet of the restrictionists is that trademark protec-
tion should be limited to preservation of the identification function 
of trademarks because the private interests of a senior user are 
considered worthy of protection only where they coincide with the 
social interest in avoiding deception of purchasers.99 In essence, 
the cry of restriction is an articulation of the metaphorical cry 
of monopoly. 
3. The Cry of Dilution 
The case for strong trademark protection is succinct. Frank 
I. Schechter, an ardent protectionist, put it this way: 
The owner of a trade-mark who expends large sums of 
money in making his mark known to the public as a symbol 
and guarantee of the excellence of his product should re-
ceive the same protection from the courts for his invest-
ment in advertising his trademark that he would undoubtedly 
be entitled to receive for investment in plant and materials.100 
There is little doubt that the pecuniary value of an established 
trademark and the expectancy of custom which the mark both 
96. Chamberlin, note 89 supr:1., at 273. See Auerbach, "Quality Standards, 
Informative Labeling, and Grade Labeling as Guides to Consumer 
Buying," 14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 363 (1949) for presentation of a 
possible government grade labeling program. 
97. Chamberlin, note 89 supra, at 273. 
98. See Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F .2d 34, 41-42 (2d Cir. 
1945) (Frank, J. concurring); Brown, note 94 supra, at 1205-06; Op-
penheim, "The Public Interest in the Protection of Industrial and In-
tellectual Property," 40 Trademark Rep. 613, 615-16 (1950). 
99. E.g., Brown, note 94 supra, at 1184-1206; cf. stern & Hoffman, "Pub-
lic Injury and the Public Interest," 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 935-41, 970-71 
(1962). 
100. Schechter, Historical Foundations of Trade-Mark Law 171 (1925). 
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symbolizes and stimulates have been powerful factors in molding 
judicial attitudes toward trademark rights.101 One commentator 
has neatly illustrated Mr. Schechter's point by analogizing trade-
mark protection to the legal principles governing trespass to land.102 
Not content with explaining the status quo, however, Schechter 
utilized his aphorism to justify the strongest possible trademark 
protection. Schechter argued that the only rational basis of trade-
mark protection was preservation of the uniqueness of marks.103 
Businessmen who invented terms for use as marks or who assidu-
ously promoted the distinctiveness of their marks should be able 
to prevent others from using those marks in broad territorial mar-
kets and on noncompeting as well as on competing goods. On the 
other hand, businessmen who elected to use words in common use 
as marks should receive a narrow ambit of protection consonant 
with the lack of distinctiveness of their symbols. Schechter's 
theory is known as the "dilution" theory of trademark protection 
because he contended that the user of a distinctive trademark 
should be able to enjoin all junior users in order to prevent "di-
lution" (diminution) of the mark's uniqueness. He believed that 
the senior user of a distinctive mark had a legitimate interest in 
ensuring that the term was solely associated by purchasers with 
his product.104 
Although the distinctiveness of a mark is one factor consid-
ered by the courts in determining whether a junior user is apt to 
be associated by purchasers with a senior user, in the absence of 
probable purchaser deception most judges have rejected dilution 
as a ground of relief at common law. 105 Proponents of the dilu-
tion theory have accordingly sought legislative approbation of the 
theory, and with some success. Five state currently have anti-
101. E.g., National Fruit Product Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 
499, 506 (D. Mass. 1942), aff'd, 140 F .2d 618 (1st Cir. 1944) (dictum). 
102. Willcox, "Territorial Extent of Trade-Mark Rights," 25 Ill. L. Rev. 
485, 489-92 (1931). 
103. Schechter, "The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection," 40 Harv. 
L. Rev. 813, 830-31 (1927). 
104. Id., at 825-26. 
105. Compare Champion Paper & Fibre Co. v. National Association of 
Mutual Insurance Agents, 148 F. supp. 123 (D.D,C.), aff'd. 249 F .2d 
525 (D.C. Cir. 1957), with Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Productions, Inc., 
147 Misc. 679, 264 N. Y. SUpp. 459 (SU.p. Ct. N. Y. County) aff'd per 
curiam, 237 App. Div. 801, 260 N.Y. SU.pp. 821 (1st Dep't 1932), aff'd 
.!!!fil!!•, 262 N.Y. 482, 188 N.E. 30 (1933). See Derenberg, "The Prob-
lem of Trademark Dilution and the Antidilution Statutes," 44 Calif. 
L. Rev. 439, 450-51 (1956); Middleton, "Some Reflections on Dilution," 
42 Trademark Rep. 175, 184-87 (1952). But see Day, "State Anti-
Dilution Without a Statute," 54 Trademark Rep. 590 (1964). 
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dilution statutes, 106 and hearings were held on a proposed federal 
act in June of 1964.107 Nevertheless, the courts have generally 
restrictively construed the anti-dilution statutes to the chagrin of 
exponents of liberal trademark protection.108 
C. Interplay Between the Cry of Dilution and the Cry of Restric-
tion With Respect to Concurrent Territorial Use on Competing 
Goods 
Since the restrictionist approach takes a "show me" attitude 
toward the asserted desirability of trademark protection, there is 
no necessary conflict between dilutionist and restrictionist posi-
tions with respect to territorial trademark rights. Indeed, it is 
the thesis of this monograph that the social interest in free com-
petition, which ordinarily overrides the social interest in avoiding 
deception of purchasers, 109 favors strong territorial trademark 
protection with respect to competing goods. 
The Hanover and Rectanus cases are readily understandable 
in their historical context. The cases were decided before radio, 
television, and national magazines made possible widespread ex-
ploitation of vast territorial markets and facilitated the develop-
ment of farflung marketing systems by mail order houses, chain 
stores, and franchisors.110 Moreover, the felicitous dicta of the 
Supreme Court made it easy for the lower courts to adjust to the 
revolution in marketing through rigorous application of the excep-
tions to the recognition of concurrent territorial rights; namely, 
where a junior user adopted his mark with intention of benefiting 
from the senior user's reputation, or where, regardless of the 
junior user's intent, the senior use was known in the junior user's 
marketing area or that area was within the senior user's probable 
106. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 35-lli(c)(1963); Ga. Code Ann. § 106-115 
(1956); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 140, § 22 (Smith-Hurd 1955); Mass. Gen. 
Laws Ann. ch. 110, § 7A (1954); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 368-d. 
107. Hearings on H.R. 4651 Before a Subcommittee of the House Commit-
tee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), 
108. See "Dilution: Trademark Infringement or Will-O' the Wisp?;" 54 
Trademark Rep. 184, 192-95 (1964). But see Polaroid Corp. v. Po-
laraid, Inc., 319 F2d 830 (7th Cir. 1963); Tiffany & Co. v. Boston 
Club, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 836 (D. Mass. 1964). 
109. See Handler, "Trade-Marks and Antitrust Law," 38 Trademark Rep. 
387-91 (1948). 
110. The Department of Commerce's 1958 census of business indicated 
that there were 182, 735 multiunit retail organizations in the United 
States. 1 Census of Business 4-2 (1958). See also Weiss, Merchan-
dising for Tomorrow 10-13 (1961) (discussing the trend toward giant 
retailing). With respect to franchising see Hall, "Franchising-New 
Scope for an Old Technique," 42 Harv. Bus. Rev. 60 (1964). 
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zone of expansion at the time that the junior user adopted his mark. 
Nevertheless, a junior user who can establish inadvertent adoption 
of a senior user's mark in a discrete trade territory to which the 
senior user's reputation had not spread can generally rely on the 
Hanover and Rectanus cases to block orderly expansion of terri-
torial markets by the senior user .111 Because the collision of 
interests frequently does not occur until a senior user has in-
vested substantial sums in his mark, he is forced to choose be-
tween (1) purchasing the junior user's rights, (2) proceeding at 
his own peril, {3) adopting a new mark,112 or (4) staying out of 
the junior user's territory.113 The first alternative may be im-
practicable if the junior user demands an exorbitant price;114 the 
second may be stymied by an infringement suit brought by the 
junior user; 115 the third may lead to later conflict with another 
good faith concurrent user; and the fourth results in a noncompet-
itive division of trade territories. The validity of recognition of 
concurrent territorial rights where marks are used on competing 
goods is further undercut by the premium it places on financial 
resources. Smaller firms which can ill afford to adopt a new 
mark or to buy out a concurrent user are more likely to be forced 
to curtail their market expansion than more affluent competitors.116 
In the long run this may not only exclude a potential competitor 
from a junior user's trade territory but impair a smaller firm •s 
ability to compete against the giants of its particular industry. 
The unsatisfactory state of territorial trademark rights at 
common law is easily illustrated. International cartel arrange-
ments allocating world markets sometimes require participants to 
adopt identical trademarks for like goods. After each participant 
111. E.g., Shoppers Fair, Inc. v. Sanders Co., 328 F.2d 496 (8th Cir. 
1964); accord, Katz Drug Co. v. Katz, 188 F .2d 696 (8th Cir. 1951). 
112. This might be done by adopting an entirely new mark or by adopting 
a second mark for use in the area of concurrent use. Both are ex-
pensive but the latter involves serious distribution problems as well. 
See "Developments in the Law-Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition," 
68 Harv. L. Rev. 814, 900 (1955). 
113. See Browne, "Three Major Trademark Problems in the United States," 
2 PTC J. Res. & Ed. 135 (1958). 
114. E.g., Symposium, "Trademarks in the Market Place," 53 Trademark 
Rep. 687, 696-97 (1963). During the legislative hearings on the Lan-
ham Bill it was suggested that courts should be given discretion to 
order sale of concurrent territorial rights at a reasonable price. 
1941 House Hearings at 187 (remarks of Louis Robertson). 
115. E.g., Conley v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 125 u.s.P.Q. 2 (N.D. Cal. 
1959). 
116. See also Hopkins, Trademarks, Tradenames, and Unfair Competition 
25 (4th ed. 1924). 
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acquires enforceable rights in the mark within his allotted terri-
tory, use by his co-conspirators of the same mark permits utili-
zation of remedies for trademark infringement to enforce the al-
location of markets both against fellow participants and third par-
ties.117 This collusive manipulation of territorial trademark 
rights is clearly illegal as an unreasonable restraint of trade 
under section 1 of the Sherman Act.118 Although the coincidental 
allocation of trade territories within the American market foster-
ed by the doctrine of concurrent territorial rights carries no sim-
ilar taint of antitrust illegality,119 the result is analogous to that 
of the cartel arrangements. Consider, for instance, the ironic 
interaction between trademark and antitrust law that followed the 
1911 dissolution of the Standard Oil combination.120 Prior to di-
vestment of its corporate empire Standard Oil of New Jersey had 
divided the country into districts and turned over the oil business 
in each district to a marketing subsidiary which acquired terri-
torial rights to the "Standard" name and mark.121 After these 
subsidiaries were separated from Standard Oil of New Jersey, the 
doctrine of concurrent territorial rights enabled each former sub-
sidiary to prevent the others from expanding their operations over 
the borders of the old districts under the "Standard" mark, 122 
The various "Standard" oil companies possessed sufficient resources 
117. See Timberg, "Trade-Marks, Monopoly, and the Restraint of Compe-
tition," 14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 323, 334-41 (1949). 
118. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); 
United States v. Holophane Co., 119 F. supp, 114 (S.D, Ohio 1954), 
aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956). See also United States v. 
Bayer Co,, 135 F. SUpp. 65 (S.D.N. Y. 1955). § 1 forbids contracts, 
combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade. § 1, 26 Stat. 
209 (1890), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1 (1964). 
119. A parallel agreement for concurrent territorial use would, however, 
be of doubtful validity under § 1. See "Developments in the Law-
Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition," 68 Harv. L. Rev. 814, 899-900 
(1955). 
120. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). See Sherman, 
"Trademark Problems as I See Them," 52 Trademark Rep. 1190-91 
(1962). 
121. The subsidiaries included Standard OU Co. of California, Standard 
Oil Co. of Indiana, Standard Oil Co. of Iowa, Standard Oil Co. of 
Kansas, Standard Oil Co. of Kentucky, Standard Oil Co. of Nebraska, 
Standard Oil Co, of Ohio, and Standard Oil Co. of New York. 
122. Esso, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, 98 F .2d 1 (8th Cir. 1938); 
accord, Standard on Co. of Indiana v. Standard Oil Co. of Ohio, 141 
F. SUpp. 876 (D. Wyo. 1956), affld. 252 F.2d 65 (loth Cir. 1958); see 
Note, "Use of Confusing Brand Names by Standard Oil Companies," 
48 Yale L.J. 332 (1938). See also Standard Oil Co. v. Standard Oil 
Co., 239 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Mo. 1965) (proceeding to modify 8th Cir. 
decree). In one instance the right to prevent market penetration has 
been held waived by contract. Humble Oil Ref. Co. v. Standard Oil 
Co., 229 F. Supp. 586 (S.D. Miss. 1964). 
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to develop new trademarks and trade names with which to pene-
trate one another's territories, 123 but companies with more modest 
means might not find this possible.124 
In view of the foregoing, it is difficult to accept the Justice 
Department's contention during the hearings on the Lanham Bill 
that "legitimate rights of the owners of trade names and trade-
marks are adequately protected by the principles of law prohibit-
ing unfair competitive practices." 125 Insofar as territorial trade-
mark rights are concerned, by ignoring the noncompetitive con-
sequences of the doctrine of concurrent territorial rights this 
statement exalts principles of trademark law over the social in-
terest in free competition in exactly the same manner as the Jus-
tice Department charged that the supporters of the Lanham Bill 
sought to do. It became evident during the hearings that the Jus-
tice Department fell into this inconsistency because of misconcep-
tion of the consequences of the Hanover and Rectanus cases. At 
one point, a Justice Department representative stated: 
There is no occasion for a controversy to arise except in 
those cases where territorial expansion may bring them 
[concurrent territorial users] altogether; and in those 
cases the courts work out, under decrees, arrangements 
whereby, if the Florida and Washington men did expand to 
Illinois, for example, there would be an arrangement where-
by there would be a designation of the source so as to in-
dicate the different ownership. [ matter in brackets sup-
plied,] 126 
The reference was to what was erroneously conceived to be the 
common practice in trademark cases of permitting several per-
sons to use the same term as a mark accompanied by qualifying 
clauses or explanatory matter differentiating the users. E.g., If 
"Toasted Corn Flakes" were the mark, a junior user might be 
permitted to sell "Quaker Toasted Corn Flakes" accompanied by 
a statement disclaiming association with the Kellogg Toasted Corn 
Flake Co., the original manufacturer of "Toasted Corn Flakes. 11 127 
Qualified decrees are utilized with some frequency to permit com-






See Sherman, note 120 ~ at 1191. 
Even the Standard on companies find the maintenance of multiple sets 
of trademarks and tradena.mes "inefficient" and are currently endeav-
oring to develop new marks and names in which they can obtain na-
tionwide rights. Ibid. 
Statement of the Department of Justice, 1944 Senate Hearing at 59. 
Id. at 40 (remarks of Elliott H. Moyer). 
Cf. Kellogg Toasted Corn Flake Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 235 Fed, 
657 (6th Cir. 1916). 
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acquired secondary meaning and to permit businessmen to use 
marks comprising their personal names,128 but the Justice Depart-
ment compounded its error concerning the prevalence of qualified 
decrees by assuming that they were specifically used to adjust 
conflicts between concurrent territorial users selling competing 
goods. The Standard Oil Co. cases are proof positive that this 
has not been so. In Esso, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co.,129 for in-
stance, the defendant had voluntarily used the words "Not Con-
nected with Standard Oil Company (Indiana}" in conjunction with 
its display of "Esso," but the Eighth Circuit nonetheless affirmed 
the grant of an absolute injunction in the following terms: 
It is urged that the so-called explanatory words, "Not 
connected with Standard Oil Company (Indiana)," were suf-
ficient to avoid the charge of unfair competition. First, it 
may be noted in passing that manifestly defendant recognized 
that without this explanation, confusion or deception might 
result. The court found that notwithstanding the explanatory 
words, actual deception and confusion did result. The marks 
are simply words, or letters of the alphabet, not derivative 
of the product .... They mean "Standard Oil," and "Stand-
ard Oil" in the named states means Standard Oil Company 
of Indiana.130 
Furthermore, the Standard Oil Co. cases do not stand alone. Be-
cause a trademark user's interests in avoiding loss of sales and 
tarnishment of reputation are so intimately involved, absolute in-
junctions against concurrent use on competing goods in the same 
territory have been the rule rather than the exception when a con-
flict has developed between concurrent territorial users. In J. A. 
Dougherty's Sons v. Kasko Distillers Products Co.,131 for example, 
128. See Handler & Pickett, "Trade-Marks and Trade Names," 30 Colum. 
L. Rev. 168, 184-89, 196-200 (1930). 
129. 98 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1938). A proceeding has been initiated to modify 
this decree. Standard Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 239 F. Supp. 97 
(E.D. Mo. 1965). 
130. 98 F.2d at 7, In Standard Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 252 F.2d 65 
(10th Cir. 1958) the Tenth Circuit similarly affirmed an absolute in-
junction against use of II Sohio" in marketing operations in Standard 
of Indiana's trade territory. 
131. 35 F. Supp. 561 (E.D. Pa. 1940); accord, Cohn-Goldwater Mfg. Co. v. 
Wilk Shirt Co., 147 F .2d 767 (2d Cir. 1945); Hemmeter Cigar Co. v. 
Congress Cigar Co., 118 F .2d 64 (6th Cir. 1941); Blanchard & Co. 
v. Charles Gilman & Son, 145 U.S.P.Q. 62 (D. Mass. 1965); Layne-
Western Co. v. Fry, 174 F. Supp. 621 (W.D. Mo. 1959), rev'd on 
other grounds, 282 F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1960); Oakford Co. v. Kroger 
Co., 157 F. Supp. 453 (S.D. Ill. 1957); cf. Farbenfabriken Bayer, 
A.G. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 307 F.2d 210 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. den., 
372 U.S. 929 (1963). 
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the senior user was absolutely enjoined from using "Country Gen-
tleman" on whisky in Pennsylvania and the junior user was abso-
lutely enjoined from using "Country Gentleman" on whisky in ter-
ritories served by the senior user or within his normal area of 
expansion. The Justice Department accordingly failed to contro-
vert, or even to acknowledge, the fact that the doctrine of concur-
rent territorial rights nurtures noncompetitive divisions of trade 
territory that are immune from challenge under the antitrust 
laws.132 
It could, of course, be contended that the courts and not the 
Justice Department are wrong and that qualified decrees should 
be employed more frequently to prevent the noncompetitive con-
sequences of concurrent territorial use by sellers of competing 
goods. The difficulty with this solution is that it palliates the 
consequences of concurrent territorial use without affecting its 
incidence. Furthermore, a qualified decree may neither prevent 
purchaser confusion nor satisfy either trademark user. In a num-
ber of cases qualified decrees have actually resulted in years of 
further litigation.133 Although the qualified decree is a legiti-
mate technique, it is by no means a panacea. 
One commentator has suggested that the doctrine of con-
current territorial rights indicates a judicial preference for en-
couragement of unfettered competition by junior users in lieu of 
encouragement of large-scale production and expansion by senior 
users.134 If this is true, the judicial logic is patently specious. ~ 
Where junior use originates in a territory unexploited by the sen-
ior user, there is obviously no competition between the senior 
user and the junior user at that time. Furthermore, once a mar-
ket overlap becomes possible, the doctrine of concurrent territor-
ial rights places an additional obstacle in the way of the develop-
ment of competition by arming the junior user with legal remedies 
for trademark infringement to ward off sorties by the senior user 
under his original mark. The net result is that the doctrine of 
concurrent territorial rights actually discourages both large-scale 
production and expansion and market competition. It is submitted, 
132. This was not necessarily because the disadvantages of the Hanover 
and Rectanus doctrine were overlooked. See Diggins, "Trade-Marks 
and Restraints of Trade," 32 Geo. L.J. 113, 120 & n. 25 (1944). 
Compare Hall, "Possible Monopoly Implications in the Trade-Mark 
Bill," 32 Geo. L.J. 171, 174 (1944). 
133. E.g., John B. Stetson Co. v. Steven L. Stetson Co., 14 F. Supp 74 
(S.D.N, Y. 1936), mod., 85 F .2d 586 (2d Cir. 1936), cert. den., 299 
U.S. 605 (1936), contempt proceedings, 128 F .2d 981 (2d Cir. 1942); 
133 F .2d 129 (2d Cir. 1943). 
134. Goble, "Where and What a Trade-Mark Protects," 22 Ill. L. Rev. 
379, 382-83 (1927). 
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however, that the deficiencies of the doctrine are not due to judi-
cial obtuseness but are inherent in judicial demarcation of terri-
torial trademark rights. If businessmen who wish to adopt valid 
trademarks have no means of ascertaining what marks are in use, 
the limitations of human ingenuity make it inevitable that multiple 
good faith adoptions of similar marks will occur. When courts 
are asked to resolve the subsequent conflicts, it is consonant with 
fundamental principles of equity that good faith junior users should 
not be penalized for the law's failure to provide them with a mean-
ingful opportunity to avoid concurrent use. The scope of territor-
ial trademark rights with respect to competing goods is fertile 
ground for legislative innovation. 
IL IMPACT OF THE LANHAM ACT ON 
TERRITORIAL TRADEMARK RIGHTS 
A. Background of the Lanham Act 
1. State Legislation 
State legislation has had virtually no influence on territorial 
trademark rights. The trademark registration statutes which exist 
in every statel are uniformly restricted to procedural and reme-
dial provisions2 with the exception of the Texas Trademark Act, 
which follows the common-law decisions extending rights through-
out a state by making registration constructive notice of a claim 
of trademark rights throughout Texas.a Indeed, a majority of state 
registration statutes expressly provide that registration does not 
prevent acquisition of common-law rights by other persons, 4 and 
courts considering statutes without this express provision have 
generally reached the same conclusion.5 The anti-dilution statutes 
in force in several states6 are equally innocuous. These statutes 
prohibit dilution of the distinctive quality of a trademark and like-
lihood of injury to the reputation of a trademark user so that in 
1. See 53 Trademark Rep. 1008-11 (1963). ~ 
2. See Sacks & Stokes, "Statutory Treatment of the Model State Trade-
mark Bill in the Areas of Service Marks and Conflicting Federal Reg-
istrations," 27 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 353, 354-55 (1959). 
3. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 851-C, §§ 5, 14 (1962); see generally 
Pravel, "New Texas Trademark Act," 44 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 486 (1962). 
4. E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 35-llk (1963); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 140, 
§ 21 (Smith-Hurd 1955). This is a key provision of the Model State 
Trademark Bill sponsored by the National Association of Secretaries 
of State, the Council of state Governments, and the United States 
Trademark Association. See generally Groen, "Recent Changes in 
state Trademark Statutes," 47 Trademark Rep. 679 (1957); March, 
"Judicial Interpretations of the Uniform state Trademark Law," 47 
Trademark Rep. 687 (1957). Registration statutes derived from the 
Model Bill are presently in force in twenty-seven states including 
Texas. See 53 Trademark Rep. 1008-11 (1963). 
5. E.g., Allen v. standard Crankshaft & Hydraulic Co., 210 F. Supp. 844 
(W.D.N.C. 1962), aff'd on other grounds, 323 F .2d 29 (4th Cir. 1963); 
Hot Shoppes, Inc. v. Hot Shoppe, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 777 (M.D.N.c. 1962); 
see generally, Broman, "State Trade-Mark Registration Statutes," 39 
Trademark Rep. 673 (1949). 
6. E.g., Conn. Gen. stat. Ann. § 35-lli(c) (1963); Ga. Code Ann. § 106-115 
(1956); m. Ann. stat. ch. 140, § 22 (Smith-Hurd 1955); Mass. Gen. Laws 
Ann. ch. 110, § 7A (1954); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 368-d. 
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order to qualify for protection a mark must possess distinctive-
ness or be known by reputation within the state. 7 Insofar as terr-
itorial trademark rights with respect to competing goods are con-
cerned, the anti-dilution statutes accordingly do little more than 
codify the common-law decisions extending territorial rights to 
areas where a trademark user's mark is advertised8 or known by 
reputation. 9 California and Montana have a unique statute provid-
ing that "any person who has first adopted and used a trade-mark, 
whether within or beyond the limits of this State, is its original 
owner." 10 The statute could be construed to give the initial user 
of a mark anywhere in the United States superior rights in Cali-
fornia and Montana, but it is not surprising that the reported cases 
in which out-of-state users have utilized the statute have all con-
cerned bad faith junior users.11 It is extremely unlikely that the 
statute would ever be applied to deprive good faith junior users of 
their marks because the statute provides no mechanism,12 and, 
indeed, no state has ever provided one, by which local business-
men can discover whether or not a mark is presently in use else-
where in the United states. Furthermore, the statute's declara-
tion that the initial user is merely the "original owner" of a mark 
leaves the courts free to hold that the original user of a mark in 
Portland, Maine, who commences use in Montana or California 
after good faith local use by another, has forfeited his "original 
ownership" by delay.13 The insubstantiality of the California and 
7. Sterling Brewing, Jnc. v. Cold Spring Brewing Corp., 100 F. Supp. 412 
(D. Mass. 1951). 
8. Pep Boys-Manny, Moe, & Jack v. Pilavin, 77 u.s.P,Q. 265 (D. Mass. 
1948); accorg, Tiffany & Co. v. Boston Club, Jnc., 231 F. Supp. 836 
(D. Mass. 1964). 
9, Food Fair Stores, Jnc. v. Food Fair, Jnc., 83 F. Supp. 445 (D. Mass. 
1948), aff'd, 177 F .2d 177 (1st Cir. 1949); accord. Great Scott Food 
Mkt., Inc., v. Sunderland Wonder, Jnc., 203 N.E.2d 376 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 
1965). 
10. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 14270; Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 85-104 (1947), 
Compare Gallo v. Safeway Brake Shops, Jnc., 140 So. 2d 912 (La. App. 
1962). 
11. See Stork Restaurant v. Sahati, 166 F .2d 348 (9th Cir. 1948); Derringer 
v. Plate, 29 Cal. 293 (1865); Evans v. Shockley, 58 Cal. App. 427, 209 
Pac. 42 (1922). The Montana statute has never been construed in a 
reported decision. 
12. The California statute permits registration of marks used in California, 
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 14230, whereas· the Montana statute permits 
registration of marks used anywhere in the co\Dltry, Mont. Rev. Codes 
Ann. § 85-102 (1947). Neither statute, however, requires registration 
in order to perfect senior rights acquired by out-of-state use against 
good faith local users. 
13. Compare Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 u.s. 403, 419-20 
(1916). 
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Montana statute is evinced by Utah's repeal of a similar provision14 
in favor of an innocuous trademark registration statute which 
~essly provides that registration does not affect rights "ac-
quired in good faith at any time at common law." l5 
The lackluster existence of the California and Montana sta-
tute indicates that the doctrine of concurrent territorial rights can 
not be obviated by a legislative coup de grace which ignores the 
problem that the Supreme Court sought to resolve. The judicial 
conscience will not brook forfeiture of the advertising expenditures 
and good will of good faith concurrent users because of lack of 
, temporal priority alone. If there is no way in which businessmen 
can find out what marks are already in use, judges are loathe to 
penalize them for making an incorrect guess. On the other hand, , 
a trademark registration statute which provides fair notice con-
cerning marks that are in use should substantially reduce these 
judicial inhibitions. If businessmen can find out what marks are 
in use, the noncompetitive consequences of the Hanover and Rec-
tanus cases supply justification for preferring the interests of the 
senior user when an overlap in territorial markets develops. State 
registration statutes, however, have never created a sufficiently 
meaningful file of reliable information concerning marks in use in 
the United States to justify penalizing businessmen who adopt marks 
conflicting with those in use elsewhere.16 Indeed, Texas is the 
only state to penalize businessmen who fail to check the registry 
concerning marks in intrastate use.17 State trademark registries 
would become more adequate if registration were mandatory but 
the Bar and powerful commercial interests have adamantly opposed 
-any steps in this direction because of the time, expense, and du-
plication involved.18 This upshot is that only a federal registration 
statute can alter the balance of interests that lies in the heart of 
the Hanover and Rectanus cases. 
14. Utah Code Ann. § 70-1-6 (1953), repealed, Utah Sess. Laws 1955, ch. 
159, § 21. 
15. Utah Code Ann. § 70-3-15 (1959). 
16. Several commentators have questioned whether state registration stat-
utes perform any useful function. 4 Callmann, Unfair Competition and 
Trade-Marks 2090 n. 59.1 (Supp. 1963); Pollack, "State Trade-Marks 
and Marks of Ownership," 14 Ohio St. L.J. 381 (1953). But see Deren-
.:· berg, "The Problem of Trademark Dilution and the Antidilution Stat-
utes," 44 Calif. L. Rev. 439-40 (1956). 
l'I~ Tex. Rev. Civ. stat. Ann. art. 851-C §§ 5, 14 (1962). 
18~ See, e.g., Broman, "state Trade-Mark Registration Statutes," 39 Trade-
man: Rep. 673 (1949); Liddy, "The Problem of state Trade-Mark Reg-
istrations," 39 Trademark Rep. 667 (1949); Perry, "state Trade-Mark 
Legislation," 37 Trademark- Rep. 283 (1947). 
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2. Pre-Lanham Act Federal Legislation 
The first federal trademark legislation was enacted in 1870.19 
Because the Constitution does not mention trademarks, the legis-
lation was based on article 1, section 8 of the Constitution which 
empowers Congress 
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by se-
curing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclu-
sive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;20 
Both this statute and a related law providing criminal penalties 
for the counterfeiting of registered marks21 were declared uncon-
stitutional in the celebrated Trade-Mark Cases of 1879. 22 The 
Supreme Court found no warrant for trademark legislation in the 
congressional power to protect authors and inventors because 
The ordinary trade-mark has no necessary relation to in-
vention or discovery. . • • It requires no fancy or imagi-
nation, no genius, no laborious thought. It is simply founded 
on priority of appropriation. We look in vain in the statute 
for any other qualification or condition.23 
The Court intimated, however, that federal trademark legislation 
could be based upon the commerce power24 if scrupulously limited 
to commerce subject to the control of Congress. Congress took 
this advice so literally that the Act of 1881 merely permitted reg-
istration with the Commissioner of Patents of common-law trade-
marks used in commerce with foreign nations or the Indian tribes.2 
The bizarre Act of 1881 was replaced in 1905 by a statute which 
extended registrability to common-law trademarks used in inter-
state commerce as well as to secondary-meaning marks used in 
any commerce subject to control of Congress for ten years prior 
to 1905.26 The Act of 1905 remained the major federal trademark 
19. Act 'of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 77-84, 16 Stat. 210-12. 
20. u.s. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
21. Act of Aug. 14, 1876, ch. 274, 19 Stat. 141. 
22. United States v. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82 (1879). 
23. Id. at 94. 
24. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
25. Act of March 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502. A supplementary statute 
made clear that the Act of 1881 applied to marks in use on the date 
of enactment. Act of Aug. 5, 1882, ch. 393, 22 Stat. 298. 
26. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724. The Act of 1905 repealed 
all inconsistent laws except insofar as they applied to existing regis-
trations under the Act of 1881. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592 § 30, 
33 stat. 731. Renewals of 1881 registrations were to be treated as 
registrations under the Act of 1905. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 
§ 12, 33 Stat 727. 
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legislation previous to the Lanham Act despite the enactment in 
1920 of a statute intended to enable users of secondary-meaning 
marks that were unregistrable under the Act of 190527 to obtain 
trademark rights in foreign countries in which protection was con-
ijngent on registration in the home country.28 Consonant with its 
limited objective the Act of 1920 permitted registration of virtu-
ally any mark which had been in "bona fide" use in commerce for 
one year.29 
The immediate consequence of the Trade-Mark Cases was 
the invalidation of the first federal trademark legislation, but the 
long-run effect, perpetuated by judicial dicta,30 was to raise doubts 
concerning the constitutionality of federal legislation which altered 
the common law of trademarks.31 The Act of 1905 reflected this 
doubt in its procedural composition: registration provided standing 
to sue in federal court,32 the ability to enforce an injunction in 
any United States court, 33 and prima facie evidence of trademark 
rights,34 but there was scant correlation between the right to use 
and the right to register a mark. The common law governed the 
acquisition of trademark rights, whereas registrability turned on 
the narrower wording of the statute. Furthermore, the attainment 
of registration was in no way determinative of the right to use. 
Aside from affording slightly greater opportunity for actual notice 
of a registrant's use,35 registration had no effect on the acquisi-
tion of concurrent territorial rights.36 One writer commented: 
27. Acquisition of secondary meaning within the ten years prior to 1905 
was the sine qua non of registrability. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 
§ 5, 33 Stat. 726. 
28. Act of March 19, 1920, ch. 104, 41 Stat. 533; see 4 Callmann, Unfair 
Competition and Trade-Marks 2057-58 (2d ed. 1950). 
29. Act of March 19, 1920, ch. 104, § l(b), 41 Stat. 533-34. 
30. E.g., American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372, 381 (1926) 
(dictum). 
31. See Derenberg, Trade-Mark Protection and Unfair Trad~ 10-11 (1936). 
32. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 17, 33 Stat. 728-29. This has been 
singled out as the chief value of a 1905 registration. See Martin, 
"Incentives to Register Given by the New Trade-Mark Act," 36 Trade-
mark Rep. 213, 214 (1946). 
33. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 20, 33 Stat. 729. 
34. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 16, 33 Stat. 728. 
35. Theodore Rectanus Co. v. United Drug Co., 226 Fed. 545, 553-54 (6th 
Cir. 1915) (dictum); affld on other grounds, 248 U.S. 90 (1918). 
36. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918) (Act of 
1881); Griesdieck Western Brewery Co. v. Peoples Bre~ Co., 149 
F.2d 1019 (8th Cir. 1945) (Act of 1905). The converse was not true. 
Concurrent territorial use of registered marks was one of several 
situations that deprived the federal register of meaning and conse-
quently discouraged registration. 
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11 [I] n doubtful cases the common law and not the Federal Act pre-
vails. Every registered right must, without exception, yield to a 
better common law right. 11 37 
A procedural federal trademark statute may have been fea-
sible when, as the Supreme Court noted in the Trade-Mark Cases, 
"a very large amount of commerce, perhaps the largest •••• " 
was intrastate; 38 but the helter-skelter development of interstate 
commerce after 1879 soon outmoded the procedural Act of 1905.39 
It was the devitalizing dogma that Congress was powerless to alter 
the common law of trademarks, rather than adequacy, which per-
petuated the statute. 40 Although a Senate committee favorably re-
ported a bill to revise the trademark laws in 1924,41 and similar 
bills were introduced in four succeeding Congresses with House 
passage attained three times,42 it was not until the latter 193O's 
that a climate of opinion conducive to actual enactment of new 
legislation began to crystalize. In 1936 Frank I. Schechter pub-
lished an influential appeal for substantive federal legislation. 43 
The next year a committee report of the A.B.A. Section of Patent, 
Trademark, and Copyright Law declared that substantive federal 
trademark legislation was both necessary and desirable. 44 When 
Congressman Lanham introduced the committee's recommendations 
as H.R. 904145 in 1938, the high road to legislative action was in 
sight. 
The road proved to be a long one.46 The Lanham Bill was 
not signed into law until July 5, 1946, with the effective date de-
ferred for a year in order to afford time to consider expedient 
37. Derenberg. note 31 supra, at 19. The Act of 1905 expressly provided: 
"That nothing in this Act shall prevent. lessen, impeach. or avoid any 
remedy at law or in equity which any party aggrieved by any wrongful 
use of any trade-mark might have had if the provisions of this Act has 
not been passed." Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 23, 33 Stat. 730. 
38. United States v. steffens. 100 U.S. 82. 96 (1879). 
39. See generally Schechter, "Fog and Fiction in Trade-Mark Protection," 
36 Colum. L. Rev. 60 (1936). Compare IV Public Papers and Ad-
dresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt 205-221 (Rosenman ed. 1938). 
40. See Derenberg, note 31 supra, at 13 n.23 & 20 n.80; Schechter, note 
39 supra. For post-Lanham Act acceptance of congressional disability 
to change the common-law of trademarks see Browne, "Territorial 
Scope and Effect of Federal Trademark Registrations," 44 Trademark 
Rep. 1357, 1359-60 (1954). 
41. See Robert. The New Trade-Mark Manual 233 (1947). 
42. See Carter, "Legislative History of the New Trade-Mark Act." 36 
Trademark Rep. 121-22 (1946). 
43. Schechter, note 39 supra; see, e.g •• Derenberg, note 31 supra. at 12-13, 
44. 1937 Comm. Rep •• A.B.A. Section PTC Law at 23-24. 
45. 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938). 
46. s. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. at 6-7 (1946). 
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amendments. 47 The Acts of 1881, 1905, and 1920 were repealed 
on the effective date of the Lanham Act.48 1881 and 1905 regis-
trations were continued in effect for their unexpired terms and 
upon expiration could be renewed under the Lanham Act. 49 In 
contrast, registrations under the Act of 1920 were to expire with-
in six months after the effective date of the Lanham Act or twenty 
years from the date of registration, whichever was later, and could 
only be renewed if renewal was required to support foreign regi-
stration. 50 
B. The Substantive Clauses of the Lanham Act 
The A.B.A. committee reported which preceded Congressman 
Lanham 's introduction of H.R. 9041 51 urged consideration of the 
following "substantive changes" in federal trademark legislation: 
1. Registration might be made constructive notice so 
as to prevent any one acquiring rights in the same mark, 
at least in interstate commerce, subsequent to such registra-
tion. 
2. The words "owner of a trade-mark'' might be de-
fined. 
3. The presumption of ownership might be made con-
clusive after the trade-mark has been on the register un-
assailed for a certain time. 
4. As a corollary, the right to petition for cancellation 
of a registered trade-mark might be limited •... 52 
47. Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 46(a), 60 Stat. 444; see 1944 Senate 
Hearings at 144 (remarks of Congressman Lanham). Though an amen-
datory bill was introduced within six months after the act became ef-
fective, S. 1919, 80th Cong., 1st Sess (1947), the noncontroversial fea-
tures of the proposed amendments were not enacted until 1962. 15 
u.s.c. ch. 22 (Supp. IV, 1963); see Hoge, "The Lanham Act's House-
keeping Amendments," 52 Trademark Rep. 1245 (1962). The establish-
ment in 1958 of a Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in the Patent 
Office has been the only other noteworthy revision of the statute. § 17, 
60 stat. 434 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1067 (1964); see Law, 
"The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board," 50 Trademark Rep. 1019 
(1960). 
48. Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 46(a), 60 Stat. 444-45. 
49. Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 46(b), 60 stat. 445. 1905 registrations 
and 1881 registrations renewed under the Act of 1905 have twentyyear 
terms as do Lanham Act registrations. See Vandenburgh, Trademark 
Law and Procedure 352 (1959). Renewal under the Lanham Act is for 
the same term. § 9, 60 Stat. 431 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1059 
(1964). Renewal is accomplished by filing a verified application with 
the Patent Office setting forth the goods in connection with which the 
mark is still in use in commerce or showing that nonuse is excusable. 
A specimen of the current style of the mark must be attached. Ibid. 
50. Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 46(b), 60 stat. 445. --
51. 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938). 
52. 1937 Comm. Rep. A.B.A. Section PTC Law at 28. There were other 
recommendations not germane to this monograph. Id. at 29. 
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Virtually the same proposals had been advanced as "procedural" 
amendments to the Act of 1905 several years earlier,53 but the 
substantive characterization was more accurate because the com-
mittee envisioned a statutory scheme in which the consequences of 
registration would annul certain common-law principles and in 
which registration would be immune from attack except as pro-
vided in the federal statute itself.54 
There were several reasons for these recommendations. In 
1934 organizations specializing in state trademark registration had 
attempted to capitalize on the insignificance of the Act of 1905 by 
launching a campaign for compulsory registration statutes in sev-
eral states. The proposed legislation generally required registra-
tion in the enacting state as a condition of trademark protection 
and provided that marks unregistered by the senior user within 
six months of enactment could be registered by any applicant,55 
The prospect that forty-eight disparate state laws might otherwise 
fragment trademark rights galvanized the Bar into action. New 
federal legislation containing substantive provisions was advanced 
in order to remove any need for state action and in order toles-
sen the significance of state law in general. 56 Another motivation 
behind the proposals derived from the function of a trademark 
registration statute. The registry maintained under the Act of 
1905 was never a meaningful source of information concerning 
marks in use because the benefits of registration were so slight 
as to compare unfavorably with the time and expense required to 
obtain it. 57 The A,B.A. committee believed that the integrity of 
the federal registry would be enhanced by substantive provisions 
which affected the right to use and provided incentives to register,58 
53. 1935 Comm. Rep., A.B.A, Section PTC Law at 9-13. 
54. See, e.g., Schechter, note 39 supra, at 72 & n. 32. The A.B.A. pro-
posals concerning assignment and licensing were also substantive in 
this sense. They are treated separately in this monograph because 
of convenience and because they were drastically modified as a result 
of the hearings on the Lanham Bill. 
55. See Rogers, "The Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trade-Marks," 
14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 173, 178 (1949). 
56. 1937 Comm, Rep., note 52 supr~ at 23, The congressional declara-
tion of intent appended to the Lanham Act states: "The intent of this 
chapter is to regulate commerce within the control of Congress. . • 
to protect registered marks used in such commerce from interference 
by State, or territorial legislation ••.• " § 45, 60 Stat. 444 (1946), as 
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1964). 
57. See Martin, 11 Incentives to Register Given by the New Trade-Mark 
Act," 36 Trademark Rep. 213-14 (1946). 
58. See ibid. The defects of the Act of 1905 so galled supporters of the 
registry concept that the major proposed revisions of the federal trade-
mark laws up to and including the initial version of the Lanham Bill 
required deposit in the Patent Office of all marks used in interstate 
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The Lanham Bill was recast countless times during the long 
debate which preceded enactment, yet the recommendations of the 
A.B.A. committee proved durable.59 The Lanham Act contains no 
definition of trademark "ownership" so that the right to register 
continues to depend basically on prior adoption and use of a mark 
in accordance with common-law principles, 60 and the evidentiary 
effect of registration can be regarded as substantive because it 
alters the burden of proof, 61 but otherwise the substantive claus-
es reflect the A.B.A. recommendations:62 registration is made 
(Footnote continued) 
commerce regardless whether registration was sought or even possi-
ble. E.g., H.R. 9041, tit. Ill, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938); see Deren-
berg, Trade-Mark Protection and Unfair Trading 731-32 (1936), The 
provision was eventually discarded as unduly burdensome. E.g., Brief 
of the United States Trademark Association, 1938 House Hearings at 
64. 
59. Edward s. Rogers, the co-chairman of the committee, helped guide 
the bill through Congress. See Rogers, note 55 suprl!., at 180; Shnider-
ma.n, "Trade-Mark Licensing-A Saga of Fantasy and Fact," 14 Law & 
Contemp. Prob. 248, 249, 250 (1949). 
60. See In re Deister Concentrator Co., 48 C.C.P,A. (Patents) 952, 289 
F .2d 496 (1961). An applicant for registration must swear that he is 
the "owner'' of the mark, § l(a)(l), 60 Stat. 427 (1946), as amended, 
15 U,S,C. § 105l(a)(1)(1964), and a deliberate falsehood renders regis-
tration subject to cancellation at any time. § 14(c), 60 Stat. 433 (1946), 
as amended, 15 U,S,C, § 1064(c) (1964); Bart Schwartz Int'l Textiles, 
Ltd. v. F.T.C., 48 c.c.P.A. (Pa.tents) 933, 289 F.2d 665 (1961). It 
remains an arguable proposition whether state or federal law controls 
the determina.tioo. of "ownership," compare s. C. Johnson & Son v. I 
Johnson, 175 F .2d 176, 178 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 338 U.S. 860 (1949) 
with Time, Inc. v. T ,I.M.E., Inc., 123 F. Supp. 446, 453 (S.D. Cal. 
1954) but there is discernible tendency to apply general federal stand-
ards sub silentio. See Aluminum Fabricating Co. v. Sea.son-All Win-
dow Corp., 160 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), a.ff'd, 259 F .2d 314 (2d 
Cir. 1958); Dudad Lure Co. v. Creme Lure Co., 143 u.s.P.Q. 358 (Tm. 
Bd. 1964). "Use in commerce'' is a separate prerequisite of federal 
registration, § 1 (a.)(l), 60 Stat. 427 (1946), 15 u.s.c. § 105l(a)(l) (1964); 
R. J. Moran Co. v. Gordon, 101 u.s.P.Q. 206 (Comm'r 1954). How-
ever, this embraces "all the commerce which may lawfully be regu-
lated by Congress," § 45, 60 Stat. 433 (1946), 15 u.s.c. § 1127 (1964), 
so that the requirement is easily met. A single instance of sale or 
transportation of trademarked goods a.cross state lines has been found 
sufficient. Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, 234 F .2d 
538 (2d Cir. 1956) (sale); New England Duplicating Co. v. Mendes, 190 
F.2d 415 (1st Cir. 1951) (transportation). 
61. § 7(b), 60 Stat. 430 (1946), 15 u.s.c. § 1057(b) (1964). Cf. Palmer v. 
Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943); Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 
208 (1939). 
62. This is not to say that the substantive provisions coincide with the 
details of the initial A.B.A. proposals. See generally Martin, note 57 
supra. 
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constructive notice of a claim of trademark rights;63 the grounds for 
cancellation of registration are restricted after a five-year period;64 
after a mark has been on the register for five years certain in-
contestable rights may be obtained. 65 
The substantive clauses of the Lanham Act apply solely to 
registrations on the Principal Register 66 established by the Act. 
Registrations on the Supplemental Register, which continues the l 
limited function of the Act of 1920, 67 are excluded from coverage.681 
The benefits of registration on the Principal Register, with the 
exception of the opportunity to acquire an incontestable right to 
use and a limited immunity from cancellation,69 also apply to 1881 
and 1905 registrations. 70 In order to avail themselves of the ex-
pected provisions 1881 and 1905 registrants must republish their 
registrations under the Lanham Act, i.e., file an affidavit with the 
Commissioner of Patents, notice of which is published in the Of-
ficial Gazette of the Patent Office, setting forth the goods on which 
the mark is presently in use in commerce and stating that the 
registrant claims the benefits of the Lanham Act for his mark. 71 
If 1881 and 1905 registrants so choose, their registrations can 
be renewed under the Lanham Act without republication. 72 
The 1881 and 1905 registrations to which the substantive 
clauses apply are primarily common-law trademarks, 73 but section 
63. § 22, 60 Stat. 435 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1964). 
64. § 14, 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1964). 
65. § 15, 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1964). 
66. §§ 1-22, 60 Stat. 427-35 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. §§ 1051-72 (1964). 
67. See Robert, The New Trade-Mark Manual 63-65 (1947). 
68. § 26, 60 Stat. 436 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1094 (1964). The supplemental 
register was established by §§ 23-28, 60 Stat. 435-36 (1946), as amend-
ed, 15 u.s.c. §§ 1091-1096 (1964). 
69. Act of Juiy 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 46(b), 60 Stat. 445; § 14(c), 60 Stat. 433 
(1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(d) (1964); § 15, 60 Stat. 434 (1946), 
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1964). 
70. Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 46(b), 60 Stat. 445. 
71. § 12(c), 60 Stat. 432 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1062(c) (1964). 
72. Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 46(b), 60 Stat. 445. 1881 and 1905 
registrations that are merely renewed remain unqualified for an in-
contestable right to use and limitation of the grounds of cancellation 
until republished. § 14(c), 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. 
§ 1064(d) (1964); § 15, 60 Stat. 434 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 
1065 (1964). 
73. The Act of 1881 did not provide for registration of any secondary-
meaning marks. The Act of 1905 merely permitted registration of 
secondary-meaning marks used exclusively in commerce for ten years 
prior to February 20, 1905. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 5, 33 
Stat. 726. Although the "ten year proviso" was slightly liberalized in 
1920, Act of March 19, 1920, ch. 104, § 9, 41 Stat. 535, it was legiti-
mately, if somewhat ingenuously, said of the clause: "Everybody knows 
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2 of the Lanham Act permits registration of most secondary-mean-
ing marks on the Principal Register.74 Although section 2(e) for-
bids registration of marks that are "merely descriptive or decep-
tively misdescriptive," "primarily geographically descriptive or 
deceptively misdescriptive," or "primarily merely a surname," the 
ambit of these prohibitions is narrower than their counterparts in 
the Act of 1905. 75 For example, if geographical terms are used 
arbitrarily, e.g., "The Atlantic" for a magazine, 76 or if a term 
has ordinary meanings apart from use as a personal name and is 
used on goods unrelated to those ordinary meanings, e.g., "Douglas," 
which is a personal name but also refers to a Scottish clan, a fir 
tree, and a squirrel, for poultry feed,77 or if a word is suggestive 
rather than merely descriptive, e.g., "Audio Fidelity" for phono-
graph records, 78 registration may be available without proof of 
secondary meaning. 79 Moreover, section 2(f) authorizes registra-
tion of virtually every mark that would otherwise fall within the 
prohibitions of section 2(e) if secondary meaning can be establish-
ed.SO The Commissioner of Patents can accept as prima facie 
evidence of secondary meaning: 
(Footnote continued) 
that secondary meaning can be acquired otherwise than by exclusive 
use from 1895 to 1905." 1935 Comm. Rep. A.B.A. Section PTC Law 
at 11. 
74. § 2(e) & (f), 60 Stat. 429 (1946), 15 u.s.c. § 1052(e) & (f) (1964). 
75. See "Developments in the Law-Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition," 
68 Harv. L. Rev. 814, 825-26 (1955). 
76. Cf., Atlantic Monthly Co. v. Frederick Ungar Pub. Co., 197 F. Supp. 
524 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). But see Ex parte The London Gramaphone Corp., 
98 U.S.P.Q. 362 (Comm'r 1953). 
77. Ex parte Omaha Cold Storage Co., 111 u.s.P.Q. 189 (Comm'r 1956). 
78. Audio Fidelity, Inc. v. London Records, Inc., 51 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 
1429, 332 F .2d 577 (1964). 
79. See generally Leeds, "Trademarks-the Rationale of Registrability," 
26 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 653, 662-64 (1958). 
80. The major exceptions are marks that run afoul of public policy. E.g., 
In re Deister Concentrator Co., 48 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 952, 289 F .2d 
496 (1961) (no trademark rights will be recognized in product configu-
rations in the public domain). Section 2 expressly prohibits registra-
tion, regardless of secondary meaning, if a mark " (a) Consists of or 
comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter, or matter which 
may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or 
dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into con-
tempt, or disrepute. (b) Consists of or comprises the flag or coat of 
arms or other insignia of the United States, or of any State or munici-
pality, or of any foreign nation, or any simulation thereof. (c) Con-
sists of or comprises a name, portrait, or signature identifying a par-
ticular living individual except by his written consent, or the name, 
signature, or portrait of a deceased President of the United States 
during the life of his widow, if any, except by the written consent of 
the widow." § 2(a), (b), & (c), 60 Stat. 428 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), 
(b), & (c) (1964). 
42 TERRITORIAL TRADEMARK RIGHTS 
proof of substantially exclusive and continuous use thereof 
as a mark by the applicant in commerce for the five years 
next preceding the date of filing of the application for its 
registration. 81 
An averment in the application may be accepted as proof of sub-
stantially exclusive and continuous use for the five year perioct. 82 
Use for five years is not even necessary if secondary meaning 
can be demonstrated without resort to the section 2(f) presump-
tion. 83 Relevant evidence includes the duration, extent, and nature 
of use, advertising expenditures, and affidavits, letters, or state-
ments from the trade or the public or from both.84 
C. Analysis of the Substantive Clauses 
1. Evidentiary Advantages 
The Act of 1905 stated that a certificate of registration was 
prima facie evidence of trademark ownership85 and the courts 
treated registration as prima facie evidence of the validity of a 
claim of trademark rights. 86 It was never authoritatively deter-
mined, however, whether registration shifted the burden of proof 
as well as the burden of going forward with the evidence.87 Sec-
tion 7 (b) of the Lanham Act makes an unexpired registration 88 
prima facie evidence of the validity of registration, ownership of 
a mark, and the exclusive right to use a mark on the goods speci-










§ 2(f), 60 Stat. 429 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1964). 
See Vandenburgh, Trademark Law and Procedure 92 (1959). The Com- I 
missioner may, of course, require additional evidence, 37 C.F .R. j 
§ 2.41(b) (1960), see generally Beran, "Trademark or Mere Unregis-
trable Matter-Where Do You Draw the Line," 52 Trademark Rep. 9531 
(1962); Hmcock, "Evidence under Section 2(f) of the Trade-Mark Act 
of 1946," 42 Trademark Rep. 877 (1952), but the applicant does not 
have to establish exclusive use. See McCormick & Co. v. Summers, 
141 u.s.P.Q. 258 (Tm. Bd. 1964). 
Ex parte Fox River Paper Corp., 99 U.S.P.Q. 173-74 (Comm'r 1953) 
(dictum). 
37 c.F .R. § 2.41(a)(l960); see In re Hollywood Brands, Inc., 41 c.c.P.A. 
(Patents) 1001, 214 F .2d 139 (1954). 
Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 16, 33 Stat. 728. 
E.g., Barbasol Co. v. Jacobs, 160 F.2d 336 (7th Cir. 1947). 
National Nu Grape Co. v. Guest, 164 F .2d 874 (10th Cir. 1947), cert. 
den., 333 U.S. 874 (1948); accord, House of Westmore, Inc. v. Denney, 
151 F .2d 261 (3d Cir. 1945); Gort Girls Frocks, Inc. v. Princess Pat 
Lingerie, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 364, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (dictum). 
An expired registration has no effect. Imperial Sugar Co. v. Imperial 
Prods., 139 U .S.P .Q. 344 (Tm. Bd. 1963). 
§ 7(b), 60 Stat. 430 (1946), 15 u.s.c. § 1057(b) (1964). Note that regis-
tration is not made evidence of the validity of the claim of trademark 
rights. See Leeds, "The Circular Trend in Trademarks," 47 A.B.A.J. 
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creates a presumption that a mark is dissimilar to other marks 
registered for similar goods,90 that a mark has secondary meaning 
if registered under section 2 (f), 91 and that the registrant has ac-
quired rights in the mark,92 and consequently has the exclusive 
right to use the mark in connection with the goods specified 93 in 
the certificate.94 Though not conclusive,95 the presumption shifts 
both the burden of going forward with the evidence and the burden 
of proof. 96 
(Footnote continued) 
256, 257 (1961). The courts, however, still tend to read in this pre-
sumption. E.g., Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Dura Elec. Lamp Co., 
247 F .2d 730 (3d Cir. 1957). 
90. But see In re Knapp-Monarch Co., 49 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 779, 296 
F.2d 230 (1961). 
91. If the mark was not registered under § 2(f), this presumption naturally 
does not exist. Jean Patou, Inc. v. Jacqueline Cochran, Inc., 201 F. 
Supp. 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd on other grounds, 312 F .2d 125 (2d 
Cir. 1963). 
92. This amounts to prima facie evidence of use as of the filing date of 
the application for registration. Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. American 
Screen Prods. Co., 49 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1230, 305 F.2d 479 (1962); 
accord, American Throwing Co. v. Famous Bathrobe Co., 45 C.C.P.A. 
(Patents) 737, 250 F .2d 377 (1957). Registration may also be treated 
as prima facie evidence of continuing use of a mark. Drexel Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Richardson 312 F.2d 525 (10th Cir. 1962); accord, 
Friedman v. Sealy, Inc., 274 F.2d 255 (10th Cir. 1959); Gillette Co. v. 
Kempel, 45 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 920, 254 F.2d 402 (1958); Sapphire 
Corp. v. Robert Hosiery Mills, Inc., 136 U.S.P.Q. 308 (Tm. Bd. 1962). 
But see In re Continental Distilling Corp., 45 C.C.P .A. (Patents) 863, 
254 F .2d 139 (1958); Leeds, note 89 supr:i., at 256. 
93. The presumption may be extended to the same class of goods as those 
named, In re Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 49 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1367, 
305 F.2d 492 (1962); but see American Liberty Ins. Co. v. American 
Liberty Life Ins. Co., 136 U .S.P .Q. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962), but not to 
merely related goods. Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal, Inc., 171 F. 
Supp. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd, 279 F.2d 607 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 
364 U .s. 909 (1960). --
94. Iowa Farmers Union v. Farmers' Educ. & Co-op Union, 247 F .2d 809, 
817 (8th Cir. 1957); accord, Curtis-Stephens-Embry Co. v. Pro-Tek-
Toe Skate Stop Co., 199 F .2d 407, 413 (8th Cir. 1952). 
95. See, e.g., Camloc Fastener Corp. v. OPW Corp., 164 F. Supp. 15 
(S.D.N.Y. 1958), aff'd per curiam, 271 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1959). 
96. Aluminum Fabricating Co. v. Season-AU Window Corp., 259 F .2d 314 
(2d Cir. 1958); accord, Dymo Indus., Inc. v. Tapeprinter, Inc., 326 
F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1964); Tigrett Indus. Inc. v. Top Value Enterprises, 
Inc., 217 F. Supp. 313 (W.D. Tenn. 1963); R.C.W., Supervisor, Inc. v. 
Cuban Tobacco Co., 220 F. Supp. 453 (S.D.N. Y. 1963); Simmonds Aero-
cessories, Ltd. v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp., 154 F. Supp. 615 (D.N.J. 
1957), rev'd on other grounds, 257 F.2d 485 (3d Cir. 1958). The pre-
sumption has been said to be easily overcome when a mark is com-
posed of descriptive words. Shaw-Barton, Inc. v. John Baumgarth 
Co., 313 F.2d 167 (7th Cir.), cert. den., 374 U.S. 831 (1963); see Dell 
44 TERRITORIAL TRADEMARK RIGHTS 
Notwithstanding the evidentiary advantages afforded by sec-
tion 7(b) a registrant will not be able to enjoin a concurrent user 
unless likelihood of confusion exists, 97 and a difference in trade 
territories has been held to negate the possibility of confusion. 98 
Thus, section 7(b) is of little consequence as a curb on concurrent 
territorial use until a registrant expands his markets so as to 
come into contact with a junior user. 
2. Constructive Notice 
Section 22 makes registration constructive notice of a regis-
trant's claim of trademark rights. Constructive notice commencei 
on the date of registration on the Principal Register or, with re-
gard to 1881 and 1905 registrations, the effective date of the Lan-
ham Act, July 5, 1947 .99 Previous federal registration statutes 
has no analogous provisions,100 although publication of applications 
for registration in the Official Gazette of the Patent Office did af-
ford occasion for actual notice of asserted trademark rights.101 
The following excerpt from the 1939 Congressional hearings on the 
Lanham Bill evinces the purpose of section 22: 
Mr. Frazer. As a matter of information, is not section 22 
suplusage, except as to the supplemental register, in view 
of section 7(b) on page 5? That section provides: 
The certificates of registration of a trademark 
upon the principal register provided by this Act 
shall be presumptive evidence of the validity of 
the trade-mark and of the registrant's exclusive 
right thereto. 
Mr. Rogers. May I suggest in that connection, that the Su-
preme Court in the case of Rectans v. United Drug Co. [ sic.] 
-quite unnecessarily, but they said that registration in the 
Patent Office is not notice; that the actual notice had to be 
shown. 
(Footnote continued) 
Pub. Co, v. Stanley Publications, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 126, 172 N,E,2d 656, 
211 N.Y.S,2d 393 (1961) criticized in Derenberg, "The Fourteenth 
Year," 51 Trademark Rep, 777, 838-40 (1961). 
97. § 32(1), 60 stat. 437 (1946), as amended, 15 U .s.c. § 1114(1) (1964). 
98. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 
1959); see Curtis-Stephens-Embry Co. v. Pro-Tek-Toe Skate Stop Co., 
199 F .2d 407 (8th Cir. 1952). 
99. § 22, 60 Stat. 435 (1946), 15 U.S,C. § 1072 (1964). 
100. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., note 36 supra; Griesedieck 
Western Brewery Co. v. Peoples Brewing Co., 149 F.2d 1019 (8th Cir, 
1945) (Act of 1905). 
101. Theodore Rectanus Co. v. United Drug Co., note 35 supra; see 2 Nim, 
Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks 731 (4th ed. 1947). 
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Now the purpose of all registration and recording acts 
is notice and, frankly, this paragraph was put in to make it 
notice, as it ought to be. 
Mr. Lanham. In the light of that decision? 
Mr. Rogers. In the light of that decision. 
Mr. Thomson. That would mean there could not be any 
honest concurrent user; after the registration has issued to 
one party, no other party could claim any honest concurrent 
user, or use beginning after that date, if it is notice to him. 
Mr. Rogers. I think that we all agree that is as it should be.102 
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It is not surprising that section 22 has been referred to as 
the most important section in the Lanham Act.103 Those making 
statements during the legislative hearings and numerous commen-
tators104 have taken the position that the notice of registered markE 
imputed by section 22 precludes junior users from acquiring ter-
ritorial rights vis-vis a registrant if the junior users initiate use 
after constructive notice commences.105 If section 22 is considere, 
discretely, this would not seem an ineluctable result for a junior 
user's knowledge of prior rights was not necessarily sufficient 
"bad faith" to bar acquisition of concurrent territorial rights under 
the Hanover and Rectanus doctrine. An improper motive was also 
requisite unless the senior user's mark was known in the junior 
user's territory or that territory was within the senior user's zone 
of imminent expansion.106 In Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 
for instance, the Supreme Court declared: 
102. 1939 House Hearings at 125. For similar comments during other 
hearings see Halliday, "Constructive Notice and Concurrent Registra-
tion,'' 38 Trademark Rep. 111, 117-20 (1948). 
103. 1 Seidel, Dubroff, & Gonda, Trademark Law and Practice 694 (1963). 
104. E.g., 4 Callmann, Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks 2071-72 (2d 
ed. 1950); Robert, The New Trade-Mark Manual 129-30 (1947); Browne 
"Territorial Scope and Effect of Federal Trademark Registrations," 
44 Trademark Rep. 1357, 1360-61 (1954); Diggins, "The Lanham 
Trademark Act," 37 Trademark Rep. 305, 316-17 (1947). But see 
Bonynge, "The Effect of Registration in Trademark Litigation," 50 
Trademark Rep. 902, 912-13 (1960). 
105. One case held that the Act of 1905 gave similar nationwide rights to 
a registered mark, Standard Brewery Co. v. Interboro Brewing Co., 
229 Fed. 543 (2d Cir. 1916), petition for cert. dismisseci, 246 U .s. 
677 (1918), but it was not followed. E.g., United States Printing & 
Lithograph Co. v. Griggs, Cooper & Co., 279 U.S. 156 (1929) (Holmes, 
J.); accord, Griesedieck Western Brewery Co. v. Peoples Brewing 
Co., note 100 supra. 
106. See text in Chapter I accompanying notes 26-34. 
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[ W] here two parties independently are employing the same 
mark upon goods of the same class, but in separate markets 
wholly remote the one from the other, the question of prior 
appropriation is legally insignificant, unless at least it appear 
that the second adopter has selected the mark with some de-
sign inimical to the interests of the first user, such as to 
take the benefit of the reputation of his goods, to forestall 
the extension of his trade, or the like.107 
Nevertheless, the legislative history of section 22 plus those sec-
tions of the Lanham Act which declare that registration is evid-
ence of the "exclusive right to use" a registered mark 108 indicate 
that Congress intended that the imputation of constructive notice 
of prior rights would be sufficient to bar subsequent acquisition 
of concurrent territorial rights by junior users on competing 
goods.109 
This generalized statement of section 22's effect is mis-
leading. Because the Lanham Act is based on the commerce 
power, the constructive notice provision can only preclude acqui-
sition of concurrent territorial rights if a junior use affects com-
merce. 11° Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that only a 
person who in good faith believes that he was the first user of a 
mark is entitled to obtain unrestricted registration and the full 
benefit of the constructive notice provision.111 If a nonregistrant 
107. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 415 (1916). 
108. § 7(b), 60 Stat. 430 (1946), 15 u.s.c. § 1057(b) (1964); § 33(a) & (b), 
60 Stat. 438 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (a) & (b) (1964). 
109. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., note 98 supra, at 362-
63; see American Foods, Inc. v. Golden Flake, Inc., 312 F.2d 619 
(5th Cir. 1963). 
110. Compare Nielsen v. American Oil Co., 203 F. Supp. 473 (D. Utah 
1962) with Peter Pan Restaurants, Inc. v. Peter Pan Diner, Inc., 
150 F. Supp. 534 (D.R.I. 1957). The argument has been made that 
any intrastate use that commences after federal registration by a 
senior user is necessarily inimical to the rights of the registrant 
and consequently subject to regulation under the commerce clause. 
See Browne, "Territorial Scope and Effect of Federal Trademark 
Registrations," 44 Trademark Rep. 1357, 1360-63 (1954). See contra, 
March, "Territorial Scope of the Trade-Mark Act of 1946," 38 __ _ 
Trademark Rep. 955, 966-68 (1948). Browne's view was endorsed 
in Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., note 98 supra; see 
Derenberg, "The Twelfth Year," 49 Trademark Rep. 1019, 1071-72 
(1959). If,the constructive notice provision is found to be inapplica-
ble because a junior use does not affect commerce, a registrant may 
still qualify for territorial protection under the common-law rules, 
e.g., if the junior user was in bad faith. See March, supra, at 967-68. 
111. § l(a) (1), 6? ~tat. 427 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1051(a) (1) 
(1964). A JUmor user with a distinct marketing area who adopted 
his mark in good faith may be able to obtain concurrent registration 
despite later knowledge of senior use. Ibid. See text at note 285 
infra for discussion of concurrent registration. 
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was actually the senior user with respect to the goods concerned, 
a registration on the Principal Register, or an 1881 or 1905 regis-
tration, is initially subject to cancellation by the senior user in 
Patent Officel.12 or judicial proceedings.113 If five years have 
elapsed since registration on the Principal Register or republica-
tion, however, a prior user can bring a Patent Office cancellation 
proceeding only if a registrant knew that he was a junior user 
when he filed an application alleging exclusive rights.114 Marks 
protected from Patent Office cancellation remain cancellable in 
judicial proceedings until an incontestable right to use is obtained. 
Thereafter, as in the Patent Office, a registrant must generally 
be shown to have made a false claim of exclusive rights for judi-
cial cancellation to be granted.115 
Even assuming that a registrant is a senior user or that 
registration can no longer be challenged on the ground of lack of 
senior use, a registrant may not be able to enjoin a junior user 
who started use after section 22 became applicable. Subsection 
32(1) (a) of the Lanham Act provides that trademark infringement 
does not exist unless concurrent use "is likely to cause confusion, 
or to cause mistake, or to deceive." 116 In the leading case of 
112. § 14, 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1064 (1964); e.g., 
Fleishmann Distilling Corp. v. Heidelberg Brewing Corp., 115 U.S.P.Q. 
183 (Comm'r 1957). See Appendix for discussion of Patent Office 
cancellation proceedings. 
113. § 37, 60 Stat. 440 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1119 (1964); e.g., Douglas Lab. 
Corp. v. Copper Tan, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 837 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), modi-
fied on other grounds, 210 F.2d 453 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 347 U.S. 
968 (1954) (supplemental register registration). 
114. § 14(c), 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1964); 
compare Bart Schwartz Int'l Textiles, Ltd. v. F.T.C., 48 C.C.P.A. 
(Patents) 933, 289 F.2d 665 (1961) with Dunleavy v. Koeppel Metal 
Furniture Corp., 122 U.S.P .Q. 395 (Tm. Bd. 1959). 1881 and 1905 
registrations that are not republished remain cancellable at any time 
for lack of prior use regardless of the registrant's good or bad 
faith. § 14(c), 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(d) 
(1964), e.g., Henry A La Pensee, Inc. v. Societe A Responsabilite, 
44 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 892, 243 F .2d 181 (1957). 
115. E.g., Travelodge Corp. v. Siragusa, 228 F. Supp. 238 (N.D. Ala. 
1964); John Morrell & Co. v. Reliable Packing Co., 295 F .2d 314, 
316 (7th Cir. 1961) (dictum). See text accompanying note 170 infra 
for discussion of the incontestable right to use. 
116. § 32(l)(a), 60 Stat. 437 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(l)(a) 
(1964). § 32(1)(a) originally provided that infringement existed where 
a use was "likely to cause confusion or mistake· or to deceive pur-
chasers as to the source of origin. • . Act of July 5, 1947, ch. 540, 
§ 32(l)(a), 60 Stat. 437 (1946). The 1962 amendments to the Lanham 
Act deleted "purchasers" as an explicit referent of confusion, mis-
take, or deception in order to make clear that a probability of pur-
chaser confusion, mistake, or deception was sufficient to constitute 
infringement. 2 U.S. Code, Cong., & Ad. News 2847, 2850-51 (1962). 
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Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc.117 the Second Circuit 
accordingly held that a registrant can not capitalize on the effect 
of the constructive notice provision until there is a probability that 
purchasers will confuse the concurrent uses. This essentially 
means that relief is not available despite the applicability of sec-
tion 22 unless a junior user's area of use lies within a registrant's 
zone of imminent expansion or a registrant's mark has become 
known by reputation or through advertising in the junior user's 
bailiwick.118 Dawn was followed by the Fifth Circuit in American 
Foods, Inc. v.<3olden Flake, Inc.,119 where relief was limited to 
the overlap between the registrant's and the junior user's selling 
and advertising zones in spite of the fact that the junior user was 
apparently employing the mark in other areas as well. Both the 
Second and Fifth Circuit recognized, however, that section 22 en-
titles a registrant to territorial protection whenever likelihood of 
purchaser confusion develops with respect to a use initiated after 
constructive notice commenced. Thus in Dawn the denial of an 
injunction was without prejudice to a later application by the reg-
istrant when he could establish an extension of his business oper-
ation, or presumptively his reputation or advertising, into the jun-
ior user's marketing area. 120 
Dawn's melding of section 22 with subsection 32(1) (a) seems 
readily defensible. Although Sterling Brewing, Inc. v. Cold Spring 
Brewing Corp., 121 the first case to discuss section 22, declared 
that the constructive notice provision entitled the owner of a re-
published 1905 registration who operated exclusively in the Mid-
west to enjoin a junior user in New England where the registered 
mark was neither known nor advertised, Sterling did not even at-
tempt to reconcile this interpretation of section 22 with subsection 
117. 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959). See Fairway Foods, Inc. v. Fairway 
Mkts., 227 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1955). 
118. The Second Circuit summarized the pivotal findings of fact as follows: 
"The district court found that in view of the plaintiff's inactivity for 
about thirty years in exploiting its trademarks in defendant's trading 
area at the retail level either by advertising directed at retail pur-
chasers or by retail sales through authorized licensed users, there 
was no reasonable expectation that plaintiff would extend its retail 
operations into defendant's trading area." 267 F .2d at 364-65. 
119. 312 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1963); see Pikle-Rite Co. v. Chicago Pickle 
Co., 171 F. Supp. 671 (N.D. Ill. 1959); Youthform Co. v. R. H. Macy 
& Co., 153 F. Supp. 87 (N.D. Ga. 1957). 
120. See Elcon Mfg. Co. v. Elcon Mfg. Co., 132 F. Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y. 
1955), a pre-Dawn decision in which a federal judge granted a pre-
liminary injunction to a registrant whose use had eventually expanded 
into a junior user's trade territory. i 
121. 100 F. Supp. 412 (D. Mass. 1951). : 
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32(1) (a).122 There is an argument that "likelihood of confusion" 
exists if similar marks are used on competing goods regardless 
of market contact between the parties,123 but this interpretation 
is undercut by the plain words of the statute. Subsection 32(1) (a) 
states that infringement consists of using "in commerce any 
reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a regis-
tered mark" where "such use is likely to cause confusion, or 
to cause mistake, or to deceive," 124 and section 45 defines a 
"colorable imitation" as a look-alike-mark. 125 In short, an iden-
tical or confusingly similar mark is an element of infringement 
but infringement also requires a probability that concurrent use 
will cause purchaser confusion, 126 a requirement. not necessarily 
supplied by the bare fact that the concurrent use involves com-
peting goods. The Dawn interpretation means in at least one re-
spect that the territorial relief available under the Lanham Act 
may be more restricted than that available at common law. As 
construed in Dawn, subsection 32(1) (a), like the common-law, would 
permit relief where a registrant is about to expand into a junior 
user's trade territory or the registrant's mark is advertised or 
known by reputation in the junior user's market when the latter 
initiates use, but subsection 32(1) (a) would not sanction relief 
solely because a junior user had deliberately copied a senior 
user's mark, whereas some common-law decisions do allow re-
lief in these circumstances.127 Again, however, the limitations 
of the Lanham Act test for trademark infringement derive from 
the way that Congress deliberately wrote the statute and not from 
the ingenuity of the Second Circuit in Dawn.128 Furthermore, 
since trademark registration is not ordinarily considered to pre-
clude reliance on common-law rights, registrants remain free to 
122. See id. at 418. This may be because the court was "out to get" the 
defendant who adopted his mark with full knowledge of the prior use 
on competing goods in the Midwest but was immune from liability 
under Massachusetts law. 
123. E.g., 45 Minn. L. Rev. 1060, 1063-65 (1961). 
124. § 32(1)(a), 60 Stat. 437 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(a) (1) 
(1964). 
125. § 45, 60 Stat. 444 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1964). 
126. See 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1075, 1077-78 (1952). 
127. E.g., Lincoln Restaurant Corp. v. Wolfies Restaurant, Inc., 291 F.2d 
302 (2d Cir.) (alternative holding) cert. den., 368 U.S. 889 (1961); cf., 
Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexitized Corp., 335 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 
1964), cert. den., 380 U.S. 913 (1965). 
128. The Lanham Act similarly omits dilution from the definition of in-
fringement. Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 293, 
299 (S.D,N.Y. 1959), aff1d on other grounds, 279 F.2d 607 (2d Cir.), 
cert. den., 364 U.S. 909 (1960). 
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to rely on those common-law rights to the extent that they out-
strip those available under the Lanham Act.129 
The result of the Dawn case has been characterized as "im-
practical," 130 and in a sense it is. The defendant was put on no-
tice that the plaintiff has a superior right to use the common mark, 
but the defendant was not ordered to abandon use forthwith. Al-
though this could be taken as an invitation to gamble that the plain-i 
tiff would never be in a position to exercise his superior rights, 
surely a prudent defendant would not do so. Even if the regis- ' 
trant's chances of territorial expansion seemed remote, the ever-
present possibility that the registered mark could be assigned to 
a more dynamic firm or licensed to a local user in the defendant's 
territory 131 should have persuaded the defendant to take advantage 
of his period of grace to effect an orderly transition to a new 
mark. When all is said and done, Dawn represents a reasonable 
interpretation of the Lanham Act that was not unforseeable. 132 
Moreover, Dawn laid to rest another possible accomodation betweer 
the Lanham Act and the common-law doctrine of concurrent terri- ! 
torial rights that would have been far more objectionable in view 
of the noncompetitive potentialities of that doctrine. Section 45 of 
the Lanham Act states that nonuse of a mark for two years is a 
prima facie abandonment of rights, 133 and the suggestion had been 
made that the failure of a registrant to equate his market with the 
territorial scope of the constructive notice provision within two 
years might constitute abandonment of a claim to trademark rights 
in the unexploited areas.134 Dawn, however, summarily rejected 
this contention and held that continuous use of a registered mark 
129. Cf. Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc., 319 F .2d 830 (7th Cir. 1963); 
see "Dilution: Trademark Infringement or Will-O1-the Wisp?" 77 
Harv. L. Rev. 520, 524-25 (1964). 
130. Derenberg, "The Sixteenth Year," 53 Trademark Rep. 785, 849 (1963). 
The same author discussed the case more fully in "The Twelfth Year 
49 Trademark Rep. 1019, 1070-72 (1959). 
131. Dawn involved a relatively static licensor. 267 F .2d 358, 360 (2d 
Cir. 1959). 
132. Compare 1954 Summary of Proceedings, A.B.A. Section PTC Law at 
21 with "Developments in the Law-Trade-Marks and Unfair Compe-
tition," 68 Harv. L. Rev. 814, 859 (1955). 
133. § 45, 60 Stat. 444 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1964). 
134. Bonynge, "The Effect of Registration in Trademark Litigation," 50 
Trademark Rep. 902, 912-13 (1960); 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1075, 1079 
(1952). Bonynge also noted a possible conflict between § 2(d), which 
provides for concurrent registration, and the constructive notice pro-
v1s1on. This suggestion ignores the legislative history of the Lanhan 
Act which indicates that § 2(d)'s sole function is to permit the regis-
ter to reflect common-law concurrent uses that develop before the 
constructive notice provision becomes applicable. 1944 Senate Hear-
ings 45-56 (comments of Henry J. Savage). 
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anywhere in the nation was sufficient to retain the benefits of the 
constructive notice provision in areas of nonuse.135 
Another possible restrictive interpretation of section 22 would 
limit imputation of notice to registered common-law trademarks. 
The Sixth Circuit's opinion in Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Bavarian 
Brewing Co., 136 affirming a decree that confined protection of a 
registered secondary-meaning mark to the registrant's trade terri-
tory, has, for instance, been interpreted as indicating that the con-
structive notice provision does not confer nationwide rights to sec-
ondary-meaning marks.137 However, Anheuser-Busch is actually 
consistent with Dawn for there was no evidence that the registrant 
intended to expand his area of use or that his mark was known 
outside his area of operations.138 Section 22 on its face applies 
to all marks registered on the Principal Register and rightly so. 
The user of a secondary-meaning mark has as great an interest 
in developing new markets as the user of a common-law trade-
mark.139 
3. Incontestability 
The Lanham Act makes it possible for the registration and 
use of marks to become free from challenge on certain grounds. 
This limited immunity or "incontestability" 140 is a function of 
three different sections of the Lanham Act. 
135. 267 F .2d 358, 363 (2d Cir. 1959). Nor should a registrant be charge-
able with laches if he does not sue a concurrent user in a remote 
trade territory. Under the Dawn theory he has no remedy until 
there is a likelihood of confusion so that he should not be penalized 
for deferring suit until that time. 
136. 264 F .2d 88 (6th Cir. 1959) noted in 25 Mo. L. Rev. 100 (1960). See 
also International Breweries, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 230 F. 
Supp. 662 (M.D. Fla. 1964). 
137. Bonynge, note 134 supra, at 909-10, 912. 
138. "Bavarian" was found to describe a type of beer in most of the United 
States. If "Bavarian'' was so descriptive as to amount to a generic 
product name, the court erred in granting the registrant any relief. 
Trademark rights cannot be acquired in a generic name; see Re-
statement (Second), Torts § 720, comment _s! (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963), 
and an erroneously issued registration may be canceled at any time. 
§ 14(c), 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1964); 
see Derenberg, "The Twelfth Year," 49 Trademark Rep. 1019, 1073-
74 (1959). 
139. In Nielsen v. American Oil Co., 203 F. Supp. 473 (D. Utah 1962) the 
American Oil Co. successfully invoked section 22 on behalf of the 
"American" brand of gasoline. 
140. The word was coined in the early days of the Lanham Bill before 
the concept was whittled down as a result of congressional hearings. 
Ooms & Frost, "Incontestability," 14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 220, 221 
(1949). See generally Williamson, "Trade-Marks Registered Under 
the Lanham Act Are Not 'Incontestable, 1 " 37 Trademark Rep. 404 
(1947). 
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to rely on those common-law rights to the extent that they out-
strip those available under the Lanham Act.129 
The result of the Dawn case has been characterized as "im-
practical," 130 and in a sense it is. The defendant was put on no-
tice that the plaintiff has a superior right to use the common mark, 
but the defendant was not ordered to abandon use forthwith. Al-
though this could be taken as an invitation to gamble that the plain-
tiff would never be in a position to exercise his superior rights, ' 
surely a prudent defendant would not do so. Even if the regis-
trant's chances of territorial expansion seemed remote, the ever-
present possibility that the registered mark could be assigned to 
a more dynamic firm or licensed to a local user in the defendant's 
territory 131 should have persuaded the defendant to take advantage 
of his period of grace to effect an orderly transition to a new 
mark. When all is said and done, Dawn represents a reasonable 
interpretation of the Lanham Act that was not unforseeable. 132 
Moreover, Dawn laid to rest another possible accomodation betweenj' 
the Lanham Act and the common-law doctrine of concurrent terri-. 
torial rights that would have been far more objectionable in view 1 
of the noncompetitive potentialities of that doctrine. Section 45 of 1 
the Lanham Act states that nonuse of a mark for two years is a 
prima facie abandonment of rights, 133 and the suggestion had been 
made that the failure of a registrant to equate his market with the 
territorial scope of the constructive notice provision within two 
years might constitute abandonment of a claim to trademark rights 
in the unexploited areas.134 Dawn, however, summarily rejected 
this contention and held that continuous use of a registered mark 
129. Cf. Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc., 319 F .2d 830 (7th Cir. 1963); 
see "Dilution: Trademark Infringement or Will-O'-the Wisp?" 77 
Harv. L. Rev. 520, 524-25 (1964). 
130. Derenberg, "The Sixteenth Year," 53 Trademark Rep. 785, 849 (1963). 
The same author discussed the case more fully in "The Twelfth Year. 
49 Trademark Rep. 1019, 1070-72 (1959). 
131. Dawn involved a relatively static licensor. 267 F .2d 358, 360 (2d 
Cir. 1959). 
132. Compare 1954 Summary of Proceedings, A.B.A. Section PTC Law at 
21 with "Developments in the Law-Trade-Marks and Unfair Compe-
tition," 68 Harv. L. Rev. 814, 859 (1955). 
133. § 45, 60 Stat. 444 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1964). 
134. Bonynge, "The Effect of Registration in Trademark Litigation," 50 
Trademark Rep. 902, 912-13 (1960); 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1075, 1079 
(1952). Bonynge also noted a possible conflict between § 2(d), which 
provides for concurrent registration, and the constructive notice pro-
vision. This suggestion ignores the legislative history of the Lanham 
Act which indicates that § 2(d)'s sole function is to permit the regis-
ter to reflect common- law concurrent uses that develop before the 
constructive notice provision becomes applicable. 1944 Senate Hear-
ings 45-56 (comments of Henry J. Savage). 
k, 
n-, 
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anywhere in the nation was sufficient to retain the benefits of the 
constructive notice provision in areas of nonuse.135 
Another possible restrictive interpretation of section 22 would 
limit imputation of notice to registered common-law trademarks. 
The Sixth Circuit's opinion in Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Bavarian 
Brewing Co., 136 affirming a decree that confined protection of a 
registered secondary-meaning mark to the registrant's trade terri-
tory, has, for instance, been interpreted as indicating that the con-
structive notice provision does not confer nationwide rights to sec-
ondary-meaning marks.137 However, Anheuser-Busch is actually 
consistent with Dawn for there was no evidence that the registrant 
intended to expand his area of use or that his mark was known 
outside his area of operations.138 Section 22 on its face applies 
to all marks registered on the Principal Register and rightly so. 
The user of a secondary-meaning mark has as great an interest 
in developing new markets as the user of a common-law trade-
mark.139 
3. Incontestability 
The Lanham Act makes it possible for the registration and 
use of marks to become free from challenge on certain grounds. 
This limited immunity or "incontestability" 140 is a function of 
three different sections of the Lanham Act. 
135. 267 F.2d 358, 363 (2d Cir. 1959). Nor should a registrant be charge-
able with laches if he does not sue a concurrent user in a remote 
trade territory. Under the Dawn theory he has no remedy until 
there is a likelihood of confusion so that he should not be penalized 
for deferring suit until that time. 
136. 264 F .2d 88 (6th Cir. 1959) noted in 25 Mo. L. Rev. 100 (1960). See 
also International Breweries, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 230 F. 
Supp. 662 (M.D. Fla. 1964). 
137. Bonynge, note 134 supra, at 909-10, 912. 
138. "Bavarian'' was found to describe a type of beer in most of the United 
States. If "Bavarian" was so descriptive as to amount to a generic 
product name, the court erred in granting the registrant any relief. 
Trademark rights cannot be acquired in a generic name; see Re-
statement (Second), Torts § 720, comment _Q (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963), 
and an erroneously issued registration may be canceled at any time. 
§ 14(c), 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1964); 
see Derenberg, "The Twelfth Year," 49 Trademark Rep. 1019, 1073-
74 (1959). 
139. In Nielsen v. American Oil Co., 203 F. Supp. 473 (D. Utah 1962) the 
American OH Co. successfully invoked section 22 on behalf of the 
"American" brand of gasoline. 
140. The word was coined in the early days of the Lanham Bill before 
the concept was whittled down as a result of congressional hearings. 
Ooms & Frost, "Incontestability," 14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 220, 221 
(1949). See generally Williamson, "Trade-Marks Registered Under 
the Lanham Act Are Not 'Incontestable,"' 37 Trademark Rep. 404 
(1947). 
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a. Cancellation Restrictions 
Under the Act of 1905 Patent Office cancellation proceedingsl41 
could be brought at any time. In one case, for instance, cancella-
tion took place more than twenty years after registration. 142 The 
most frequent grounds of cancellation were that the mark was mere-
ly descriptive, geographical, or a personal name, or that the can-
cellation petitioner was the prior user with superior rights to the 
mark.143 Section 14 of the Lanham Act imposes a statute of lim-
itations upon these common grounds for cancellation in order to 
give greater security to trademark rights.144 If five years has 
elapsed since registration on the Principal Register or republica-
tion of an 1881 or 1905 registration, 145 the right to register can 
no longer be challenged on the ground that the mark is merely 
descriptive, 146 geographical, or a surname or on the ground that 
the petitioner was the prior user of the mark.147 On the other 
hand, cancellation proceedings can still be brought at any time for 
the following reasons: 148 (1) the mark has become the common 
descriptive name of an article or substance; (2) the mark has been 











See Appendix for a discussion of cancellation proceedings under the 
Lanham Act. 
White House Milk: Prods. Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co., 27 C.C.P.A. 
(Patents) 1194, 111 F .2d 490 (1940). 
See "Developments in the Law-Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition," 
68 Harv. L. Rev. 814, 829 (1955). 
§ 14, 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1064 (1964). § 14 
applies to Patent Office proceedings which result in restriction as 
well as cancellation of registration. United States Steel Corp. v. 
National Copper & Smelting Co., 131 U.S.P.Q. 397 (Tm. Bd. 1961). 
If an inter partes Patent Office proceeding is commenced within the 
five-year period and the party in the position of a plaintiff relies 
on a Principal Register or republished registration, the statute of 
limitations does not apply to a request for cancellation filed after 
the expiration of the five-year period by the party in the position 
of a defendant. Sunbeam Corp. v. Duro Metal Prods. Co., 106 U.S. 
P.Q. 385 (Comm•r 1955). See Appendix for discussion of inter partes 
Patent Office proceedings. 
Seiler•s Inc. v. Hickory Valley Farm, Inc., 139 U,S.P.Q. 460 (Tm. Bd.1963 
Dunleavy Co. v. Koeppel Metal Furniture Corp., 122 U.S.P .Q. 395 
(Tm. Bd. 1959), See generally, Ooms & Frost, note 140 supra, at 
225-26. 1881 and 1905 registrations that have not been republished 
remain subject to cancellation proceedings at any time. § 14(c), 60 
Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 U,S.C. § 1064(d) (1964). 
§ 14(c), 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1964). / 
Hy-Cross Hatchery, Inc. v. Osborne, 49 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1163, 303 
F .2d 947 (1962). Modification of a mark may amount to an abandon-
ment. Hewitt Soap Co. v. Lanolin Plus Cosmetics, Inc., 101 U.S.P .Q, 
295 (Comm•r 1954). 
Intentional fraud is requisite. Bart Schwartz Int'l Textiles, Ltd. v. 
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registration was improper in view of certain absolute prohibitions 
in section 2 of the Lanham Act; 151 or (5) the mark has been used 
by or with the permission of the registrant to misrepresent the 
source of goods. 
A proviso to section 14 authorizes the Federal Trade Com-
mission to bring cancellation proceedings against marks on the 
Principal Register for any of the grounds to which the five-year 
statute of limitations is inapplicable. 152 The terms of the author-
ization thus exclude registrations under prior acts whether or not 
republished 153 and cancellation of Principal Register registrations 
because of junior use or because the registered mark is merely 
descriptive,154 geographical, or a surname.155 Although trademark 
users have been apprehensive over the existence of any F.T.C. 
ability to bring cancellation proceedings,156 the proviso to section 
14 is substantially a dead letter.157 To the extent that the F. T.C. 
polices trademark abuses, the agency prefers to proceed under the 
broad language of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.158 
151. Section 2 prohibits registration if a mark "(a) Consists of or com-
prises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which 
may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living 
or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them 
into contempt, or disrepute. (b) Consists of or comprises the flag 
or coat of arms or other insignia of the United States, or of any 
State or municipality, or of any foreign nation, or any simulation 
thereof. (c) Consists of or comprises a name, portrait, or signa-
ture identifying a particular living individual except by his written 
consent, or the name, signature, or portrait of a deceased President 
of the United States during the life of his widow, if any, except by 








(1946), 15 u.s.c. § 1052(a), (b), & (c) (1964). 
§ 14, 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1964). 
F.T.C, v. Elder Mfg. Co., 84 U.S.P.Q. 429 (Comm 1r 1950). 
A descriptive word is distinguishable from a common descriptive 
name in that a descriptive word generally identifies characteristics 
of goods whereas a common descriptive name identifies the generic 
class within which particular goods fall. Ex parte L.R. Nelson Mfg. 
Co., 94 U.S.P.Q. 119 (Comm'r 1952). 
See Bart Schwartz Int'l Textiles, Ltd. v. F.T.C., 48 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 
933, 289 F .2d 665 (1961). 
See, e.g., Derenberg, "The Status of Existing Trademark Registra-
tions Under the New Trademark Act of 1946," 3 Food Drug Cosm. 
L.Q. 267, 278 (1948). 
See Stoughton, "Cancellation of Trademarks," 50 Trademark Rep. 890, 
891-92 (1960). 
§ 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U .s.c. § 45(a)(l) (1964); e.g., 
Waltham Watch Co. v. F.T.C., 318 F.2d 28 (7th Cir.), cert. den., 375 
U.S. 944 (1963). In its petition for certiorari the Waltham Watch 
Company contended that § 14 of the Lanham Act defined FTC juris-
diction over trademarks and precluded a cease and desist order under 
§ 5. ATRR 116:A-10,11 (10/1/63). 
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Indeed, neither the F. T.C. nor the Justice Department opposed de-
letion of the proviso during 1954 hearings on Lanham Act amend-
ments.159 The amendments failed to pass, however, and in 1961 
the Commission obtained cancellation of a registration because the 
registrant had fraudulently sworn that he had no knowledge that 
anyone else had the right to use the word claimed as a mark in 
commerce.160 The Commission apparently resorted to section 14 
because the registrant had filed his registration with the Bureau 
of Customs in order to block importation of Italian spun rayon 
cloth bearing the generic Italian term "fiocco," 161 but it seems 
doubtful that its "victory" restored the Commission's faith in sec-
tion 14. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals held that the 
F. T.C. could not cancel a mark because of mere descriptiveness 
and that an applicant for registration had no duty to ascertain 
whether a word had a descriptive or generic meaning in a foreign 
language. Cancellation was ordered simply because the particular 
applicant knew that the word was used generically by Italian ex-
porters when he swore that no one else had a right to use the 
word in commerce.162 
In appraising the significance of the statute of limitations in 
section 14, it must be borne in mind that the section is solely con-
cerned with the right to register,163 Although section 14 may bar 
Patent Office cancellation of registration because of a mark's de-
scriptiveness, the courts remain free despite section 14 to consider 
the descriptive nature of a mark in determining the right to use.164 
Furthermore, section 37 of the Lanham Act, which permits a court 
to order cancellation of registration "in any action involving a reg-
istered mark," 165 affords the same remedy as a Patent Office 
159. 1954 Senate Hearings at 92-94. 
160. Bart Schwartz Int'l Textiles, Ltd. v. F. T ,C., note 155 supra. 
161. Id. at 936, 289 F .2d 665, 668 (1961). 
162. This aspect of the Schwartz case is discussed in Derenberg, "The 
Fourteenth Year," 51 Trademark Rep. 777, 821-22 (1961). 
163. Hammermill Paper Co. v. Gulf States Paper Corp., 52 C.C,P.A. 
(Patents) 797, 337 F.2d 662 (1964). 
164. Cf. John Morrell & Co. v. Reliable Packing Co., 295 F .2d 314 (7th 
Cir. 1961) criticized in Derenberg, "The Fifteenth Year," 52 Trade-
mark Rep. 877, 927-28 (1962). 
165. § 37, 60 Stat. 440 (1946), 15 U,S.C. § 1119 (1964). "Actions involving 
a registered mark" include an infringement suit brought by a regis-
trant, Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal, Inc., 279 F .2d 607 (2d Cir.), 
cert. den., 364 U.S. 909 (1960), a treble damage action under the anti-
trust laws in which a registered mark is interposed as a defense 
Bascom Launder Corp. v. Telecoin Corp., 2 04 F .2d 331 (2d cir.),' 
cert. den., 345 U.S. 994 (1953), and an action for a declaratory judg-
ment as to the validity of a registered mark, Simmonds Aerocessoriei 
Ltd. v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp., 257 F.2d 485 (3d Cir. 1958). See gen-
erally Stoughton, note 157 supra, at 892-93. 
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proceeding 166 but section 14 applies only to the latter. Thus a 
court may order cancellation of registration after the five-year 
period on a ground not available to a cancellation petitioner. In 
Allen v. Standard Crankshaft & Hydraulic Co., 167 for instance, a 
court asserted the existence of the power to cancel registration 
because the plaintiff was the prior user despite the expiration of 
the five-year period. The Patent Office Trademark Trial and Ap-
peal Board has refused cancellation in a similar case. 168 Although 
it may initially seem anomalous that courts should be able to can-
cel registrations under section 37 on grounds that are barred in 
the Patent Office by section 14, this result is necessitated by the 
fact that section 14 does not affect the right to use a mark. There 
would be an unwarranted disparity between the right to use and the 
right to register if a court which determined that a registrant had 
no right to use a mark could not cancel registration. Indeed, the 
principal difficulty concerning section 37 is that judges are reluc-
tant to order the Commissioner to rectify the register. In Oakford 
Co. v. Kroger Co.,169 for instance, the court applied the doctrine 
enunciated in the Hanover and Rectanus cases to sanction concur-
rent territorial use but declined to direct the Commissioner to 
conform the register to the decree. 
b. Incontestable Right to Use 
If a registered mark has been in continuous use in commerce 
for five consecutive years after registration on the Principal Reg-
ister or republication! 70 and within one year after expiration of a 
five-year period the registrant files an affidavit with the Commis-
sioner specifying that neither has there been a final Patent Office 
or judicial decision adverse to the registrant's right to register 
or to use his mark nor is any such proceeding pending, 171 section 
166. Simmonds Aerocessories, Ltd. v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp., note 165 
supra; accord, Sylvania Elec. Prods. Inc. v. Dura Elec. Lamp Co., 
247 F .2d 730 (3d Cir. 1957); Nancy Ann Storybook Dolls, Inc. v. 
Dollcraft Co., 197 F.2d 293 (9th Cir.), cert. den., 344 U,S. 877 (1952). 
167. 210 F. Supp. 844, 854 (W.D,N.C, 1962), aff'd on other grounds, 323 
F .2d 29 (4th Cir. 1963). See text accompanying note 193 infra, for 
discussion of the Standard Crankshaft case. 
168. Southern California Engineering Co. v. General Ionics Corp., 126 
U,S,P,Q. 472 (Tm. Bd. 1960). 
169. 157 F. Supp. 453 (S.D. Ill. 1957). 
170. There is no magic in the five years immediately following registra-
tion or republication. Any consecutive five-year period will do. 37 
C.F ,R. § 2,167(f) (1960). 
171. 37 C,F.R. § 2.167 (1960). The affidavit also must specify the goods 
referred to in the registration on which the mark has been in con-
tinuous use. Ibid. 
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15 of the Lanham Act makes the right to use the mark "incontest-
able" in judicial proceedings ,172 This means that within the limi-
tations of section 15 an incontestable right to use is a good de- I 
fense 173 to a prayer for cancellation in an action involving a reg- , 
istered mar kl 74 and, except as modified by section 33(b), to an 
infringement suit brought against a registrant.175 Section 15 is 
subject to the same exceptions as section 14176 and, like section 
14, imposes a statute of limitations on contentions that a regis-
trant was not the initial user 177 or that a mark is unprotectable 
because merely descriptive,178 geographical, or a surname. 179 
In addition to incorporating the exceptions to section 14, 
section 15 states that an incontestable right to use cannot be raised 
as a defense where the other party obtained a valid right to use a I 
mark or trade name under state or territorial law prior to the 
publication of a registrant's application for registration or prior I 
to republication of an 1881 or 1905 registration. 180 This excep-
tion was intended to ensure that an incontestable right to use would 
172. § 15, 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1964). 
173. Section 15 is defensive in effect. It insulates trademark rights from 
certain challenges but does not enlarge them. Rand McNally & Co. 
v. Christmas Club, 105 U.S.P.Q. 499 (Comm'r 1955), aff'd on other 
grounds, 44 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 861, 242 F .2d 776 (1957); see Cam-
bridge Rubber Co. v. Sun Valley Mfg. Co., 137 U.S.P.Q. 385 (Tm. 
Bd. 1963). 
174. See John Morrell & Co. v. Reliable Packing Co., 295 F .2d 314, 316 
(7th Cir. 1916) (dictum) (discussing related section 33(b) ). But see 
Allen v. Standard Crankshaft & Hydraulic Co., 210 F. Supp. 844 
(W.D.N.C. 1962), aff'd on other grounds, 323 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1963). 
175. Herbert Prods., Inc. v. Oxy-Dry Sprayer Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 71, 145 
N.Y.S.2d 168 (Sup. Ct. N,Y. County 1955); see Borg-Warner Corp. 
v. York-Shipley, Inc., 127 U.S.P,Q. 42 (N.D. Ill. 1960), modified on 
other grounds, 293 F.2d 88 (7th Cir.), cert. den., 368 U.S. 939 (1961). 
See note 209 infra and accompanying text for discussion of section 
33(b). --
176. § 15 incorporates the principal exceptions to § 14 by reference, § 15, 
60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1065 (1964), and unneces-
sarily repeats the exception with regard to terms that are common 
descriptive names. § 15(4), 60 Stat. 434 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1065(4) (1964); see Robert, The New Trade-Mark Manual 138 (1947). 
177. See Ooms & Frost, "Incontestability," note 140 supra, at 225-26 (1949), 
178. Seiler's, Inc. v. Hickory Valley Farm, Inc., 139 u.s.P.Q. 460 (Tm. 
Bd. 1963); accord, Eastern Metals Research Co. v. Hunter Spring Co., 
119 U,S,P,Q. 448 (Tm. Bd. 1958); see Pure Oil Co. v. Paragon Oil 
Co., 117 U,S.P.Q. 321 (N.D. Ohio 1958). 
179. See generally Derenberg, "The Status of Existing Trademark Regis-
trations Under the New Trademark Act of 1946," 3 Food, Drug, cosm. 
L.Q. 270, 278-81 (1948). 
180. § 15, 60 Stat. 433 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1964); Herbert Prods., 
Inc. v. Oxy-Dry Sprayer Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 71, 145 N.Y.S,2d 168 
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1955). 
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not enlarge a registrant's rights against other lawful users. 181 
In substance, the state rights exception removes the statute of 
limitations otherwise imposed by section 15 on a claim that a reg-
istrant was a junior user in those states in which territorial rights 
were acquired by another before publication or republication. 182 
Reference to the dates of publication and republication for this 
purpose is mystifying. The legislative history suggests that these 
dates were chosen because publication and republication put con-
current users on notice of a registrant's claim of adverse trade-
mark rights. 183 This rationale, however, ignores the distinction 
between publication and republication, which merely offer an op-
portunity for actual notice of asserted trademark rights, 184 and 
section 22 of the Lanham Act, 185 which imputes constructive notice 
of trademark registrations to persons without actual notice. Sec-
tion 22 applies to Principal Register registrations on the date of 
registration, not on the date of publication, 186 and to 1881 and 
1905 registrations on July 5, 1947, not the date of republication.187 
Thus, if a registrant on the Principal Register acquires an incon-
testable right to use his mark, the state rights exception does not 
exclude from incontestability areas in which other persons acquired 
state rights between the date of publication and the date of regis-
tration, although section 22 does not bar acquisition of concurrent 
rights during this interval. An incontestable right to use would 
consequently be a defense to an infringement suit brought by a 
person who acquired state rights through initiation of good faith 
use during the period between publication and registration of the 
incontestable mark on the Principal Register if it were not for 
another section of the Lanham Act. Subsection 33(b) (5) 188 removes 
181. The exception first appeared in a version of the Lanham Bill pre-
pared by a coordinating committee sponsored by the National Asso-
ciation of Manufacturers. H.R. 5461, § 15, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1941). A statement by the coordinating committee introduced into 
the record of the congressional hearings offers what evidence there 
is of intent. See 1941 House Hearings at 132. 
182. Herbert Prods., Inc. v. Oxy-Dry Sprayer Corp., note 180 supra. 
183. See 1941 House Hearlngs at 133-34. 
184. Theodore Rectanus Co. v. United Drug Co., note 35 supra. 
185. § 22, 60 Stat. 435 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1964). 
186. Nielsen v. American Oil Co., 203 F. Supp. 473 (D. utah 1962). 
187. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., note 98 supra. 
188. § 33(b)(5), 60 Stat. 439 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1115(b)(5) 
(1964). The interplay between § 33(b)(5) and the states rights excep-
tion was commented on in Travelodge Corp. v. Siragusa, 228 F. Supp. 
238 (N.D. Ala. 1964) (alternative holding). § 33(b)(5) did not correct 
the discrepancy until the 1962 amendments to the Lanham Act. For-
merly, § 33(b)(5) also referred to the date of publication as the time 
at which a concurrent user's territorial rights were defined. § 33(b) 
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an incontestable right to use as a defense to an infringement suit r 
in those areas in which a good faith concurrent user engaged in s 
continuous use prior to registration of the incontestable mark. The c 
state rights exception is also largely superfluous insofar as the \I 
1881 or 1905 registrants are concerned. Section 22 precludes ac- c 
quisition of rights adverse to those of a registrant after July 5, t 
1947, regardless of republication or incontestability, 189 and sec-
tion 49 190 saves all rights acquired in good faith prior to that r 
date. Finally, subsection 33(b} (6) 191 removes the incontestable 
right to use as a defense to an infringement suit in those areas 
in which a concurrent user who obtained registration prior to re-
publication of the 1881 or 1905 registration engaged in continuous 
use prior to republication. 
Although devoid of major import the state rights exception 
remains a source of potential mischief,192 In Allen v. Standard 
Crankshaft & Hydraulic Co., 193 for instance, the exception was 
utilized to justify judicial cancellation of an incontestable mark. 
The case involved an infringement suit by the registrant of "arc-
plated" against the registrant of "arcwell." Both the plaintiff's 
and defendant's marks were incontestable but the court determined 
that the plaintiff was the initial user in North Carolina and declared 
that the state rights exception to section 15 stripped the defendant's 
mark of all incontestable rights and rendered his registration sub-
ject to judicial cancellation. 194 This construction of the state 
(Footnote continued) 
(5), 60 Stat. 439 (1946), 15 u.s.c. § 1115(b)(5) (1958); see Statement 
on Behalf of the National Trademark Coordinating Committee, 1954 
Senate Hearings at 47. 
189. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., note 98 supra; see Dig-
gins, "The Lanham Trademark Act II," 37 Trademark Rep. 419, 432-
33 (1947). 
190. Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 49, 60 Stat. 446. 
191. § 33(b)(6), 60 Stat. 439 (1946), as amended, 15 U.s.c. § 1115(b)(6) 
(1964). § 33(b)(6) is only literally applicable if the republished mark 
has become incontestable, ibid., but the policy of the subsection seems 
equally relevant before incontestability is achieved. Cf. Forstmann 
Woolen Co. v. Murray Sices Corp., 10 F.R.D. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). 
192. E.g., Letter from the Rochester Patent Group, 1941 House Hearings 
at 237; see "Developments in the Law-Trade-Marks and Unfair Com-
petition," 68 Harv. L. Rev. 814, 830-31 (1955). 
193. 210 F. Supp. 844 (W.D.N.C. 1962), aff'd on other grounds, 323 F.2d 
29 (4th Cir. 1963). 
194. Although the district judge in the Allen case spoke of the plaintiff's 
"right to have the defendant's mark cancelled," Allen v. Standard 
Crankshaft & Hydraulic Co., 210 F. Supp. 844, 854 (W.D.N.C. 1962), 
it appears that the decree enjoined the defendant from using his mark 
without a formal direction to the Commissioner to cancel the defen-
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rights exception does not seem justified by the reciprocal relation-
ship between section 14 and 15. These sections were intended to 
create greater security for trademark rights by limiting the time 
within which prior and concurrent users could assert conflicting 
claims in both the Patent Office and the courts.195 Section 16 of 
the Lanham Act, for instance, states that a later applicant for reg-
istration cannot assert superior rights in Patent Office interference 
proceedings if a registrant has acquired an incontestable right to 
use his mark in judicial proceedings.196 After the attainment of 
an incontestable right to use, the parallel function of sections 14 
and 15 suggests that judicial as well as Patent Office cancellation 
of registration should generally be restricted to cases falling with-
in the exceptions common to both sections.197 Ordinarily, the state 
rights exception to section 15 should merely authorize the courts 
to order territorial restriction of registration in order to retlect 
(Footnote continued) 
Co., 323 F .2d 29, 35-36 (4th Cir. 1963). Since court-ordered aban-
donment of a trademark is a more severe sanction than cancellation 
of registration, the terms of the decree do not palliate the court's 
construction of the state rights exception. 
195. E.g., Time, Inc. v. T.I.M.E., Inc., 123 F. Supp. 446, 453 (S.D. Cal. 
1954) (dictum) (§ 15); Dunleavy Co. v. Koeppel Metal Furniture Corp., 
122 U.S.P.Q. 395 (Tm. Bd. 1959) (§ 14); see Ooms & Frost, note 177 
supra, at 225-26, 232-33. 
196. § 16, 60 Stat. 434 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1066 (1964). An 
interference proceeding is an inter partes Patent Office proceeding 
to determine which of two rival claimants, at least one of whom is 
an applicant for registration, is entitled to a Principal Register reg-
istration. See Appendix. As a practical matter, marks that have 
been registered or republished for over five years have a similar 
immunity from interference proceedings. When an interference is 
declared between an application and a registration, the applicant will 
not be permitted to register his mark unless he can obtain cancella-
tion of the registered mark, 37 C.F.R. § 2.96 (Supp. 1964), and a 
registration will not generally be cancelled in an interference pro-
ceeding unless it could be cancelled in a cancellation proceeding. 
See Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Redbanks Orchard Co., 102 U.S.P.Q. 
409 (Comm'r 1954); Vandenburgh, Trademark Law and Procedure 
298-99 (1959). Therefore, the grounds, on which registrations which 
have been registered or republished for more than five years are 
subject to interference, are the same grounds on which incontestable 
registrations are subject to cancellation, i.e., the exceptions to § 14. 
197. The total cancellation in Allen, for instance, was justified by the fact 
that the defendant made a claim of exclusive rights in his application 
which he knew to be false-a ground of cancellation common to both 
sections 14 and 15. See Allen v. Standard Crankshaft & HydrauUc 
Co., note 194 supra. 
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the extent to which the state rights exception is applicable, 198 
The state rights exception should only justify cancellation of a 
registration if the registrant and a person claiming superior state 
rights base their claim of trademark rights on use in the same 
state, and the registrant has never acquired territorial rights in 
other states,199 
c. The Conclusive Evidence Rule 
Section 33(b) of the Lanham Act 200 complements section 15 
by providing that registration furnishes conclusive evidence of a 
registrant's exclusive right to use a mark in commerce once an 
incontestable right to use is achieved. Section 33(b) could have 
been interpreted as referring to the use of incontestability as a 
sword rather than as a shield. In that event an incontestable right 
to use would have entitled a registrant to enjoin any concurrent 
use which produced likelihood of purchaser confusion except as ex-
pressly provided in section 33(b) itse1f.20l Instead, the section 
has been construed to be a restatement in evidentiary terms of 
the statute of limitations imposed by section 15202 so that other 
considerations continue to determine whether a registrant is en-
titled to affirmative trademark protection. In Cambridge Rubber 
Co. v. Sun Valley Manufacturing Co., 203 for instance, the Patent 
Office Trademark Trial and Appeal Board held that a registrant 
who had an incontestable right to use a mark could not oppose 204 
the registration of the same mark by a prior user, although the 
registrant was protected from cancellation. The defensive construction 
198. The Patent Office has no equivalent authority because of the absence 
of a state rights exception to § 14. Cf. United States Steel Corp. v. 
National Copper & Smelting Co., 131 U,S,P,Q. 397 (Tm. Bd. 1961). 
199. It is difficult to tell from the opinion but this may have been the 
situation in Allen. See 210 F. Supp. 844 (W.D.N.C. 1962). 
200. § 33(b), 60 Stat. 438 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1115(b) (1964). 
The conclusive evidence rule is limited to the goods specified in the 
affidavit required to obtain an incontestable right to use. Ibid. 
201. See "Developments in the Law-Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition," 
68 Harv. L. Rev. 814, 829-30 (1955). See Williamson, "Trade-Marks 
Registered Under the Lanham Act Are Not 'Incontestable, 1 " 37 Trade-
mark Rep. 404, 408-10 (1947) concerning the exceptions to § 33(b). 
202. E.g., John Morrell & Co. v. Reliable Packing Co., 295 F .2d 314 (7th 
Cir. 1961); Rand McNally & Co. v. Christmas Club, 105 U.S.P.Q. 499 
(Comm'r 1955), aff'd on other grounds, 44 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 861, 
242 F .2d 776 (1957). The evidentiary effect of incontestability is of 
major importance to small business. See Taggart, "Trade-Marks 
and the Lanham Act," 38 Trademark Rep. 125, 142 (1948). 
203. 137 u.s.P.Q. 385 (Tm. Bd. 1963). 
204. An opposition proceeding is an inter partes Patent Office proceeding 
initiated by a person objecting to the issuance of a Principal Register 
registration. See Appendix. 
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of section 33(b) is of particular moment in infringement suits. In-
contestability may be a good defense if a registrant is the defen-
dant, 205 but, where a registrant is the plaintiff, the courts deter-
mine his right to relief with slight regard for incontestability. 206 
Section 33(b) contains several exceptions which necessitate 
careful consideration of the relationship between section 33 (b) and 
section 15. The former baldly states that a registration that has 
become incontestable is not conclusive evidence of the exclusive 
right to use where any of the following circumstances exist: (1) 
registration or the incontestable right to use was fraudulently ob-
tained; (2) the mark has been abandoned; (3) the mark has been 
used by or with the permission of the registrant to misrepresent 
the source of goods; (4) the alleged infringing use is a good faith 
nontrademark use; (5) the infringing use was commenced without 
knowledge of the registrant's use prior to registration or republi-
cation by the registrant; (6) the infringing mark was used and reg-
istered prior to registration or republication of the incontestable 
mark; and (7) the incontestable mark has been or is being utilized 
to violate the antitrust laws. 207 There has been dispute as to the 
significance of these exceptions 208 but any consequence beyond re-
moving an incontestable right to use as a defense to an infringe-
ment suit usually depends on other sections of the Lanham Act 
than section 33(b).209 Even so, not all the exceptions have the 
same effect on the conclusive evidence rule. 
205. Herbert Prod., Inc. v. Oxy-Dry Sprayer Corp., note 180 supra; see 
Borg-Warner Corp. v. York-Shipley, Inc., 127 U.S.P.Q, 42 (N.D. Ill. 
1960), modified on other grounds, 293 F.2d 88 (7th Cir.), cert. den., 
368 U.S. 939 (1961). 
206. See Jean Patou, Inc. v. Jacqueline Cochran, Inc., 312 F .2d 125 (2d 
Cir. 1963); John Morrell & Co. v. Reliable Packing Co., 295 F.2d 
314 (7th Cir. 1961); Peterson Bros., Inc. v. Murphy, 205 F. Supp. 
432 (S,D, Fla. 1961); Richard Hudnut v. Du Barry, Inc. 127 U.S.P.Q. 
486 (S,D. Cal. 1960), aif'd, 323 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1963). This was 
prophesied in Handler, "Trade-Marks and Anti-Trust Laws," 38 
Trademark Rep. 387, 392 (1948). 
207. § 33(b) 1-7, 60 Stat. 438-39 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S,C. § 1115(b) 
(1)-(7) (1964). 
208. Compare Stoughton, "Incontestability Under the Lanham Act, 11 34 
Women Law. J. 8, 9, 47 (No. 3 1948) with Robert, The New Trade-
Mark Manual 139-48 (1947). 
209. Section 33 deals with the significance of registration in infringement 
suits so that the exceptions to section 33(b) necessarily remove an 
incontestable right to use as a defense to an infringement suit _2!E 
tanto modifying section 15. The Senate and House conferees explic-
itly stated, however, that the exceptions to section 33 (b) did not 
"modify the substantive law of trademarks. . .as set out in other 
sections of the act" aside from the implicit effect on section 15. 
92 Cong. Rec. 7524 (1946) (remarks of Congressman Lanham); 92 
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Subsections 33(b) (1), (2), and (3) dispense with the conclusive 
evidence rule whenever registration was fraudulently obtained, the 
mark has been abandoned, or the mark was used by or with the 
permission of the registrant to misrepresent the source of goods. 210 
These circumstances also constitute grounds for cancellation of 
registration211 and exceptions to an incontestable right to use 212 
so that whenever they exist registration has no evidentiary value.213 
This should also be true if a registered mark is shown to have 
become the common descriptive name of an article or registered 
contrary to the absolute prohibitions of section 2 of the Lanham 
Act, although section 33(b) does not reiterate these grounds for 
cancellation and exceptions to incontestability. 214 
Subsection 33(b) (4) 215 excepts from the conclusive evidence 
rule use of a person's name in his own business other than as a 
trade or service mark 216 as well as good faith use of descriptive 
descriptive or geographical terms or devices in a geographical 
(Footnote continued) 
Cong. Rec. 7636 (1946) (remarks of Senator Hawkes). This should 
mean, for example, that the exceptions to section 33(b) do not or-
dinarily remove the incontestable right to use as a shield against 
judicial restriction or cancellation of registration as this is princi-
pally governed by sections 14 and 15. But see text accompanying 
notes 228-34 infra. 
210. § 33(b) (1), (2), (3), 60 Stat. 438 (1946), as amended, 15 U .s.c. § 1115 
(b) (1), (2), (3) (1964). Subsection 33(b) (1) also makes reference to 
fraudulent acquisition of an incontestable right to use a mark. 
211. § 14(c), 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1964). 
212. § 15, 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1964). 
213. This is not true where only an incontestable right to use was fraudu-
lently obtained. Submission of a false affidavit under § 15 should not 
affect the status of registration as "prima facie" evidence, § 7(b), 60 
Stat. 430 (1946), 15 u.s.c. § 1057 (b) (1964), or even subsequent ac-
quisition of an incontestable right to use on a proper affidavit. See 
Robert, note 208 supra, at 141. 
214. It was unnecessary to repeat any of the exceptions to an incontest-
able right to use in § 33(b) since the latter only applies to the extent 
that an incontestable right to use exists. § 33(b), 60 Stat. 438 (1946), 
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (1964); see "Developments in the 
Law-Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition," 60 Harv. L. Rev. 814, 
829-30 (1955). 
215. § 33(b) (4), 60 Stat. 438 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (4) (1964). 
216. A service mark is a mark used in the sale or advertising of services 
to identify the services of one person and distinguish them from the 
services of another. § 45, 60 Stat. 443 (1946), as amended, 15 U,S,C, 
§ 1127 (1964). Service marks are registrable on the Principal Regi-
ster. § 3, 60 Stat. 429 (1946), 15 u.s.c. § 1053 (1964). See gener-
ally Isler, "Service Mark Registration Requirements," 37 J. Pat. Off. 
Soc'y 243 (1955). 
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or descriptive sense.217 This "fair use" concept was initially ad-
vanced as a reasonable limitation on offensive employment of in-
contestable secondary-meaning marks. 218 The subsection was 
nevertheless subjected to severe criticism throughout the congres-
sional hearings by those who believed that the exemption was too 
narrow 219 and should include use of generic terms. 220 As enacted, 
subsection 33(b) (4) is appreciably broader than the original propo-
sal, 221 and, while the subsection contains no reference to generic 
terms, barring an incontestable right to use in common descriptive 
names accomplishes the same result. 222 
If a mark was adopted without knowledge of the registrant's 
use and used continually prior to registration on the Principal Reg-
ister or republication of the mark that has become incontestable, 
subsection 33(b) (5) removes the area of continuous antecedent use 
from the application of the conclusive evidence rule. 223 Subsec-
tion 33(b) (6) similarly states that registration is not conclusive 
evidence in the area in which another person used a registered 
mark previous to registration on the Principal Register or repub-
lication of the mark that has become incontestable.224 Subsection 
33(b) (6) was regarded as a necessary concomitant of the requirement 
217. Use as a trademark is not a fair use. See Pure Foods, Inc. v. 
Minute Maid Corp., 214 F.2d 792 (5th Cir.), cert. den •. 348 U.S. 888 
(1954); Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 206 F.2d 144 (3d Cir.), 
cert. den., 346 U.S. 867 (1953). But see Jean Patou, Inc. v. Jacque-
line Cochran, Inc., 312 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1963). 
218. 1941 House Hearings at 63-65 (remarks of Robert W. Byerly). 
219. E.g., 1941 House Hearings at 63-74, 103-16. 
220. Statement of Milton Handler, 1941 House Hearings at 224-25; 1944 
Senate Hearings at 102-03 (remarks of Milton Handler). 
221. Compare H.R. 102, § 32(2), 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) with§ 33(b) 
(4), 60 Stat. 438 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (4) (1964). 
222. § 15(4), 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1065(4) (1964). 
But see Handler, note 206 supra, at 391-92 (1948). In Nissen Tram-
poline Co. v. American Trampoline Co., 193 F. Supp. 745 (S.D. Iowa 
1961) a court ordered cancellation of Lanham Act registration be-
cause of the genericness of the registered term, although neither in-
contestability nor the conclusive evidence rule appear to have been 
involved. 
223. § 33(b) (5), 60 Stat. 439 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (5) 
(1964); compare Hot Shoppes, Inc. v. Hot Shoppe, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 
777 (M.D.N.C. 1962) with Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Lakeland Groc-
ery Corp., 301 F.2d 156 (4th Cir.), cert. den., 371 U.S. 817 (1962). 
Modern day advertising may make the area of prior use extremely 
large. See Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 293, 
299-300 (S.D.N. Y. 1959) (dictum), aff'd on other grounds, 279 F .2d 
607 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 364 U.S. 909 (1960). 
224. § 33(b) (6), 60 Stat. 439 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (6) 
(1964). 
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in subsection 33(b) (5) that the privileged rights must be acquired 
in good faith. Otherwise, if there were several registrants of sim-
ilar marks, each of whom may have known of the others' use, the 
first to obtain an incontestable right to use might gain dispropor-
tionate rights with respect to the others simply because the Patent 
Office processed his papers first. 225 Subsection 33(b) (6) was ac-
cordingly conceived as removing the protection ordinarily afforded 
by the conclusive evidence rule with respect to concurrent users 
who obtained registration prior to registration on the Principal 
Register or republication of the mark that has become incontest-
able regardless of the concurrent users' knowledge of the mark 
that has become incontestable when they adopted their marks. This 
means that the constructive notice provided by section 22 should 
not preclude the availability of the subsection 33(b) (6) exception,226 
although section 22 probably does bar resort to the subsection 
33(b) (5) exception because of the latter's "without knowledge" re-
quirement. 227 
The relationship of subsections 33(b) (5) and 33(b) (6) to sec-
tion 15 has been subject to dispute. It has been assumed by at 
least one major commentator-Daphne Robert (Mrs. Leeds)-that 
subsection 33(b) (5) does not, and that subsection 33(b) (6) does, 
remove the incontestable right to use as a defense to a prayer 
for judicial restriction of registration on the theory that subsec-
tion 33(b) (5) dovetails with the state rights exception to section 
15, whereas subsection 33(b) (6) creates a new exception to both 
sections 15 and 33(b). 228 At first blush, it appears as though both 
of these assumptions are incorrect. This construction, for in-
stance, overlooks the language in section 33(b) restricting appli-
cation of the conclusive evidence rule to situations where "the 
right to use the registered mark has become incontestable." 229 
Since the state rights exception limits incontestability, neither 
section 33(b) nor subsection 33(b) (5) have relevance to the extent 
225. 1941 House Hearings at 168-70, 192. 
226. If the junior use was initiated in actual as well as constructive bad 
faith, however, attainment of registration would not protect the junior 
user because registration would be subject to cancellation at any 
time. § 14-15, 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1064-65 
(1964). 
227. Cf. Travelodge Corp. v. Siragusa, 228 F. Supp. 238 (N.D. Ala. 1964) 
(alternative holding). See contra Vandenburgh, Trademark Law and 
Procedure 55 (1959). ---
228. Robert, The New Trade-Mark Manual 140-43 (1947); see also Diggins, 
"The Lanham Trade-Mark Act," 37 Trademark Rep. 419, 432 (1947). 
229. § 33(b), 60 Stat. 438 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (1964). 
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that the state rights exception comes into play. 230 Instead, sub-
section 33(b) (5) eliminates the conclusive evidence rule in areas 
in which bona fide concurrent use commences during the interval 
between publication of the senior user's application for registra-
tion on the Principal Register and issuance of registration despite 
the failure of the state rights exception to preserve these rights.23l 
Moreover, contrary to Mrs. Leeds' position, there are indications 
in the legislative history that neither subsection 33(b) (5) nor sub-
section 33(b) (6) was intended to have any impact on section 15 be-
yond the removal of the incontestable right to use as an absolute 
defense to an infringement suit. Both the Senate and House con-
ferees told their respective colleagues: 
It is clear from the language of the act and from the 
congressional history of the act as it is found in the hearings 
and reports that the seven "defenses or defects" listed under 
paragraph (b) of section 33 are intended to relate to and to 
affect the weight of evidence to be given to the certificate of 
registration where the owner claims the benefit of the incon-
testable rule and where the opposite party can, by the weight 
of the evidence, establish any one of the things listed in the 
seven paragraphs in paragraph (b); but these seven paragraphs 
are not intended to enlarge, restrict, amend, or modify the 
substantive law of trademarks either as set out in other sec-
tions of the act or as heretofore applied by the courts under 
prior laws. [ Emphasis supplied.] 232 
On the other hand, despite the sweeping language of this statement, 
its specific purpose was to explain to Congress the effect of sub-
section 33(b) (7), not subsections 33(b) (5) and (6), and it is difficult 
to believe that the statement is correct insofar as these subsections 
are concerned. Subsections 33(b) (5) and (6) are only literally ap-
plicable if a registered or republished mark has become incontest-
able but the policy of the subsections must be equally relevant prior 
to the attainment of incontestability. Otherwise, incontestability, 
which was meant to enhance trademark rights, would lessen a reg-
istrant's rights with respect to the concurrent users protected by 
the subsections .233 The applicability of the policy of subsections 
33(b) (5) and (6) to registered marks that are not incontestable 
230. See "Developments in the Law-Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition," 
68 Harv. L. Rev. 814, 829-31 (1955). But see Travelodge Corp. v. 
Siragusa, 228 F. Supp. 238 (N.D. A_la. 1964). 
231. See notes 182-88 supra and accompanying text. 
232. 92 Cong. Rec. 7524 (1946) (remarks of Congressman Lanham); 92 
Cong. Rec. 7636 (1946) (remarks of Senator Hawkes). 
233. Cf. Forstmann Woolen Co. v. Murray Sices Corp., 10 F.R.D. 367 
(S.D.N.Y. 1950). 
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means that the subsections must, in effect, constitute exceptions 
to the prima facie evidence rule of section 7(b) as well as to the 
conclusive evidence rule of section 33(b) and, for this reason, 
should also be considered exceptions to the immunity from judicial 
restriction of registration accorded by section 15 as Mrs. Leeds 
suggested. If these exceptions affected the conclusive evidence 
rule and the prima facie evidence rule but not section 15, persons 
falling within the exceptions could enjoin use of the incontestable 
mark within their enclaves but could not obtain a restriction of 
the registration of the incontestable mark to reflect the registrant's 
actual right to use. It is more consistent with the Lanham Act's 
purpose of reconciling the right to register with the right to use 
to consider that subsections 33(b) (5) and 33(b) (6) permit those who 
can bring themselves within the exceptions to both enjoin the reg-
istrant of an incontestable mark and to obtain territorial restric-
tion of the incontestable mark's registration. Z34 
Subsection 33(b) (7) originated as a Senate amendment to the 
final House version of the Lanham Bill.235 The original Senate 
language created an exception to the conclusive evidence rule if 
"the mark has been or is being used in violation of the antitrust 
laws of the United States." 236 The enacted provision includes a 
conference committee revision limiting the exception to a mark 
that "has been or is being used to violate the antitrust laws of 
the United States." 237 This antitrust exception is tangible evid-
ence of the Justice Department's hostility to the theory of incon-
testability 238 and has been enbroiled in controversy from the 
234. Cf. Conley v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 125 U.S.P.Q. 2 (N.D. Cal. 1959). 
235. s." Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2 (1946). 
236. Ibid. (emphasis supplied). 
237. § 33(b) (7), 60 Stat. 439 (1946), 15 u.s.c. § 1115(b) (7) (1964) (em-
phasis supplied). 
238. E.g., Statement of the Department of Justice, 1944 Senate Hearings 
at 59-62. Justice Department fears that the Lanham Bill could be 
construed to license antitrust violations also led to a declaration in 
section 46 (a) of the Lanham Act that "nothing contained in this Act 
shall be construed as limiting, restricting, modifying, or repealing 
any statute in force on the effective date of this Act which does not 
relate to trade-marks, or as restricting or increasing the authority 
of any Federal department or regulatory agency except as may be 
specifically provided in this Act." Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, 
§ 46(a), 60 Stat. 445 (1946). The Justice Department characterized 
a prototype of this clause as "indefinite," "general," and an inade-
quate "safeguard against future interpretations of the bill ... as per-
mitting restraints of trade and the creation of monopolies." 1944 
Senate Hearings at 65. This judgment seems to have been borne 
out by subsequent events. The subsection has received no relevant 
interpretation and is not even reported in the text of the 1964 edition 
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moment of conception. 239 The principal issues are: (1) When is 
a mark used "to violate" the antitrust laws? (2) Was the antitrust 
exception intended to affect the capacity to sue for trademark in-
fringement? 240 
In submitting the conference report to the House, Congress-
man Lanham answered the first question as follows: 
If a trade-mark should be used the legal, causal, and effi-
cient instrumentality to effect a contract, agreement, or ar-
rangement which violates the antitrust laws [ sic.] then the 
actual use of the mark to carry out such a scheme would 
constitute a use in violation of the antitrust laws; but if the 
mark is in no sense an essential legal element of the unlaw-
ful conduct, then the fact that the registrant may have vio-
lated the antitrust laws would not bring paragraph (7) of 
paragraph (b) of section 33 into operation.241 
The Senate conferees later told the Senate that this statement 
meant that use of a trademark "must have been a part of the 
process of violating the antitrust laws" for section 33(b) (7) to 
apply. 242 These indications of Congressional intention make it 
difficult to agree with commentators who have minimized the ap-
plicability of section 33(b) (7). 243 A trademark would seem to be 
"part of the process of violating the antitrust laws" in numerous 
situations including those involving (1) patently unwarranted claims 
to trademark rights in commercially necessary language coupled 
with threats of infringement suits against competitors, 244 (2) agree-
ments by competitors to allocate markets and to require joint use 
(Footnote continued) t 
of the United States Code. See notes accompanying 15 U.S.C. § 1051 
(1964). See also "Quality Control and the Antitrust Laws in Trade- \ 
mark Licensing," 53 Trademark Rep. 113 0, 1164-68 (1963). 
239. E.g., Rogers, "The Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trade-
Marks," 14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 173, 183-84 (1949). 
240. Prior to the enactment of § 33(b) (7) a plaintiff's antitrust record had 
no effect on his ability to sue for trademark infringement. E.g., O. 
& W. Thum Co. v. Dickinson. 245 Fed. 609 (6th Cir. 1917), cert. den., 
246 U.S. 664 (1918); see Nicoson, "Misuse of the Misuse Doctrine in 
Infringement Suits," 9 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 76, 96 (1962). But see Folmer 
Graflex Corp. v. Graphic Photo Service, 41 F. Supp. 319 (D. Mass. 
1941), new trial granted on other grounds, 45 F. Supp. 749 (D. Mass. 
1942). 
241. 92 Cong. Rec. 7524-25 (1946). 
242. 92 Cong. Rec. 7873-74 (1946) (remarks of Senator Hawkes). 
243. E.g., Diggins, "The Lanham Trade-Mark Act," 37 Trademark Rep. 
419, 440 (194 7); Handler, note 206 supra, at 395 (1948). 
244. If several persons are involved in this conduct, it may constitute a 
conspiracy in restraint of trade violative of § 1 of the Sherman Act. 
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of a common mark so that remedies for trademark infringement 
can be utilized to police the division of territories,245 (3) a dom-
inant corporation's receipt of a trademark assignment from a 
competitor along with a transfer of the good will associated with 
the mark where the transaction results in a probable substantial 
lessening of competition,246 (4) exploitation of a trademark's com-
mercial value through tying clauses in trademark licenses which 
are unrelated to the licensor's duty to control the nature and qual-
ity of the goods sold by the licensee, 247 and (5) possibly even 
discriminatory grant of trademark licenses.248 
The number of instances in which trademarks may figure in 
antitrust violations makes the effect of subsection 33(b) (7) on tainted 
marks of considerable moment. The House conference committee 
report249 and Congressman Lanham 's presentation of the report to 
the House 250 maintain that the antitrust defense has exactly the 
effect that section 33(b) indicates; i.e., if a mark is used to violate ' 
the antitrust laws, the conclusive evidence rule does not apply in 
(Footnote continued) 
§ 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964), see Tirn-
berg, "Trade-Marks, Monopoly, and the Restraint of Competition," 
14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 323, 331 (1949). If a single individual is 
involved there could be an attempt to monopolize violative of section 
2 of the Sherman Act, § 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 u.s.c. 
§ 2 (1964), Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 71 F .2d 662 (2d Cir. 
1934), or an "unfair method of competition" under § 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act, § 5: 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 
U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1964); Christmas Club, 25 F.T.C. 1116 (1937); Al-
bany Chem. Co., 3 F.T.C. 369 (1921). 
245. See Farbenfabriken Bayer, A.G. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 307 F .2d 207 
(3d Cir. 1962), cert. den., 372 U.S. 929 (1963). 
246. See Farm Journal, Inc., 53 F,T.C. 26 (1956). A trademark can not 
be validly assigned without the good will associated with the mark. 
§ 10, 60 Stat. 431 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1964). 
247. A tying arrangement exists where a vendor will sell one product 
only if a purchaser will agree to buy another independent product as 
well. The existence of a trademark license was summarily dismissed 
as a justification for otherwise illegal tying clauses in Switzer Bros., 
Inc. v. Locklin, 297 F .2d 39 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. den., 369 U.S. 851 
(1962) where the tying clauses were not necessary to maintain the 
quality of the products on which the licensed mark was used. On the 
other hand, in Susser v. Carvel Corp. 332 F .2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), 
cert. dismissed, 33 U.S,L, Week 3355 (1965), a divided Second Cir-
cuit held that a trademark licensor's duty of quality control removed 
tying clauses related to the integrity of the trademark product from 
the category of an antitrust violation. For discussion of a trademark 
licensor's duty of quality control see Chapter Ill infra. 
248. See K,S. Corp. v. Chemstrand Corp., 203 Supp. 230 S,D.N.Y. 1962); 
K.S. Corp. v. Chemstrand Corp., 198 F. Supp. 310 (S,D.N. Y. 1961). 
249, H.R. Rep. No 2322, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., at 6 (1946). 
250. 92 Cong. Rec. 7524 (1946). 
IMPACT OF LANHAM ACT 69 
judicial proceedings. The Senate conferees, however, used the fol-
lowing language in explaining the conference committee's handiwork 
to the Senate: 
This exception means, and should mean, that a trade-mark 
owner who sues another user for infringement must come 
into court with clean hands, and if he is using the mark to 
violate the antitrust law he is subject to be contested and to 
have his violation used as a defense. [ Emphasis supplied.) 251 
[ T] he Senate inserted [ sic] this amendment to make it a 
defense to an infringement suit as well as to make it a ground 
of contestability if it should be shown that the registrant was 
using the mark itself to violate the antitrust law. [ Emphasis 
supplied. J 252 
Although it is possible to read the comments of the Senate con-
ferees as merely emphasizing that a defendant in an infringement 
suit can utilize subsection 33(b) (7) to preclude the plaintiff's as-
sertion of the conclusive evidence rule,253 it seems that the Sena-
tors meant something more. 254 In an effort to fathom the Senate 
conferees' oracular pronouncements several writers have noted 
that the other exceptions to the conclusive evidence rule are de-
fenses to an infringement suit so that subsection 33(b) (7) must 
also constitute a defense.255 However, many of these writers 
have not given equivalent emphasis to the fact that the other ex-
ceptions to the conclusive evidence rule are not uniformly avail-
able to every defendant in every infringement suit. Although fraud-
ulent registration, abandonment, or deceptive use of a mark can 
be raised by any defendant, "fair use," good faith concurrent use 
prior to registration of an incontestable mark, and use of a reg-
istered mark prior to registration or republication of an incontest-
able mark manifestly cannot be. This distinction may provide a 
solvent for fears that subsection 33(b) (7) would bar every suit for 
infringement of a mark subject to an antitrust defense if it is con-
ceded that the subsection affords a defense.256 
251. 92 Cong. Rec. 7636 (1946) (remarks of Senator Hawkes) (emphasis 
supplied). 
252. 92 Cong. Rec. 7873 (1946) (remarks of Senator O'Mahoney) (emphasis 
supplied.) 
253. See Robert, The New Trade-Mark Manual 210 (1947). 
254. See Lockhart, "Violation of the Anti-Trust Laws as a Defense in Civil 
Actions," 31 Minn. L. Rev. 507, 566-67 (1947); Tirnberg, note 244 
supra, at 359. 
255. See Handler, note 206 supra, at 395; Lockhart, note 254 supra, at 
567-68; Timberg, note 244 supra, at 359. 
256. See Nicoson, note 240 supra, at 97 & n. 141; Note, "The Antitrust 
Defense in Trademark Infringement Actions," 45 Va. L. Rev. 94, 
102-03, 106 (1959). 
70 TERRITORIAL TRADEMARK RIGHTS 
Section 33(a) states that registration is prima facie evidence 
of a registrant's exclusive right to use the mark on the goods 
specified in the certificate "but shall not preclude an opposing 
party from proving any legal or equitable defense or defect which 
might have been asserted if such mark had not been registered." 257 
On the other hand, section 33(b) declares that on attainment of an 
incontestable right to use registration is conclusive evidence of 
the exclusive right to use except with regard to seven enumerated 
defenses or defects, including use of a mark to violate the anti-
trust laws. 258 A possible inference from the wording of sections 
33(a) and (b) is that equitable defenses available against an ordin-
ary registration cannot be raised after attainment of an incontest-
able right to use unless enumerated in section 33(b). 259 Though 
there is dictum to this effect,260 it seems reasonably clear today 
that equitable defenses not specified in section 33(b) can be as-
serted to bar reliance on the conclusive evidence rule. 261 This 
construction was not, however, assured when the Lanham Bill was 
under legislative consideration. Therefore, if subsection 33(b) (7) 
was meant to do more than waive the conclusive evidence rule, 
the language of the Senate conferees and the juxtaposition of sec-
tions 33(a) and (b) suggest that the subsection was merely intended 
to preserve the possibility of raising an antitrust defense to in-
fringement suits where the maxim of clean hands would dictate the 
withholding of relief. Since at the time of the enactment of the 
Lanham Act there was no reported trademark infringement suit in 
which a defense of unclean hands had been sustained on the basis 
of a plaintiff's antitrust violations,262 subsection 33(b) (7) must have 
been predicated on the contemporary assumption that the burgeon-
ing "patent misuse" doctrine, which bars enforcement of patent 
rights during periods of misuse, would soon spill over into the 
257. § 33(a), 60 Stat. 438 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1115(a) (1964). 
258. § 33(b), 60 Stat, 438 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1115(b) (1964). 
259. See "Developments in the Law-Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition," 
68 Harv. L. Rev. 814, 830 (1955). 
260. Apple Grower Ass'n v. Pelletti Fruit Co., 153 F. Supp. 948, 951 
(N.D. Cal. 1957) (dictum); Richard Hudnut v. DuBarry, Inc., 127 U.S. 
P.Q. 486, 489 (S,D. Cal. 1960) (dictum), aff'd on other grounds, 323 
F .2d 986 (9th Cir. 1963). 
261. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 182 F. Supp. 350 
(E.D.N.Y. 1960), aff'd, 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 368 U.S. 
820 (1961), accord, Lance, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 210 F. Supp. 272 (E.D. 
Pa. 1962); Gillette Co. v. Ed Pinaud, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y, 
1959). 
262. The applicability of the maxim was, however, suggested on a motion 
to strike the defense in Folmer Graflex Corp. v. Graphic Photo Ser-
vice, 41 F. Supp. 319 (D. Mass. 1941), new trial granted on other 
grounds, 45 F. Supp. 749 (D. Mass. 1942). 
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trademark field. 263 Because a defense of "trademark misuse" 
would apply to all registered and unregistered marks, 264 subsec-
tion 33(b) (7)'s humble office was to ensure that an incontestable 
right to use would not destroy the defense. Viewed in this light, 
the subsection's reference to past as well as to present antitrust 
violations is not a command to deny perpetually relief to marks 
involved in antitrust violations but a simple declaration that un-
purged antitrust violations commenced prior to the effective date 
of the Lanham Act, as well as those initiated after July 5, 1947, 
can be raised as defenses when the registrant of an incontestable 
mark sues for infringement. 
If subsection 33(b) (7) has been read correctly, it is one of 
the ironies of legal history that a statutory provision intended to 
preserve the availability of an anticipated defense appears to be 
the principal reason for the potential existence of that defense. 
A full-fledged trademark misuse doctrine did not develop shortly 
after 1946 and has not developed to this day,265 but there are in-
dications that the very existence of subsection 33(b) (7) could re-
sult in evolution of the doctrine. In Forstmann Woolen Co. v. 
Murray Sices Corp., 266 for instance, Judge Medina theorized: 
Plaintiff urges that its violation of the anti-trust laws 
is no defense in an action for infringement of its trade-mark, 
citing numerous cases. Defendant relies on 15 U.S.C.A. § 1115. 
That Section, enacted as part of the Lanham Act of 1946, pro-
vides, in substance, that a mark which has become incontest-
able under the provisions of the Lanham Act may not be en-
forced where "the mark has been or is being used to violate 
the anti-trust laws of the United States." Plaintiff's marks are 
registered under the Act of 1905, and no incontestability at-
taches thereto. Nevertheless, if a trade-mark owner's use of 
his incontestable mark is subject to the defense specified in 
§ 1115 a fortiori, the plaintiff's mark, which lacks the status 
of incontestability, must be subject to the same defense.267 
Judge Medina granted the plaintiff's motion to strike the antitrust 
defense from the answer, however, because the antitrust violation 
pleaded did not involve the plaintiff's trademark. Several subsequent 
263. See Handler, note 206 supra, at 395-97; Ooms & Frost, note 139 
supra, at 228-30 (1949); Note, "The Besmirched Plaintiff and the 
Confused Public: Unclean Hands in Trademark Infringement," 65 
Colum. L. Rev. 109, 113-14 (1965). 
264. See Handler, note 206 supra, at 395-96. 
265. See Handler, "Trademarks-Assets or Liabilities," 48 Trademark 
Rep. 661, 674-76 (1958); ATRR 204:A-5 (6/8/65). 
266. 10 F .R.D. 367 (S.D.N. Y. 1950). 
267. 10 F.R.D. 367, 370. 
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cases which cite subsection 33(b) (7) or the Forstmann case for the 
propostition that an antitrust violation may bar an infringement suit 
are also on pleading or procedural points.268 An antitrust defense 
has yet to be sustained on the merits in an infringement suit. 269 
As soon as subsection 33(b) (7) was perceived to be the root 
of a trademark misuse doctrine, efforts were made to expunge the 
provision from the Lanham Act because of "the psychologically and 
legally undesirable effect of seemingly offering a weapon to un-
scrupulous competitors and infringers to avoid a judicial condem-
nation of their own conduct. • • • "270 Opinions expressed concern-
ing the proposed amendment reflected continuing controversy over 
the effect of subsection 33(b) (7). Proponents of amendment as-
sumed that the subsection either waived the conclusive evidence 
rule or legislated a defense to an infringement suit that would be 
unavailable after repeal. 271 The Justice Department concurred in 
the latter interpretation and opposed deletion of "an important weap-
on in enforcing the antitrust laws." 272 On the other hand, the re-
port of the Senate Judiciary Committee endorsing deletion stressed 
that subsection 33(b) (7) was surplusage because violation of the an-
titrust laws could always be raised via a defense of unclean hands.273 
Since subsection 33(b) (7) survived the 1962 amendments to 
the Lanham Act 274 it would be well to hazard a guess as to the 
future. The current view that the conclusive evidence rule can 
only be raised as a defense to an infringement suit275 postdates 
268. Sanitized, Inc. v. S,C. Johnson & Sons, Inc., 23 F .R.D. 230 (S.D.N. Y. 
1959); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Marshall-Wells Co., 1959 Trade Cas. 
,r 69343 (N.D. Ill. 1959) (mem.); Forstmann Woolen Co. v. Alexander's 
Dept. Stores, 11 F .R.D. 405 (S.D.N. Y. 1951). See also Aerojet-Gen-
eral Corp. v. Aero-Jet Prods. Corp., 33 F.R.D. 357 (N.D. Ohio, 1963). 
269. See Baker v. Simmons Co., 307 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1962); American 
Auto Ass'n v. Spiegel, 205 F.2d 771 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 346 U.S. 
887 (1953); G.D. Searle & Co. v. Institutional Drug Distribs., Inc., 
151 F. Supp. 715 (S.D. Cal. 1957). 
270. Derenberg, "The Fourth Year," 41 Trademark Rep. 893, 919 (1951). 
Cf. National Dynamics Corp. v. John Surrey, Ltd., 144 U.S,P .Q. 184 
(S.D.N. Y. 1964) for an example of abuse of an antitrust defense. 
271. See Statement on Behalf of National Trademark Coordinating Com-
mittee, 1954 Senate Hearings at 47-48. Compare Att'y Gen. Nat'l 
Comm. Antitrust Rep. 260 (1955). 
272. 1954 Senate Hearings at 94. 
273. Sen. Rep. 2266, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. at 9 (1954); see Derenberg, note 
270 supra, at 919. Compare Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 
260 (1955). 
274. See 4 Callmann, Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition, Supp., 1963, 
at 111-13 (2d ed. 1950). 
275. E.g., John Morrell & Co. v. Reliable Packing Co., 295 F.2d 314 (7th 
Cir. 1961); Rand McNally & Co. v. Christmas Club, 105 U,S,P.Q. 499 
(Comm'r 1955), aff'd on other grounds, 44 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 861, 
242 F.2d 776 (1957). 
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much of the discussion concerning subsection 33(b) (7). Statements 
on the floor of Congress and most writers have assumed that the 
conclusive evidence rule could be utilized by a plaintiff and that 
the antitrust defense limited the ability to do so. 276 The defensive 
interpretation of section 33(b) requires a compensating shift in anal-
ysis. 
The defensive interpretation of section 33(b) should lead to 
the conclusion that 33(b) (7) is unrelated to a registrant's ability 
to obtain affirmative relief for trademark infringement. When a 
registrant is sued for trademark infringement, the antitrust de-
fense simply reduces his registration to prima facie evidence of 
the exclusive right to use without constituting an independent ground 
for cancellation of registration or lifting the statute of limitations 
imposed by section 15 on certain grounds of judicial cancellation.27 7 
The duration of subsection 33(b) {7)'s suspension of the conclusive 
evidence rule turns on interpretation of the function of the sub-
section. If the previously suggested interpretation is accepted, 
and the subsection is considered to merely leave the door open 
for a trademark misuse doctrine, the conclusive evidence rule 
would only be waived while an antitrust violation continued-in the 
event that a trademark misuse doctrine crystallized.278 The con-
trary view that subsection 33(b) (7) constitutes a mandatory statu-
tory exception to the conclusive evidence rule would probably re-
sult in permanent suspension of section 33(b) once a mark had 
been used to violate the antitrust laws because the subsection's 
explicit reference to past as well as to present antitrust violations 
would permit plaintiffs to raise perpetually the same antitrust of-
fense to ward off the conclusive evidence rule.279 This mechan-
istic interpretation of the antitrust defense would be objectionable 
in that it offers no reward for repentance by an antitrust violator 
but would not inflict an intolerable penalty for his illegal conduct. 
Waiver of the conclusive evidence rule as a defense to an infringe-
ment suit is a pinprick at best. Since subsection 33{b) {7) has no 
effect on the prima facie evidence rule or the constructive notice 
276. E.g., 92 Cong. Rec. 7636 (1946) (remarks of Senator Hawkes); 92 
Cong. Rec. 7873 (1946) (remarks of Senator O'Mahoney); Loc_khart, 
"Violation of the Anti-Trust Laws as a Defense in Civil Actions," 
31 Minn. L. Rev. 507, 566-68 (1947). 
277. Cott Beverage Corp. v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 
300 (S.D.N. Y. 1956), appeal dismissed 243 F .2d 795 (2d Cir. 1957) 
(per curiam); see Robert, The New Trade-Mark Manual 144-47 (1947). 
278. See text accompanying notes 255-64 supra. Compare Robert, note 
277 supra, at 144. 
279. Cf., Nicoson, note 240 supra, at 97 & n.141 (1962); "Antitrust De-
fense In Trademark Infringement Actions," 45 Va. L. Rev. 94, 102-
03, 106 (1959). 
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prov1s1on, concurrent users should only be able to rebut defensive 
use of the prima facie evidence rule if they commenced good faith 
use prior to the commencement of constructive notice 280 or if a 
registered secondary-meaning mark lacked secondary meaning in 
a particular area.281 Moreover, in the latter instance the con-
structive notice provision would permit the registrant to expand 
the area in which his mark has secondary meaning insofar as 
persons who commenced use after constructive notice began are 
concerned.282 Interpretation of subsection 33(b) (7) as legislating 
an inflexible antitrust defense is only indefensible if this is con-
sidered to be a mandatory defense to infringement suits by a reg-
istrant. Viewed in this light, the explicit reference to past as 
well as to present antitrust violations would lead to total loss of 
trademark protection whenever a mark had been used to violate 
the antitrust laws because defendants could repeatedly raise the 
same antitrust offense as a defense to infringement suits.283 In 
stark contrast, the patent misuse doctrine, which provided the in-
spiration for subsection 33(b) (7), merely deprives a patentee of 
legal protection for the duration of patent misuse.284 Taken as 
a rigid statutory defense to trademark infringement, subsection 
33(b) (7) is an inexorable penalty offering no reward for repentance 
and no solace to a consuming public confused by unchecked appro-
priation of a condemned mark. 
D. Concurrent Registration 
The Act of 1905 neither authorized the Patent Office to con-
sider the equitable principles applied by the courts285 nor altered 
the equitable doctrine permitting concurrent territorial rights if a 
junior user adopted a mark in good faith;286 yet registration for 
280. The common-law rule that concurrent territorial rights must be ac-
quired in good faith would control unless a concurrent user who ob-
tained registration prior to registration or republication of the in-
contestable mark is entitled to greater territorial rights under § 33(b) 
(6) regardless of good faith. § 33{b) (6), 60 Stat. 439 (1946), as 
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (6) (1964). 
281. Cf. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Bavarian Brewing Co. 264 F .2d 88 (6th 
Cir. 1959). 
282. Cf. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d 
Cir. 1959). 
283. See Nicoson, note 240 supra, at 97 & n.141; "Antitrust Defense In 
Trademark Infringement Actions," 45 Va. L. Rev. 94, 102-03, 106 
(1959). 
284. United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457 
(1957). 
285. See Robert, The New Trade-Mark Manual 55-56 (1947). 
286. E.g., Griesdieck Western Brewery Co. v. Peoples Brewing Co., 149 
F.2d 1019 (8th Cir. 1945). 
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goods of the "same descriptive properties" was denied to all ex-
cept the first user.287 Section 2(d), 288 which authorizes concur-
rent registration, was one of several sections of the Lanham Act 
intended to remedy the glaring discrepancy between the right to 
use and the right to register which discredited the registry main-
tained under the Act of 1905. 289 Although section 2(d) is not a 
substantive provision of the Lanham Act because it has no direct 
effect on common-law concurrent territorial rights, section 2(d} 
interlocks with the substantive provisions and thus warrants dis-
cussion at this point. 
Section 2 (d} permits the Commissioner to issue concurrent 
registrations if he determines that confusion is unlikely because 
of distinctions "as to the mode or place of use of the marks or 
the goods in connection with which such marks are used," 290 but 
Patent Office practice has been to refuse concurrent registration 
unless there is a territorial distinction in the use of marks. 291 
If there is no likelihood of purchaser confusion because of differ -
ences in goods or in modes of use of a mark, the Patent Office 
maintains that an unrestricted registration is available and that 
287. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 5, 33 Stat. 725-26; e.g., Pennsylvania 
Petroleum Co. v. Pennzoil Co., 23 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 706, 80 F .2d 67 
(1933): California Packing Corp. v. Tillman & Bendel, Inc., 17 C.C.P.A. 
(Patents) 1048, 40 F.2d 108 (1930). 
288. § 2(d), 60 Stat. 428 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1964). 
289. See 1944 Senate Hearings at 45-46; 1939 House Hearings at 118-19 
for § 2(d)'s meager legislative history. Other noteworthy provisions 
are § 19, which permits the Patent Office tribunals to apply princi-
ples of laches, estoppel, and acquiescence, § 19, 60 Stat; 434 (1946), 
15 U.S.C. § 1069 (1964), and § 37, which empowers courts to direct 
the Commissioner of Patents to conform the register to their deci-
sions, § 37, 60 Stat. 440 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1119 (1964). Despite 
substantial improvement in the situation the Lanham Act has been 
said to make the right to register "nearly but not completely coin-
cident" with the right to use. Callmann, "Trademarks-the Right to 
Use vs. the Right to Register," 51 Trademark Rep. 1209 (1961). See 
also Lunsford, "The Right to Use and the Right to Register-the 
Trademark Anomaly," 43 Trademark Rep. 1 (1953). 
290. § 2(d), 60 Stat. 428 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1964). 
291. See Baxter Laboratories, Inc. v. Don Baxter, Inc., 87 U.S.P.Q. 122 
(Comm'r 1950), juris. retained, 38 C.C.P .A. (Patents) 786, 186 F .2d 
511 (1951); Ford Motor Co. v. Lincoln Radio & Television Corp., 99 
U .s.P .Q. 60 (Comm' r 1953). These cases were dee ided under the 
original wording of this portion of § 2(d) which permitted concurrent 
registration if the Commissioner found confusion unlikely because of 
distinctions "as to the mode or place of use or the goods in connec-
tion with which such registrations may be granted .... " § 2(d), 60 
Stat. 428 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1958). During 1954 hearings 
the Patent Office objected to amending this to read "or the goods in 
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concurrent registration is not required.292 Section 37 of the Lan-
ham Act permits a court to order issue of concurrent registration 
in these instances,293 but, as viewed by the Patent Office itself, a 
concurrent use proceeding is an inter partes proceeding 294 to de-
termine an applicant's right to a registration embracing part of 
the United States where another person is using the same or a 
similar mark on related goods in another part of the country. 
Section 2(d) prescribes the determinations that must be made by 
the Office in a concurrent use proceeding that is not based upon 
a judicial resolution of the right to use: confusion of purchasers 
must not be apt to result from concurrent use, and an applicant 
must have been found to have engaged in both lawful use in com-
merce and use prior to certain dates if applications to register 
confusingly similar uses have been filed by others.295 
(Footnote continued) 
connection with which the marks are used" on the basis of its theory, 
see text accompanying note 292 infra, that a sufficient difference be-
tween goods to forestall likelihoodof confusion would render concurrent 
use proceedings unnecessary and permit separate unrestricted regis-
tration. 1954 Senate Hearings at 19-20. Quaere: Should congres-
sional enactment of the language opposed by the Patent Office affect 
its theory? See Derenberg, "The Thirteenth Year," 50 Trademark 
Rep. 773, 875 (1960). For pro and con on the merits of the Patent 
Office approach, compare "Trade-Marks, Unfair Competition, and 
the Courts: Some Unsettled Aspects of the Lanham Act," 43 Trade-
mark Rep. 906, 914 (1953), with Derenberg, "The Seventh Year," 
44 Trademark Rep. 991, 1008-10 (1954). 
292. Rohn & Haas Co. v. C. P. Hall Co., 91 U.S.P.Q. 69 (Comm'r 1951); 
accord, Nebraska Consolidated Mills Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 118 
U.S.P.Q. 454 (Comm'r 1958). In the latter case the Assistant Com-
missioner specifically found that an unrestricted registration was 
possible. 
293. E.g., Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal, Inc., 279 F.2d 607 (2d Cir.), 
cert. den., 364 U.S. 909 (1960). 
294. See Appendix for the distinction between ex parte and inter partes 
Patent Office proceedings. 
295. A concurrent use proceeding will be instituted only if an application 
seeking concurrent territorial registration is pending in the Patent 
Office and the mark is registrable except for questions of concurrent 
registration. 37 C.F.R. § 2,99(a) (1960); e.g., Ex parte M. Wile & 
Co., 109 U.S.P.Q. 114 (Comm'r 1956). However, a Patent Office 
trademark examiner has discretion to allow amendment of a regular 
application in order to transform it into an application for concurrent 
registration, 37 C.F.R. § 2.73 (1960), and other Patent Office pro-
ceedings can be converted into concurrent use proceedings. Fair v. 
Twin City Wholesale Grocer Co., 98 U.S.P.Q. 16 (Comm'r 1953). As 
an alternative the Commissioner may restrict the territorial scope 
of an existing registration on the basis of evidence presented in 
another inter partes proceeding. Prince Dog & Cat Food Co. v. 
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Concurrent registrations are granted where marks would pro-
duce a likelihood of purchaser confusion if used in the same mar-
ket but this probability is obviated by a difference in trade terri-
tories. Section 2(d) requires a specific finding by the Patent Of-
fice that confusion between concurrent uses is unlikely; 296 a stip-
ulation by the interested persons to that effect is not controlling.297 
In close cases a probability of confusion is more apt to be found 
to exist if the marks have been in use a relatively short time,298 
especially if the concurrent users have adjacent markets. 299 On 
the other hand, experience in concurrent use of marks may pre-
clude an inference of likelihood of purchaser confusion that might 
otherwise have been made.300 
A person who has no legal right to use a mark obviously has 
no right to registration.301 In the context of concurrent territor-
ial use, the "lawful use" requirement means that a junior user who 
adopts his mark in constructive bad faith by virtue of section 22 
of the Lanham Act, as well as a junior user in actual bad faith, 
(Footnote continued) 
Central Nebr-aska Packing Co., 128 U.S.P.Q. 405 (Tm. Bd. 1961), 
rev' d on other grounds, 49 C.C.P .A. (Patents) 1328, 305 F .2d 904 
(1962). 
296. Ex parte Chadbourne Hosiery Mills, Inc., 107 U.S.P.Q. 12 (Comm'r 
1955). 
297. Ford Motor Co. v. Lincoln Radio & Television Corp., 99 U.S.P.Q.60 
(Comm'r 1953). 
298. See Flintkote Co. v. Merriam & Co., 88 U.S.P.Q. 390 (Comm'r 1951). 
See Derenberg, "The Fourth Year," 41 Trademark Rep. 893, 900-01 
(1951); Hancock, "Notes from the Patent Office," 46 Trademark Rep. 
53, 54 (1956). 
299. Flintkote Co. v. Merriam & Co., 88 U.S.P.Q. 390 (Comm'r 1951); see 
Old Monastery Wine Co. v. St. Julian Wine Co., 110 U.S.P .Q. 241 
(Comm'r 1956). The Flintkote case has been said to be too doctri-
naire on this point. See 20 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 246 (1951). The 
recent case of Coastal Chem. Co. v. Dust-A-Way, Inc., 139 U.S.P.Q. 
208 (Comm'r 1963) seems to evidence a more flexible approach; but 
§ 2(d) itself has been construed as requiring the Patent Office to ap-
ply the likelihood of confusion test more strictly than the courts. 
Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal, Inc., 279 F.2d 607 (2d Cir.), cert. 
den., 364 U.S. 909 (1960); accord, Craddock-Terry Shoe Corp. V:-
Billy Boy Co., 133 U.S.P.Q. 218 .(Tm. Bd. 1962). 
300. Nebraska Consolidated Mills Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 118 U.S.P.Q. 
454 (Comm'r 1958). 
301. E.g., Ex parte Crown Beverage Corp., 102 U.S.P.Q. 312 (Comm'r 
1954); see Carmo Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Markoulis, 121 u.s.P.Q. 46 (Tm. 
Bd. 1959). The converse is not necessarily true even under the 
Lanham Act. E.g., Salem Commodities, Inc. v. Miami Margarine 
Co., 44 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 932, 244 F.2d 729 (1957); see note 289 
supra. 
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is not entitled to concurrent registration.302 The Patent Office 
also takes the position that an extension of trade territory by a 
junior user after notice of senior use will not ordinarily be con-
sidered in determining the territory for which a junior user will 
be granted concurrent registration. In Coastal Chemical Co. v. 
Dust-A-Way, Inc., 303 the Commissioner declared: 
The first user in commerce which can lawfully be regulated 
by Congress is entitled to registration for the entire country 
less the area in which the other user can establish actual use 
prior to notice of adverse use.304 
The principal exception to this proposition occurs where a jWlior 
user obtains an unrestricted registration an appreciable period of 
time before the senior user applies for registration. In these cir-
cumstances, the Patent Office maintains that it increases the in-
centives to register if the junior user is allowed concurrent reg-
istration for the entire country with the exception of those states 
in which the senior user engaged in use prior to notice of the 
junior use,305 These rules-of-thumb are not inflexible, however, 
and the Patent Office may "balance the equities" in apportioning 
territorial rights. 306 
In the absence of a judicial determination of the right to use, 
concurrent registration can only be issued to a person who used 
his mark prior to the filing date of the earliest application by 
another to register a confusingly similar use on the Principal Reg-
ister,307 or prior to July 5, 1947, if a concurrent user has an un-
expired 1881 or 1905 registration.308 In the early days of the 
Lanham Act the Patent Office tended to restrict the scope of con-
current registration to the area of use at the time that the earli-
est relevant application was filed.309 This approach was supported 
302. See Coastal Chem. Co. v. Dust-A-Way, Inc., note 299 supra. A use 
that violates regulatory legislation is also not a "lawful use." Cf., 
Coahoma Chem. Co. v. Smith, 113 U.S.P.Q. 413 (Comm'r 1957),aff'd 
on other grounds, 46 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 801, 264 F.2d 916 (1959~ 
accord, In re Taylor, 133 U.S.P.Q. 490 (Tm. Bd. 1962). 
303. 139 u.s.P.Q. 208 (Comm'r 1963). 
304. 139 u.s.P.Q. 208, 210. 
305. Coastal Chem. Co. v. Dust-A-Way, Inc., note 299 supra. 
306. Haas Bros. v. Charles Jacquin et Cie., 143 U.S.P.Q. 37 (Comm'r 
1964). 
3 07. This includes applications which have matured into registrations. See 
Frontier Ref. Co. v. Frontier Oil Ref. Corp., 118 U.S.P.Q. 176 
(Comm'r 1958). 
308. An expired registration is not considered in concurrent use proceed-
(Comm'r 1953). 
ings. Fair v. Twin City Wholesale Grocer Co., 98 U.S.P.Q. 16 i 
309. E.g., Ex parte Chadbourn Hosiery Mills, Inc., 107 U.S.P.Q. 12 (Comlll1 
1955); Flintkote Co. v. Merriam & Co., 88 U.S.P.Q. 390 (Comm'r 1951) 
I 
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by a few commentators who made a deduction that section 2{d) was 
intended to regulate the acquisition of concurrent territorial rights 
from the language barring concurrent registration to a person 
whose use commenced after the filing of an application for regis-
tration by a senior user .310 If the filing of an application did not 
also preclude the acquisition of subsequent concurrent territorial 
rights, they apparently reasoned, a variance between the right to 
use and the right to register would continue to exist despite the 
avowed purpose of section 2{d). With all due respect to this ap-
proach, reading section 2 (d) as governing concurrent territorial 
rights is even more incongruous. This substantive interpretation 
reduces the constructive notice provision to surplusage because 
section 22 makes registration constructive notice and filing of an 
application to which section 2{d) refers necessarily precedes reg-
istration.311 Furthermore, under a substantive interpretation sec-
tion 2{d) as originally written312 would have barred acquisition of 
concurrent rights after the filing of an application under the act 
of 1881 in 1890, or under the Act of 1905 in 1910, in irreconcil-
able conflict with the clear intent of Congress that the Lanham 
Act should not impair rights acquired in good faith prior to July 
5, 1947 .313 
The flaws in a substantive interpretation of section 2(d) re-
quire acknowledgment of the fact that the section was poorly draft-
ed. 3l4 Although valid at common law, all good faith concurrent 
uses which were initiated after the filing of an application but be-
fore the operability of the constructive notice provision were in-
explicably denied registrability.315 The most signal aspect of the 
variance between the right to use and the right to register per-
petuated by section 2 {d) was, however, removed by the 1962 
310. E.g., Diggins, "The Lanham Trade-Mark Act," 37 Trademark Rep. 
305, 317 (1947). 
311. There are clear statements in the legislative history that § 22 was 
intended to reduce concurrent territorial use, e.g., 1939 House Hear-
ings at 125. This is not true with respect to § 2(d). See 1944 Senate 
Hearings at 45-46; 1939 House Hearings at 118-19. 
312. Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 2(d), 60 Stat. 428; Ex parte Stauffer 
Chem. Co., SO U.S.P.Q. 180 (Comm'r), reconsideration den., 81 U.S.P.Q. 
170 (Comm'r 1949). 
313. Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 49, 60 Stat. 446. The effect of the 
constructive notice provision on concurrent territorial rights is con-
sonant with this intent. Section 22 applies to 1881 and 1905 registra-
tions only as of July 5, 1947. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, 
Inc., 267 F .2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959). 
314. See Halliday, "Constructive Notice and Concurrent Registration," 38 
Trademark Rep. 111, 121 (1948). 
315. See Vandenburgh, "Concurrent Registration of Trademarks," 29 J. 
Pat. Off. Soc'y 720, 726-27 (1947). 
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amendments to the Lanham Act. The amendments conformed sec-
tion 2(d) and the constructive notice provision by making concur-
rent registration available to junior uses initiated in good faith 
prior to July 5, 1947, regardless of the filing of an earlier appli-
cation under the Acts of 1881 or 1905.316 A discrepancy between 
the right to use and the right to register continues to exist with 
respect to good faith concurrent uses begun during the interval 
between the filing of an application for registration on the Princi-
pal Register and issue of a registration to the applicant but other 
aspects of the Lanham Act can be utilized to correct the situation, 
Section 2(d} itself gives the Patent Office discretion to issue con-
current registration if a court "has finally determined that more 
than one person is entitled to use the same or similar marks in 
commerce. n317 At least subsequent to the 1962 amendments to 
the Lanham Act, this language permits the Patent Office to com-
pensate for the lack of coalescence between section 2(d) and sec-
tion 22 whenever a court has sanctioned concurrent use that com-
menced after the filing of an application for registration,318 Fur-
thermore, if a court order concurrent registration in addition to 
recognizing lawful concurrent use, section 37 compels the Patent 
Office to comply. 319 
E. Evaluation of the Impact of the Lanham Act on Territorial 
Trademark Rights 
The most important section of the Lanham Act from the 
standpoint of concurrent territorial use is clearly the constructive 
notice provision. By imputing knowledge of a registered mark to 
subsequent users, section 22 enhances a registrant's ability to 
316. § 2{d), 60 Stat. 428 {1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1964); 
see Hoge, "The Lanham Act's Housekeeping Amendments," 52 Trade-
mark Rep. 1245, 1251 (1962). 
317. § 2{d), 60 Stat. 428, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1964). 
318. Prior to the 1962 amendments this clause began with the words "and 
concurrent registrations may be similarly granted by the Commis-
sioner .... 11 § 2{d), 60 Stat. 428 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1958). 
Derenberg argued that the term "similarly" made the restrictions on 
concurrent registration in § 2{d) applicable to registration based on 
a court decree. See Derenberg & Merchant, "Problems in Registra-
tion Procedure," 37 Trademark Rep. 799, 801 (1947). While the Pat-
ent Office seemed to take a contrary position even prior to the 1962 
amendments, see Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Dunhill Tailored Clothes, Inc., 
49 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 730, 741 n. 8, 293 F.2d 685, 693 n. 7, cert. den., 
369 U.S. 864 (1961); Ex parte Crown Beverage Corp., 102 U,S.P.Q. 
312 (Comm'r 1954), the deletion of "similarly'' by those amendments 
should remove whatever doubt previously existed. 
319. § 37, 60 Stat. 440 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 119 (1964); Ex parte Westgate 
Sea Prods. Co., 84 U.S.P.Q. 368, 371-72 (Comm'r 1950) (dictum). 
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expand the geographical scope of his business operations under his 
existing trademarks. Restriction of the grounds of cancellation and 
acquisition of an incontestable right to use generally supplement 
section 22 by making registration, on which the constructive notice 
provision hinges, more secure. It is accordingly highly significant 
that during the hearings on the Lanham Bill the Justice Department 
never leveled a specific attack at section 22. 320 Indeed, through 
criticism of the recognition of the principle of concurrent territor-
ial rights in the concurrent registration provisions, 321 the Anti-
trust Division might be said to have inferentially supported the 
constriction of concurrent territorial rights that section 22 was 
meant to bring about. This is not to say that some of the claims 
concerning the effect of section 22 were not extravagant or that 
the Justice Department was justified in its attack on section 2(d). 
Both during the legislative hearings and in published articles 
certain individuals have steadfastly maintained that section 22 both 
precludes acquisition of any rights by junior users who inaugurate 
use after constructive notice begins and prevents persons who be-
gan use prior to registration by another from expanding their ter-
ritorial rights.322 The first proposition was sustained by the Sec-
ond Circuit in Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc.,323 the 
second is questionable, although supported by the Patent Office in-
terpretation of the concurrent registration provisions in Coastal 
Chemical Co. v. Dust-A-Way, Inc.324 In Coastal, the Commis-
sioner announced that a senior user was ordinarily entitled to con-
current registration "for the entire country less the area in which 
the other user can establish actual use prior to notice of adverse 
use .... , "325 but, because a junior user had sought and obtained 
an unrestricted registration 38 months before the senior user filed 
an application, the junior user was granted concurrent registration 
for every state except those in which the senior user established 
adverse rights prior to notice of the junior use. 
320. But see 1944 Senate Hearings at 41-42 (remarks of Elliott H. Moyer). 
The Antitrust Division's general opposition to the need for revision 
of the trademark laws, of course, encompassed § 22. E.g., Statement 
of the Department of Justice, id. at 58-71. 
321. Id. at 38-39 (remarks of Bartholemew Diggins); Statement of the De-
partment of Justice, id. at 63-64. 
322. E.g., 1943 House Hearings at 49-50 (remarks of Wallace J. Martin); 
1941 House Hearings at 169 {remarks of Wallace J. Martin); Martin, 
"Incentives to Register Given by the New Trade-Mark Act," 36 Trade-
mark Rep. 213, 216 (1946). 
323. 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959). 
324. 139 U.S.P.Q. 208 (Comm'r 1963). 
325. Id. at 210. 
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The Coastal theory concerning the effect of notice on con-
current territorial rights is unworkable and illustrates the implau-
sibility of the contention that section 22 forecloses acquisition of 
fresh territorial rights by concurrent users who obtained initial 
rights before registration by another. If mere notice of conflicting 
rights precluded either a senior or a junior user from gaining new 
territorial rights, their legal positions would be frozen on the date 
notice was received and there could theoretically be blocks ofter-
ritory in which neither party could acquire rights. It will not do 
to say that notice will generally be provided solely by section 22 
so that only a nonregistrant will lose the ability to increase his 
rights. The dispatch of letters advising concurrent users of their 
lack of rights is a commonplace of trademark practice326 which 
would undoubtedly become even more popular if the Coastal theory 
represented the law; and, assuming that both a senior and junior 
user are aware of each other's existence, Coastal produces an ab- ' 
surd result in territory untapped by either party prior to notice 
of the other's existence. Commercial life is not static and one or 
the other will eventually expand his area of use. Once this dyna-
mic user presses into an unoccupied area in which he is allegedly 
deprived of rights because of his notice of another use on compet-
ing goods, how will the courts react to the fact of expansion? 
Should another concurrent user who also has no rights in the area 
be able to enjoin the expansion? Logic says no and Dawn supports 
this by denying relief to even a person with superior rights if con-
current use does not produce likelihood of purchaser confusion. 
But if no one can sue to stop this expansion what is the point in 
saying that a person with knowledge of conflicting use can not ob-
tain further rights? Furthermore, once expansion has taken place 
and the public has become familiar with the mark, it would impair 
the identification function of trademarks to deny the expander re-
lief against other concurrent users in his new territory, and, if he 
obtains relief as he should, he will in substance have obtained 
additional rights through expansion regardless of the Coastal theory, 
The unreality of the Patent Office position is further under-
scored by its radical deviation from sensible common-law princi-
ples. At common law a senior user's knowledge of junior use had 
no affect on his potential territorial rights unless it resulted in lachei 
or acquiescence in a junior user's expansion into an area in which 
the senior user had originally had rights.327 Moreover, the Hanove -and Rectanus concept of a good faith junior user determined whether 
326. E.g., Tillman & Bendel Inc. v. California Packing Corp., 63 F.2d 
498 (9th Cir.), cert. den., 290 U.S. 638 (1933). 
327. E.g., Jacobs v. Iodent Chem. Co., 41 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1930). 
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concurrent territorial rights could be acquired at all, but, once 
this threshold question was answered affirmatively, the extent of 
those rights depended primarily on precedence in the penetration 
of a market. Thus, in J. A. Dougherty's Sons v. Kasko Distillers 
Products Corp.328 the court limited a senior user to the following 
relief against a good faith junior user: 
The plaintiff [ the senior user] is entitled to a decree eniom-
ing the defendant [ the junior user] from using the trade-mark 
"Country Gentleman" in those areas outside of Pennsylvania 
where the plaintiff is using the same or may do so in the 
normal course of sales expansion .... 329 
The language of the United States Supreme Court in American 
Trading Co. v. H. E. Heacock Co.330 is also instructive. The 
plaintiff in American Trading was associated with the Internation-
al Silver Co., one of two concurrent users of "Rogers" for silver-
ware in the United States. Plaintiff distributed the International 
Silver Co. 's products in the Philippines and obtained registration 
of the "Rogers" mark there. When a competitor sought to import 
silverware manufactured by Wm. A. Rogers, Ltd., the other user 
in the United States, plaintiff obtained relief under Philippine law 
which was sustained by the Supreme Court in the following terms: 
[I] t is unnecessary to consider the respective rights of the 
International Silver Company and Wm. A. Rogers, Limited, 
in relation to the use of their marks in the States of the 
Union. These rights have been the subject of numerous ju-
dicial decisions. It is sufficient to say that when petitioners 
entered the trade within the Philippine Islands in 1925, they 
found a field already occupied and were bounded to respect 
the rights there established. Nor do we find any ground for 
holding that the respondent is estopped from seeking relief 
by reason of its relation to the International Silver Company. 
Respondent manifestly had acquired an interest in the local 
trade which was entitled to protection, and it has sought and 
obtained that protection in accordance with the law governing 
that trade.331 
It is easy to comprehend why mere notice of another use 
should not bar further expansion of territorial markets by a person 
who has already acquired concurrent territorial rights. The doc-
trine of concurrent territorial rights is noncompetitive because the 
rights acquired by each concurrent user raise legal barriers to 
328. 35 F. Supp. 561 (E.D. Pa. 1940). 
329. Id. at 565. 
330. 285 U.S. 247 (1932). 
331. Id. at 260-61 (sustaining the validity of a Philippine trademark regis-
tration statute relied on by the plaintiff}. 
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the expansion of markets under the same mark by the others. 
This may be justified at common law by the desirability of pro-
tecting the identification function of trademarks if there is actual 
market conflict between concurrent users and by the desirability 
of avoiding forfeiture of a junior user's good will if he did not 
have fair notice of the senior use when he adopted his mark; but 
there are no concomitant justifications for precluding a good faith 
junior user, or a senior user, from extending his concurrent ter-
ritorial rights where this does not involve a clash with a concur-
rent user. It would merely restrain trade without countervailing 
benefit to permit one concurrent user to enjoin another in an area 
where the plaintiff's mark is not used, advertised, or known, and 
it would result in unwarranted forfeiture of a defendant's good will 
to allow a concurrent user who was the last to reach such a mar-
ket to summarily oust his predecessor. The judges were right in 
considering that later-acquired knowledge of concurrent use did not 
petrify a senior user's or a good faith junior user's ability to ac-
quire additional rights at common law once the applicability of the 
noncompetitive doctrine of concurrent territorial rights was estab-
lished. 
The common-law concept that notice of concurrent use does 
not inhibit extension of previously-gained territorial rights is easily 
engrafted on section 22, and properly so in the light of its propo-
nents' statements that section 22 was intended to operate within 
the interstices of the Hanover and Rectanus doctrine.332 Indeed, 
this interpretation may already have been adopted by the Second 
Circuit. In Avon Shoe Co., Inc. v. David Crystal, Inc.333 Judge 
Hincks commented: 
It is true that the Lanham Act indeed prevents a junior user 
from claiming good faith when his use begins subsequent to 
a prior user's registration under the Act. But that provision 
is inapplicable here. For the defendant's use commenced more 
than two years prior to the effective date of that Act.334 
The principal difficulty with respect to this interpretation of sec-
tion 22 arises with respect to incontestability and the conclusive 
evidence rule. Subsection 33(b) (5)335 excepts from the conclusive 
evidence rule, and by implication from section 15, only the area 
in which a good faith junior user used his mark prior to registra-
tion or republication by another of the mark that has become 
332. See note 102 supra and accompanying text. 
333. 279 F.2d 607 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 364 U.S. 909 (1960). 
334. Id. at 611. 
335. 60 Stat. 439 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1115(b) (5) (1964). 
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incontestable. If an incontestable right to use were a defense to 
an infringement suit and to a prayer for a cancellation in the area 
in which a good faith junior user broadens his use following reg-
istration or republication by another of a mark that has become 
incontestable, it would be difficult to maintain that the junior user 
could obtain rights in this territory. The impact of subsection 
33(b) (5) is, however, negated where any of the exceptions to sec-
tion 15 can be established because section 33(b) is only applicable 
"if the right to use the registered mark has become incontestable 
able .•.. 11336 One of the exceptions to section 15 is that a reg-
istered mark "has been abandoned." 337 The relevance of this 
exception is demonstrated by the following excerpt from Hanover 
Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf:338 
Allowing to the Allen & Wheeler firm and corporation [the 
senior user] the utmost that the proofs disclose in their 
favor, they have confined their use of the "Tea Rose trade-
mark to a limited territory, leaving the south-eastern States 
untouched. . . . If, during the long period that has elapsed 
since the last specified sale of Allen & Wheeler "Tea Rose"-
this was "in the later 701 s" -that flour has been sold in other 
parts of the United States, excluding the south-eastern States, 
no clearer evidence of abandonment by non-user of trade-mark 
rights in the latter field could reasonably be asked for. [Em-
phasis supplied.] 339 
Hanover suggests that subsection 33(b) (5) should be inapplicable 
because of abandonment of a registrant's rights derived from reg-
istration in those areas in which a good faith junior user engages 
in unobstructed and substantial expansion of his use following reg-
istration or republication by another of a mark that has become 
incontestable. 340 
A similar analysis should be employed with respect to a 
senior user who neglects to obtain registration before it is obtained 
by a good faith concurrent user. Because nonregistrant senior 
users are thereby penalized for exploiting open markets, it is a 
336. § 33(b), 60 Stat. 438 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1115(b) (1964). 
337. § 15, 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1964). 
338. 240 u.s. 403 (1916). 
339. Id. at 419. 
340. This interpretation is consistent with Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food 
Stores, Inc., 367 F .2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959). Dawn held that use by a 
registrant anywhere in the nation retained the benefit of the construc-
tive notice provision in areas of nonuse. The above discussion is 
based on the assumption that section 22 does not bar extension of 
concurrent territorial rights by a person who obtained these rights 
before constructive notice began. The abandonment referred to is of 
the territorial rights that might otherwise be derived from § 33(b) (5). 
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euphemism for a restraint of trade to characterize a rule fore-
closing further aggrandizement of territorial rights by the nonreg-
istrant senior user as "an incentive to register." Small penalties 
might be appropriate for a failure to register but an arbitrary de-
limitation of territorial rights throughout the length and breadth of 
the United States is not. Indeed, nonregistrant senior users are 
treated even more harshly by section 15 and 33(b) than good faith 
junior users. Their rights are protected solely by the state rights 
exception to section 15 which cuts off rights as of the date of pub-
lication or republication of the registrant's mark that has become 
incontestable.341 This unnecessarily harsh and noncompetitive re-
sult should be compensated for by considering that a registrant's 
territorial rights derived from registration are abandoned in those 
areas in which a nonregistrant senior user engages in unobstructed 
and substantial expansion of his use following publication or re-
publication by another of a mark that has become incontestable. 
The Justice Department's attack on the concurrent registration 
provisions was as out of focus as some of the claims concerning 
the import of section 22. During the hearings on the Lanham Bill 
the Antitrust Division maintained that the concurrent registration 
provisions could be "utilized to establish and police divisions of 
territory .•• by registrations in the Patent Office." 342 This was 
anomalous for the concurrent registration provisions reflected the 
common-law doctrine of concurrent territorial rights343 and a ma-
jor theme of the Justice Department's opposition to the proposed 
legislation was the adequacy of the common law to protect "legit-
imate rights" of trademark users.344 Insofar as the Justice De-
partment objected to the principle of concurrent territorial rights, 
its quarrel was with the common law, not the Lanham Bill, but 
the Antitrust Division was probably primarily concerned with the 
practice of concurrent territorial use. The effect that issue of 
concurrent registrations can have on the incidence of concurrent 
use is necessarily conditioned by the fact that territorial restric-
tions in a registration curtail only the advantages derived from 
registration and not the capacity to use a mark.345 Since several 
341. § 15, 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1964). 
342. 1944 Senate Hearings at 64. 
343. See Derenberg & Merchant, "Problems in Registration Procedure," 
37 Trademark Rep. 799, 802 (1947); Legislative Note, "Possible Monop-
oly Implications in the Trade-Mark Bill," 32 Geo. L.J. 171, 174, 181 
(1944). 
344. E.g., 1944 Senate Hearings at 59. 
345. In re National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 49 C.C,P.A, (Patents) 854, 
863, 297 F .2d 941, 948 (1962) (concurring opinion); Alfred Dunhill, 
Inc. v. Dunhill Tailored Clothes, 49 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 730, 738 N.5, 
293 F.2d 685, 691 n.4, cert. den., 369 U.S. 864 (1961). 
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of these substantive advan'i:ages, like the constructive notice pro-
vision and incontestability, penalize junior users by inhibiting sub-
sequent acquisition and enforcement of concurrent territorial rights, 
concurrent registration may weaken registration as a deterrent to 
concurrent territorial use by limiting the territorial scope of the 
substantive provisions of the Lanham Act; but this would not neces-
sarily encourage concurrent territorial use over and above that 
probable at common law. The Justice Department's forebodings 
could only have been realized if the Patent Office had interpreted 
section 2(d} as permitting concurrent registration in circumstances 
in which concurrent territorial rights would not have been recog-
nized at common law. 
Whatever might have occurred, the Patent Office has taken 
its cue from the legislative hearings and administered the statute 
so as to avoid the consequences forseen by the Justice Depart-
ment.346 Section 2(d) requires a formal Patent Office proceeding 
before concurrent registration can be issued regardless of any 
understanding among the persons affected,347 and the Patent Office 
has stubbornly adhered to the spirit of the requirement. From the 
first, concurrent registration has been treated as an "extraordin-
ary remedy for extraordinary circumstances" that is not routinely 
granted.348 A person must have engaged in substantial use of his 
mark and must have acquired common-law rights for concurrent 
registration to be available.349 Moreover, even though a right to 
concurrent registration may be unquestionable, the Patent Office 
has disregarded private agreements concerning the appropriate 
territorial scope of concurrent registration to what some believe 
is an extreme degree. 350 Although the 1962 decision of the Court 
346. See Hancock, "Notes from the Patent Office," 45 Trademark Rep. 
272, 273 (1955); Timberg, "Trade-Marks, Monopoly, and the Restraint 
of Competition," 14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 323, 352-53 (1949). 
347. E.g., Ex parte Chadbourn Hosiery Mills, Inc., 107 U.S.P.Q. 12 (Comm'r 
1955). The original conception of concurrent registration was exactly 
the opposite. In 1925 it was proposed that "plural registrations" should 
be permitted only if the interested parties filed written consents in the 
Patent Office. See Derenberg, "The First Year," 38 Trademark Rep. 
831. 849-50 (1948). 
348. See Leeds, "Trademarks from the Government Point of View," 44 
Calif. L. Rev. 489, 494-96 (1956); Hancock, "Notes from the Patent 
Office," 46 Trademark Rep. 53 (1956), 45 Trademark Rep. 272 (1955). 
349. Compare B-1 Beverage Co. v. Rock Creek Ginger Ale Co., 110 U.S. 
P .Q. 381 (Comm 'r 1956) with Old Monastery Wine Co. v. St. Julian 
Wine Co., note 299 supra, see Hancock, "Notes from the Patent Of-
fice," 46 Trademark Rep. 53-54 (1956); Leeds, "Trademarks from 
the Government Viewpoint," 44 Calif. L. Rev. 489, 494-96 (1956). 
350. E.g., Ex parte Chadbourn Hosiery Mills, Inc., note 347 supra; see 
Derenberg, "The Ninth Year," 46 Trademark Rep. 1017, 1073-75 
(1956). 
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of Customs and Patent Appeals in In re Nat'l Distillers & Chem. 
Corp. 351 indicated that agreements among interested persons should 
be given greater weight in ordinary registration proceedings, the 
transfer value may not be great insofar as concurrent registration 
proceedings are concerned. Section 2(d} itself bars consent as a 
basis for concurrent registration and the Commissioner continues 
to look askance at stipulations concerning the territorial scope of 
concurrent registration. 352 
Another possible basis for the Justice Department's aversion 
to section 2(d) may have been a largely unarticulated concern that 
issue of concurrent registration on the basis of a private agree-
ment for concurrent use would impair the Justice Department's 
ability to attack the underlying agreement. Since the Patent Office 
can only authorize concurrent registration if marks are in "con-
current lawful use, 11353 it can plausibly be contended that issue of 
concurrent registration on the basis of an agreement for concur-
rent territorial use would constitute an administrative determina-
tion that the agreement did not violate the antitrust laws.354 How-
ever it is doubtful that this determination would have any impact 
on antitrust liability. Congressional approval of a pervasive scheme 
of regulation may preclude antitrust proceedings with regard to 
matters entrusted to an administrative agency, but Patent Office 
regulation of territorial allocations by competitors is hardly per-
vasive.355 This is made explicit by section 46(a} of the Lanham 
Act which provides that: 
[ NJ othing contained in this Act shall be construed . .. as re-
stricting or increasing the authority of any Federal depart-
ment or regulatory agency except as may be specifically pro-
vided by this act.356 
351. 49 C .C .P.A. (Patents) 854, 297 F .2d 941 (1962). 
352. Coastal Chem. Co. v. Dust-A-Way, Inc., note 299 supra. In Haas 
Bros. v. Charles Jacquin et Cie, 143 U.S.P.Q. 37 (Comm'r 1964) the 
Commissioner adopted the terms of a stipulation concerning the scope 
of concurrent registration but only after an affirmation of his power 
to disregard the agreement and a careful review of the facts. 
358. § 2(d), 60 Stat. 428 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1964). 
354. Though the requirement of "lawful use" was not one of the last minute 
Senate amendments intended to harmonize the Lanham Bill with the 
antitrust laws, concurrent use pursuant to an agreement violative of 
the antitrust laws would certainly not be "lawful." See "Developments 
in the Law-Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition," 68 Harv. L. Rev. 
814, 899-900 (1955). 
355. Compare Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 
U.S. 296 (1963) (preclusion) with California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 
369 U.S. 482 (1962) (nonpreclusion). 
356. Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 46(a), 60 Stat. 445. 
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Voluntary judicial deference to a Patent Office determination of 
"lawful concurrent use" also seems improbable in view of the 
Patent Office's lack of sophistication in antitrust matters.:357 
The Justice Department's disapproval of the concurrent reg-
istration provisions can not in fairness be taken as a strong in-
dorsement of the right to territorial expansion accorded a regis-
trant by section 22 with respect to persons who adopted their 
marks after constructive notice began. It should be acknowledged 
that the objections raised to incontestable rights,358 particularly 
with respect to generic and descriptive terms,359 would also be 
relevant to the broad territorial rights derived from section 22. 
The Justice Department essentially contended that facilitating the 
acquisition of greater exclusivity in trademark rights through fed-
eral legislation would be detrimental to small business. :3GO Al-
though "small business" is a difficult concept to define, 3Gl the 
context makes reasonably clear what the Justice Department had 
in mind. The Lanham Bill was strongly supported by the National 
Association of Manufacturers362 and the United States Trademark 
Association. 363 Since both of these organizations have a sizable 
number of large manufacturers among their membership, the Jus-
tice Department would appear to have championed the cause of 
manufacturers who produce goods for regional or local markets 
as well as the myriad of local businesses that retail goods and 
services. :3G4 
The plea on behalf of local business was more substantial. A 
company that has developed a regional or multistate marketing 
system365 should possess sufficient financial resources to be able 
to afford trademark advice and protection.366 A multistate or region-
al business should also possess sufficient commercial sophistication 
357. See Diggins, "The Lanham Trademark Act," 37 Trademark Rep. 305, 
322 (1947). 
358. See, e.g., 1944 Senate Hearings at 40 (remarks of Elliott H. !\Toyer). 
359. Sec, e.g., Statement of the Department of Justice, id. at S9-G2, id. 
at 1:36 (remarks of Elliott H. Moyer). 
360. Statement of the Department of Justice, id. at 59. 
361. See Adelman, "Small Business-A Matter of Definition," lG A.D.A. 
Antitrust Section 18 (1960). 
362. See 1941 House Hearings at 129-32. 
363. See id. at 124-26. 
364. See Carretta, "Some Competitive Practices with which Small Business 
Must Contend," 24 Law & Contemp. Prob. 169 (1959); e.g., 1944 Senate 
Hearings at 39, 41-42 (remarks of Elliott H. Moyer). 
365. Local firms located on or near state lines excepted. See 1941 House 
Hearings at 184. 
366. Cf. Harnish, "The New Trade-Mark Law," 32 Mass. L.Q. 27, :l2 
(1947). A fair amount of general information can be obtained at 
nominal cost from the government either by writing one's clcctecl 
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to be chargeable with the legal consequences of failure to search 
for conflicting registrations in the Patent Office before adopting 
a mark and the legal consequences of failure to register that mark. 
A thriving but modest interstate business has actually far more to 
gain than to lose from the substantive provisions of the Lanham 
Act. Under the common law a smaller business with a "magic" 
trademark was not only subject to depredations by minor league 
buccaneers who commenced simulated bona fide uses in separate 
territories in order to cash in on the potentialities of the mark, 
but was also subject to virtual encirclement by commercial giants 
with the same disguised purpose and greater resources. The com-
mon law stacked the cards in favor of big business. Because the 
extent of territorial rights turned on the extent of use, only the 
largest firms were able to establish broad territorial rights quick-
ly enough to head off most potential concurrent users.367 Small 
firms, which could least afford it, were more likely to be am-
bushed by good faith concurrent users as they slowly expanded 
their markets. By their inroads on the common law, the substan- I 
tive provisions of the Lanham Act placed small business on a more 
equal plane with big business. For the price of registration a 
small company can obtain the same legal opportunity to expand its 
markets under a mark that a big company can. Furthermore, reg-
istration serves as a protective shield with which to ward off sor-
ties by commercial giants.368 On the other hand, it cannot be de-
nied that the nationwide rights derived from registration place local 
business on a procrustean bed. Even today how many of the local 
drug stores, grocery stores, or haberdasheries that place their 
labels on a few items can realistically be expected to check the 
federal registry first, and then obtain registration? Moreover, 
registration is not available without use in commerce, and local 
firms are unlikely to be acquainted with the subtleties of token 
use.369 
(Footnote continued) 
representatives, e.g., 1941 House Hearings at 185 (remarks of Con-
gressman Lanham), or the Government Printing Office. E.g., Watson, 
Small Business and Trade-Marks (Economic-Small Business-Series 
No. 68 G.P,O. 1949). 
367. See Hopkins, Trademarks, Tradenames, and Unfair Competition 25 
(4th ed. 1924). 
368. See A. Smith Bowman Distillery, Inc. v. Schenley Distillers, Inc., 
198 F. Supp. 822 (D. Del. 1961); Borg-Warner Corp. v. York-Shipley, 
Inc., 127 U.S.P.Q. 42 (N,D. Ill. 1960), modified, 293 F.2d 88 (7thCir.), 
cert. den., 368 U.S. 939 (1961); Conley v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 125 
u.s.P.Q. 2 (N.D. Cal. 1959). 
369. See, e.g., 1941 House Hearings at 73-74, 181-87 (remarks of Louis 
Robertson). 
IMPACT OF LANHAM ACT 91 
An obvious rejoinder to the Justice Department's concern 
over the effect of the Lanham Act on local business is that this 
effect is de minimus when compared with the benefit accruing to 
multistate enterprise. Certainly the advertising expenditures in-
vested in trademarks in multistate use would ordinarily be greater 
than those in local use. By the same token, forcing a multistate 
firm to adopt a new mark should impose a greater financial burden 
than requiring a local firm to do so.370 Furthermore, the Lanham 
Act is not devoid of features which cushion its impact on local busi-
ness. The constructive notice pro-vision's lack of effect of con-
current uses initiated before constructive notice commenced aids 
established local businesses.371 The act's limitation to interstate 
commerce, albeit "all commerce which may lawfully be regulated 
by Congress," 372 has some, 373 if not a great deal, of cushioning 
effect;374 and the "fair use" exception to the conclusive evidence 
rule is also of moment: a registered trademark can infringe a 
local trade name, and the "fair use" exception removes the con-
clusive evidence rule as a defense with respect to some of the 
most common local trade names; namely, trade names composed 
of the names of those engaged in the business or their privies.375 
370. Disparity in size between interstate and local firms may mean that 
the relative burden on the local firm is greater than a dollars-and-
cents comparison would indicate. Nevertheless, economic waste is 
minimized by placing the burden on the smaller firm. 
371. See text accompanying notes 332-41 infra. 
372. § 45, 60 Stat. 443 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1127 (1964). See 
generally Dunner, "The Effect of the Lanham Act of Intrastate Ac-
tivities," 40 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 379 (1958). 
373. Compare Peter Pan Restaurants, Inc. v. Peter Pan Diner, Inc., 150 
F. Supp. 534 (D.R.I. 1957) with John R. Thompson Co. v. Holloway, 
141 U.S.P .Q. 355 (N.D. Tex. 1964). 
374. See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d 
Cir. 1959) (bakery marketing goods within a 45 mile radius of Roches-
ter, N.Y., subject to the constructive notice provision); Nielsen v. 
American Oil Co., 203 F. Supp. 473 (D. Utah 1962) (gasoline station 
selling to interstate travelers in commerce); Drop Dead Co. v. s. C. 
Johnson & Sons, Inc, 326 F.2d 87, 94 (9th Cir. 1963) (alternative hold-
ing), cert. den., 377 U.S. 907 (1964) ($700P in sales affects commerce); 
cf. In re Gastown, Inc., 51 C.C.P .A. (Patents) 876, 326 F .2d 780 
(1964). 
375. § 33(b) (4), 60 Stat. 438 (1946), 15 u.s.c. § 1115(b) (4) (1964); see 
John R. Thompson Co. v. Holloway, 141 U.S.P.Q. 355 (N.D. Tex. 
1964). The fair use exception does not apply to trademark use. See 
Pure Foods, Inc. v. Minute Maid Corp., 214 F.2d 792 (5th Cir.), 
cert. den., 348 U.S. 888 (1954); Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 
206 F.2d 144 (3d Cir.), cert. den., 346 U.S. 867 (1953). But see 
Jean Patou, Inc. v. Jacqueline Cochran, Inc., 312 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 
1963). 
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With all due regard for the foregoing, it is the Lanham Act 
definition of trademark infringement that seems to offer the great-
est safeguard for local interests. 376 As this definition was con-
strued in Dawn Donut Co. v. Hartis Food Stores, Inc., 377 a fed-
eral registrant, although entitled to superior rights with respect 
to all persons who started use after constructive notice began, 
cannot enjoin such local concurrent users unless the registered 
mark is known in the locality or the local use lies within the reg-
istrant's zone of imminent expansion. The Dawn interpretation 
tempers the literal significance of the substantive provisions of 
the Lanham Act with the commercial reality that not every reg-
istrant will be able to capitalize on his nationwide trademark 
rights and ensures that local interests will only be sacrificed to 
those of a dynamic federal registrant. Stagnant registrants will 
have a right without a remedy. Admittedly, Dawn may lead to 
some unfortunate consequences. Some local firms will doubtless 
increase advertising investments in their trademarks and trade 
names in blissful ignorance that continued use of these trade iden-
tifiers is due to the temporary license extended by the Dawn in-
terpretation. When the federal registrant subsequently invades the 
hitherto peaceful local preserve, the courts will be faced with the 
bitter fruit of compromise. It is to be hoped that judicial states-
manship will avoid undue hardship, not by denying the registrant 
his opportunity to expand, but by permitting the local user to ad-
just his infringing use in a way,378 or over a period of time,379 
that will minimize his losses.380 
The foregoing discussion has particular relevance to regis-
tered secondary-meaning marks. 381 Secondary-meaning marks 
are potent advertising devices since they consist of familiar, 
376. § 32(1) (a), 60 Stat. 437 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (a) 
(1964). 
377. 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959). 
378. See Hot Shoppes, Inc. v. Hot Shoppe, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 777 (M.D.N.C. 
1962). 
379. Elcon Mfg. Co. v. Elcon Mfg. Co., 132 F. Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1955); 
see Victory Chain, Inc. v. Rosenberg, 10 Misc. 2d 382, 174 N.Y.S. 
2d 46 (Sup. Ct. Chenango County 1958). 
380. The Lanham Act states: "The several courts vested with jurisdiction 
of civil actions arising under this chapter shall have power to grant 
injunctions, according to the principles of equity and upon such terms 
as the court may deem reasonable, to prevent the violation of any 
right of the registrant of a mark registered in the Patent Office." 
(Emphasis supplied.) § 34, 60 Stat. 439 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1964), 
381. See "Developments in the Law-Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition," 
68 Harv. L. Rev. 814, 831 (1955). 
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easy-to-remember terms.382 For this reason the acquisition of 
a secondary-meaning mark can seriously affect competitors' ad-
vertising programs. Because of the Pure Oil Company's "Pure" 
mark, for instance, none of their competitors can sell "Pure" 
products.383 Despite the importance of secondary-meaning marks, 
the Patent Office can permit registration upon a mere averment 
without requiring proof of secondary meaning384 and other users 
who do not religiously scan the Official Gazette of the Patent Of-
fice may not be aware of a registrant's claim of exclusive rights 
until incontestable rights have been obtained. 385 The upshot will 
probably be a more rigorous application of the Dawn rationale to 
registered secondary-meaning marks. Although an incontestable 
right to use may make registration a good defense to a prayer for 
cancellation, attempts by the registrant to utilize registration as 
the basis for an infringement suit wil_l require cogent proof of the 
geographical extent of secondary meaning in order to establish 
likelihood of purchaser confusion. 386 
382. This is not to say that secondary meaning marks are the best trade-
marks from the standpoint of legal protection. See "Selection and 
Adoption of Trademarks," 53 Trademark Rep. 687, 706-08 (1963). 
383. See Pure Oil Co. v. Paragon Oil Co., 117 U.S.P.Q. 321 (N.D. Ohio 
1958). 
384. 37 C.F .R. § 2.41(b) (1960). 
385. See 1941 House Hearings at 66-67 (remarks of Wallace H. Martin); 
id. at 73-74 (remarks of Louis Robertson). 
386. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Bavarian Brewing Co., 264 F .2d 88 (6th 
Cir. 1959). Anheuser is discussed in Bonynge, "The Effect of Regis-
tration in Trademark Litigation," 50 Trademark Rep. 902, 909-10 
(1960). 
III. ASSIGNMENT AND LICENSING OF TRADEMARKS 
An assignment transfers the assignor's exclusive right to the 
use of a mark, whereas a license permits a privileged use of a 
mark by another subject to the licensor's quality control. 1 Both 
are inconsistent with the original legal conception of a trademark 
as an identification of the source of goods. If a mark is consid-
ered to denote a particular person, it is patently deceptive to allow 
another to sell goods under its aegis.2 Notions concerning assign-
ment and license are consequently permised upon a view that a 
trademark primarily identifies not the source of goods, but like 
goods, from, or controlled by, a single anonymous source.3 
The Lanham Act put the assignment and licensing of trade-
marks upon a new footing. The governing legal principles were 
simplified and clarified so that employment of those methods of 
transferring trademark rights was greatly facilitated. The De-
partment of Justice bridled at this endeavor because of fears that 
consensual allocation of territorial trademark rights might gain a 
resultant immunity from antitrust liability. 4 Evaluation of the An-
titrust Division's position requires an appreciation of the general 
treatment of territorial allocations under the antitrust laws and 
the nature and background of the Lanham Act provisions dealing 
with the assignment and licensing of trademarks. 
A. General Treatment of Territorial Allocations Under the Anti-
trust Laws 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act is the principal antitrust yard-
stick by which territorial allocations are measured. Section 1 
states that 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or other-
wise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is de-
clared to be illegal. . . .5 
1. See Restatement (Second), Torts § 756A, comment ~ (Tent. Draft No. 
8, 1963). 
2. Cf. Messer v. The Fadettes, 168 Mass. 140, 46 N.E. 407 (1897); see 
Taggart, "Statutory New Concepts of Trade-Mark Ownership," 38 Trade-
mark Rep. 125 (1948). 
3. See Brown, "Advertising and the Public Interest," 57 Yale L.J. 1165, 
1185-87 (1948). 
4. See 1944 Senate Hearings at 63-64. 
5. § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). 
94 
ASSIGNMENT AND LICENSING 95 
Although the Supreme Court may have initially flirted with the idea 
that every contract, combination, or conspiracy that restrained 
trade was ineluctably condemned by this uncompromising phraseol-
ogy, the Court concluded early in the history of the Sherman Act 
that only unreasonable restraints of trade fell within the statute's 
ambit.6 As an antidote to the sweeping inquiry prerequisite to a 
wholly factual determination of reasonableness,7 the Court has 
also held that 
[T] here are certain agreements or practices which because 
of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any re-
deeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable 
and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the pre-
cise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their 
use. This principle of per se unreasonableness not only 
makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the 
Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone con-
cerned, but it also avoids the necessity for an incredibly com-
plicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire 
history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, 
in an effort to determine at large whether a particular re-
straint has been unreasonable •.. ,8 
The validity of restraints outside the per se category continues to 
be tested by a broad factual evaluation, often referred to as a rule 
of reason inquiry, which seeks to ascertain whether conceded inter 
partes restraints strengthen or inhibit the competitive process, 
limit the supply of goods or services or produce socially useful 
economic efficiency gains. Restraints which have overall deleteri-
ous effects are not condoned.9 The crux of the essentially tenta-
tive dichotomy between restraints that are per se illegal and those 
that are tested by the rule of reason lies in the evidence that must 
be considered by a court.10 Per se illegality may be announced 
on the basis of evidence concerning the nature and the factual 
6. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). For contrasting 
views as to the initial interpretation of the statute compare Handler, 
Antitrust in Perspective 4-12 (1957) with Bork, "The Rule of Reason 
and the Per Se Concept," 74 Yale L,J. 775, 785-96 (1965). 
7. Cf. Dirlam & Kahn, Fair Competition 268-75 (1954). 
8. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
9. See Handler, note 6 supra, at 26-28; Loevinger, "The Rule of Reason 
in Antitrust Law," 50 Va. L. Rev. 23, 33-34 (1964). There is cur-
rently a lively debate over the extent to which a per se rule or a 
rule of reason inquiry should be based on economic considerations 
alone. See Symposium, "The Goals of Antitrust," 65 Colum. L. Rev. 
363 (1965). 
10. Loevinger, note 9 supra, at 32-34. But see Massel, Competition and 
Monopoly 88-91 (1963). 
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setting of a defendant's conduct. 11 On the other hand, if this evi-
dence does not warrant a conclusion that there is a pernicious ef-
fect on competition without redeeming virtue, evidence concerning 
probable competitive effects must also be weighed.12 In procedu-
ral terms this means that whenever a defendant's conduct falls 
within a per se category, the defendant has the burden of going 
forward with evidence to negative the implication of unmitigated 
anticompetitive effect; where a non-per se offense is involved, the 
burden of going forward with evidence with respect to both the 
nature of the defendant's conduct and its competitive effect rests 
upon the plaintiff, 13 
Whatever the test applied, if a territorial allocation violates 
section 1 of the Sherman Act, it will also offend the broad pro-
scription of "unfair methods of competition" in section 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act,14 Section 5, which embraces 
both incipient and consummated Sherman Act offenses,15 paradoxi-
cally resulted in part from a movement to supplement the general 
language of the Sherman Act with more specific antitrust stand-
ards.16 Far from performing this original purpose, section 5 in-
stead vests additional general antitrust authority in the Federal 
Trade Commission, an administrative agency whose orders are 
subject to judicial review. Insofar as this administrative blank 
check embraces territorial allocations, the Commission has a gen-
eral predisposition to follow the distinctions between application 
of the rule of reason and a per se approach charted under section 
1 of the Sherman Act.17 
"The general objective of the antitrust law is promotion of 
competition in open markets, "18 and this objective is implemented 
in no small part through the prohibition of agreements which unduly 
11. E.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); see Att'y 
Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 11 (1955); Loevinger, note 9 supr11., 
at 33; Oppenheim, "Antitrust Booms and Boomerangs," 59 Nw. L. Rev. 
33, 35-37 (1964). 
12. E.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); see Att'y 
Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep, 11 (1955); Loevinger, note 9 supra, 
at 33-34. 
13. See Packer, Book Review, 67 Yale L,J, 1141, 1142-43 (1958). 
14. § 5, 38 Stat, 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U,S.C, § 45(a) (1) (1964). 
15. See F .T.C. v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948). 
16. See Handler, note 6 supra, at 29-31. 
17. See Sandura Co., Dkt. 7042, 1961-63 F.T,C, Complaints, Orders, Stipu-
lations ,r 15945 (1962), rev1d, 339 F .2d 847 (6th Cir, 1964); Snap-On 
Tools Corp., 59 F. T .C. 1035 (1961), rev'd, 321 F .2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963). 
See generally Oppenheim, "Harmonization of Section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act with the Sherman and Clayton Acts," 17 A.B.A. 
Antitrust Section 231, 236-37 (1960), 
18. Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep, 1 (1955). 
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impair rivalry among sellers.19 Intentionally anticompetitive con-
duct is condemned out of hand yet in many cases conduct is equiv-
ocal, or at least evidence of subjective intent is lacking. In these 
situations the economic relationship between the parties to restric-
tive agreements is a material factor in determining whether the 
agreements have an anticompetitive effect. Agreements among com-
peting sellers, called horizontal agreements because they involve 
persons on the same level of manufacture or distribution, may 
strike at the heart of competition and are often invalidated by the 
antitrust laws. The validity of agreements between buyers and 
sellers, so-called vertical agreements, also depends on the effect 
of the agreements on competing sellers-with judicial approbation 
being more likely because this effect is indirect. Finally, agree-
ments between persons who have no discernible economic relation-
ship may be placed in a catchall conglomerate category 20 that is 
usually treated most tolerantly under the antitrust laws. 
Although the pertinent Supreme Court cases have concerned 
competitors with substantial market power and involve more than 
bare allocation of markets, there is little doubt that horizontal di-
vision of markets is ordinarily a per se offense.21 The unique cir-
cumstances which have led two district judges to apply the rule of 
reason to horizontal territorial allocations merely emphasize their 
customary per se illegality. United States v. National Football 
League,22 which upheld National Football League bylaws forbidding 
telecasts of outside games when the home team was playing at 
home, turned on the sui generis nature of professional football, 
including the need to protect the gate receipts of the weaker teams. 
When the same federal district court later held that the terms of 
the earlier decree forbade the League to sell the pooled television 
19. Bork, "The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept," 74 Yale L.J. 775 
(1965). 
20. Cf. Bock, Mergers and Markets 30 (2d ed. 1962). 
21. United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 
1961); see Kayson & Turner, Antitrust Policy 144 (1959); Massel, note 
10 supra, at 89; Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 26 (1955). The 
leading Supreme Court opinions are Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. 
United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) and Addystone Pipe & Steel Co. v. 
United States, 175 U .s. 211 (1899). In White Motor Co. v. United 
States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), a case involving vertical territorial re-
straints, the court included horizontal territorial allocations in a roll 
call of per se violations disregarding an amicus curiae brief that 
urged the avoidance of dicta on horizontal arrangements. Id. at 259; 
see 51 Calif. L. Rev. 608, 619 n. 89 (1963). 
22. 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953). See Bork, "Ancillary Restraints 
and the Sherman Act," 15 A.B.A. Antitrust Section 211, 231-34 (1959) 
for a critical analysis of the theory of National Football League. 
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network,23 Congress in turn stressed the singularity of the context 
by legislating a specific exemption from the antitrust laws. 24 Uni-
ted States v. Pan American World Airways, Inc,,25 concerned an 
equally exceptional situation. In 1929 PanAmerican and W.R. Grace 
& Co. established Panagra, a jointly controlled airline, in order to 
obtain United States mail contracts for western South America. 
The joint venture included an understanding between Pan American 
and Grace that Panagra and Pan American would not duplicate or 
parallel each other's South American routes. Disregarding a gov-
ernment charge that the agreement was per se invalid, the district 
judge concluded that the rule of reason was applicable and that the 
territorial allocation did not unreasonably restrain competition. He 
stressed as mitigating the restraint the large amount of capital 
necessary to finance an airline, the fierce competition from foreign 
carriers, and a Post Office and State Department policy of zoning 
operations of American international carriers. The Pan American 
and National Football League cases give no indication that an al-
location of domestic markets by competing businesses would be 
other than a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act and 
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.26 
Analysis of vertical territorial restraints customarily dis-
tinguishes between restraints on the seller and restraints on the 
buyer.27 The former typically involves a manufacturer's promise 
that a particular dealer will be the manufacturer's exclusive sales 
outlet for a defined territory.28 Although an exclusive sales out-
let agreement negates intrabrand competition from within a dealer's 
territory by removing the possibility that additional dealers will be 
appointed and that the manufacturer will engage in direct sales, 
these agreements have been uniformly sustained unless enmeshed 
23. United States v. National Football League, 196 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Pa. 
1961). 
24. Blaich v. National Football League, 212 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). 
25, 193 F. Supp. 18 (S.D,N,Y. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 371 U.S. 296 
(1963). 
26. With respect to § 5 see, e.g., W, B. Saunders Co., 35 F.T.C. 382 (1942); 
Hardwood Charcoal Co., 31 F.T.C. 706 (1940). 
27. But see Jordan, "Exclusive and Restricted Sales Areas Under the An-
titrust Laws," 9 U, C,L,A.L. Rev. 111, 142-43 (1962). 
28. An exclusive sales outlet arrangement may or may not be based upon 
an agreement between a manufacturer and a distributor. If the ar-
rangement is a de facto result of a manufacturer's unilateral decision 
to lirn it the number of his distributors, an antitrust violation is im-
probable, See Turner, "The Definition of Agreement Under the Sher-
man Act," 75 Harv. L. Rev. 655, 703-04 (1962). But see id. at 705. 
The textual discussion is accordingly focused on exclusive sales outlet 
agreements, 
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in an anticompetitive scheme or monopoly power existed at either 
the buyer or seller level.29 In other words, exclusive sales out-
let agreements have been tested by the rule of reason under both 
section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act. 30 The furor over vertical territorial allocations 
sparked by White Motor Co. v. United States31 has, however, re-
cently led to a critical reappraisal. It has been suggested that 
exclusive sales outlet agreements should be presumptively illegal32 
and that their business purpose must justify both their existence 
and the material terms of the contract before a rule of reason 
inquiry is justified.33 The assumptions of the critics of exclusive 
sales outlet agreements have been questioned,34 but Mr. Justice 
Brennan's concurring opinion in White Motor contained the follow-
ing footnote: 
The District Court suggested, 194 F. Supp., at 585-86, 
and the Government seems to concede, that certain types of 
exclusive franchises would not violate the Sherman Act, al-
though a determination of the legality of such arrangements 
would seem also to require an examination of their operation 
and effect.35 
Quaere: What does this observation portend? It should at least in-
spire more careful consideration of the reasonableness of the contrac-









E.g., New York Automatic Canteen Corp. v. Automatic Canteen Corp., 
1963 Trade Cas. ,r 70625 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); see 51 Calif. L. Rev. 608, 
617 & nn.74-75 (1963). 
See Day, "Exclusive Territorial Arrangements Under the Antitrust 
Laws," 40 N.C.L. Rev. 223, 229-35, 248 (1962); Jordan, note 27 supra, 
at 134-42, 152 (1962); Robinson, "Restraints on Trade and the Orderly 
Marketing of Goods," 45 Cornell L.Q. 254, 255-61 (1960). With re-
spect to § 5 see Sandura Co., 0kt. 7042, 1961-63 F. T.C. Complaints, 
Orders, Stipulations ,r 15945, ,r 16095 (1962), rev'd on other grounds, 
339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964); Snap-On Tools Corp., 59 F.T.C. 1035 
(1961), rev'd on other grounds, 321 F .2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963), 
372 u.s. 253 (1963). 
Turner, note 28 sue~11, at 704-05; Note, "Restricted Channels of Dis-tribution Under the S erman Act," 75 Harv. L. Rev. 795, 824-27 (1962). 
Note, "Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act," 
note 32 supra, at 823-27; 51 Calif. L. Rev. 608, 617-19 (1963). 
Cf. Handler, "Recent Antitrust Developments," 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 159, 
166-68 (1963). 
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 271 n. 11 (1963). See 
also Jordan, note 27 suprl.!, at 142-43. 
See Stewart, "Exclusive Franchises and Territorial Confinement of 
Distributors," 22 A.B.A. Antitrust Section 33, 44 (1963); 51 Calif. L. 
Rev. 608, 618 (1963) (speculating on increased Justice Department in-
terest). Compare New York Automatic Canteen Corp. v. Automatic 
Canteen Corp., 1963 Trade C as. ,r 70625 (S.D.N. Y. 1962) which sus-
tained a thirty-two year contract under the current permissive stand-
ards. 
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Vertical territorial restraints on buyers range from requir-
ing a dealer to perform minimum marketing functions in a defined 
area before soliciting sales elsewhere, through for bidding a dealer 
to solicit sales outside his designated territory, to a ban on sales 
to persons residing outside the territory. These restrictions will 
be respectively referred to as designation of areas-of-primary-
responsibility, closed territories, and geographical customer allo-
cation. The customary sanctions for disregard of territorial re-
strictions are some form of profit "pass-over" from the raiding 
dealer to a dealer whose territorial rights he has infringed or the 
refusal of a manufacturer to continue doing business with an of-
fending dealer. 37 
Closed territories and geographical customer allocation are 
in relatively common use38 and sustained by a substantial body of 
older precedent.39 Nevertheless, since 1949 the Antitrust Division 
has asserted their per se invalidity and garnered a surprising num-
ber of consent decrees abjuring the restraints.40 White Motor Co., 
however, refused to accede to Justice Department importunities and 
issue was joined. The district court granted the government's 
motion for summary judgment holding White's system of geograph-
ical customer allocation illegal per se,41 but the Supreme Court 
reversed and remanded the case for a trial noting that 
This is the first case involving a territorial restriction 
in a vertical arrangement; and we know too little of the actual 
impact of ... that restriction ... to reach a conclusion on 
the bare bones of the documentary evidence before us.42 
Justices Harlan, Stewart, and Goldberg joined Mr. Justice Douglas 
in the majority opinion in which Mr. Justice Brennan concurred. 
Chief Justice Warren and Justice Black joined Mr. Justice Clark 







See Note, "Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act," 
note 32 supra, at 814-17. 
But see Robinson, note 30 supra, at 254. The area-of-primary-respon-
sibility concept emerged from the provisions of consent decrees termi-
nating alleged violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act. E.g., United 
States v. American Type Founders Co., 1958 Trade Cas. IT 69065 (D,N.J, 
1958) (consent decree); United States v. Philco Corp., 1956 Trade Cas. I 
IT 68409 (E.D. Pa. 1956) (consent decree). 
E.g., Phillips v. Iola Portland Cement Co., 125 Fed. 593 (8th Cir. 1903), 
cert. den,, 192 U.S. 606 (1903); see generally Robinson, note 30 supra, 
at 261-65 and accompanying notes. 
E.g., United States v. Studebaker Corp., 1965 Trade C as. IT 71410 (D. 
Neb. 1965) (consent decree); see generally Handler, "Annual Review of 
Antitrust Developments," 15 Recore! of N.Y.C.B.A. 362, 374,-75 (1960). 
United States v. White Motor Co., 194 F. Supp. 562 (N.D, Ohio 1961). 
White Motor Co. v. United States, note 35 supra, at 261. 
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White's "enjoyment of the fruits of its illegal action." 43 White 
Motor Co. itself was not as impressed by the Court's largess. 
White accepted a consent decree in which it renounced all present 
and future vertical territorial restraints. 44 
Although another Supreme Court opinion will be necessary to 
ascertain the touchstone of legitimacy,45 the basic issue is the 
extent to which solicitude for intrabrand competition will lead the 
Court to require justifications for vertical territorial restraints on 
buyers that do not substantially impair market competition,46 A 
full dress rule-of-reason inquiry would disregard abridgment of 
intrabrand competition for a valid business purpose, absent an over-
riding anticompetitive design or concomitant undue impairment of 
market competition at either buyer or seller levels;47 but it is 
optimistic to assume that the Court will dismiss intrabrand com-
petition lightly. The three dissenters in White Motor would have 
struck down the avowed restriction of intrabrand competition out 
of hand, and the opinion of the Court couched reversal of the dis-
trict court as follows: 
We do not know enough of the economic and business stuff 
out of which these arrangements emerge to be certain. They 
may be too dangerous to sanction or they may be allowable 
protections against aggressive competitors or the only prac-
ticable means a small company has for breaking into or stay-
ing in business ... and within the "rule of reason" .... 
There is an analogy from the merger field that leads us to 
conclude that a trial should be had. A merger that would 
otherwise offend the antitrust laws because of a substantial 
lessening of competition has been given immunity where the 
acquired company was a failing one,48 
While admittedly inconclusive, this language seems to coincide with 
the views of commentators requiring convincing justifications for 
43. Id. at 283. 
44. United States v. White Motor Co., 1964 Trade Cas. ,r 71195 (N,D. Ohio 
1964) (consent decree). 
45. See ATRR 122:B-3 (11/12/63). For views suggesting a per se approach 
see Kessler & Stern, "Competition, Contract, and Vertical Integration," 
69 Yale L.J. 1, 113 (1959); Rifkind, "Divisions of Territory Under the 
Antitrust Laws," 1953 CCH Antitrust Symp. 173, 180-81; Turner, note 
28 supr~ at 698-99. Proponents of the rule of reason include Day, 
note 30 supra, at 248-51; Jordan, note 27 supr~ at 152-55 (1962); 
Robinson, note 30 supra, at 267-68 (1960); Note, "Restricted Channels 
of Distribution Under the Sherman Act," 75 Harv. L. Rev. 795, 823-24 
(1962). 
46, See Handler, note 34 supra, at 161-70 (1963). 
47. See Jordan, note 27 supra, at 155. 
48. White Motor Co. v. United States, note 35 supra, at 263-64, 
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restraints on intrabrand competition49 and appears consistent with 
evolution of the per se rule which denies established firms with 
large market shares the privilege of using tying clauses.50 Mr. 
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion is equally suggestive. He 
adverted to the claim that territorial restrictions were necessary 
to effective competition by independent truck manufacturers and to 
the situation of a manufacturer starting out in business or market-
ing a new and risky product as merely indicating possible justifi-
cations for vertical territorial restraints. 51 These reflections 
were, moreover, qualified by a footnote suggesting that justifica-
tion might only be open to companies with small market shares, 
and by a caveat that even a justifiable restriction might be un1.aw-
ful if its terms were too severe or "excessively anticompetitive. "52 
The lower federal courts may interpret White Motor as a mandate 
to apply the rule of reason to vertical territorial restraints until 
the Supreme Court writes a definitive opinion,53 but prudent coun-
sel view White Motor as a thunderhead on the horizon that is slow-
ly moving toward their clients.54 
The application of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act to vertical territorial restraints on buyers has paralleled 
section 1 experience. At first charges of invalidity were dismis-
sed55 or found wanting, 56 then the administrative attitude changed 
radically. 57 In Snap-On Tools Corp.58 a sizable manufacturer of 
hand tools was ordered to abandon a program of vertical geograph-
ical customer allocation but allowed to designate areas-of-pri-
mary responsibility. In Sandura Co.59 a small manufacturer of 
49. Stone, "Closed Territorial Distribution," 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 286, 314-17 
(1963); Turner, note 28 supra, at 698-99. Note, "Restricted Channels 
of Distribution Under the Sherman Act," note 45 supra, at 823-29, 832-
34. 
50. See Oppenheim, "Antitrust Booms and Boomerangs," 59 Nw. L. Rev. 33, 
38-40 (1964). But see Snap-On Tools Corp. v. F. T .c ., 321 F .2d 825 
(7th Cir. 1963). 
51. White Motor Co. v. United States 372 U.S. 253, 268-70 (1963). 
52. Id. at 269 n. 8, 270-72. 
53. E.g., Bandura Co. v. F.T.C., 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964); Snap-On 
Tools Corp. v. F.T.C., note 50 supra; see ATRR 122:B-3 (11/12/63). 
But see United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. 
Ill. 1965) (outlawing geographical customer allocation with respect to 
stock purchased by a distributor). 
54. E.g., United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., note 53 supra; see Stew-
art, "Exclusive Franchises and Territorial Confinement of Distribu-
tors,'' 22 A.B.A. Antitrust Section 33, 37, 47 (1963). 
55. General Cigar Co., 16 F.T.C. 537 (1932). 
56. Columbus Coated Fabrics, 55 F. T.C. 1500 (1959). 
57. International Staple & Mach. Co., 59 F.T.C. 1080 (1961). 
58. 59 F.T.C. 1035 (1961). 
59. Dkt. 7042, 1961-63 F.T.C. Complaints, Orders, Stipulations ,r 15945, 
I! 16095 (1962). 
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plastic floor and wall covering was handed a virtually identical 
order. Both Snap-On and Sandura were decided prior to the Su-
preme Court's disposition of White Motor, in fact, the F. T.C. 
hearing examiner in Sandura relied on the trial court opinion in 
White Motor. 60 When the cases were reviewed by the Seventh 
and Sixth Circuits respectively, White Motor had been reversed 
and remanded by the Supreme Court. The courts of appeals in-
terpreted the Supreme Court's action as indicating that the rule 
of reason was presently applicable to vertical territorial restraints, 
found Snap-On's and Sandura's vertical restrictions justified by a 
need to combat fierce interbrand competition, and set aside the 
Commission's cease and desist orders.61 
Except where there is an obvious intent to stifle future com-
petition62 the rule of reason is necessarily the Sherman Act and 
Federal Trade Commission Act test for conglomerate territorial 
restrictions on buyers. 63 The absence of an economic relationship 
between the parties makes it requisite to probe the factual matrix 
of a restriction before a judgment of invalidity can be rendered, 
if, indeed, these restrictions are ever invalid. As a practical 
matter, however, pure conglomerate territorial restrictions are 
rare and the subsequent development of competition will mature 
them into horizontal or vertical restraints subject to the antitrust 
principles governing those types of restraints. For example, as-
sume that a nonmanufacturing trademark licensor64 has developed 
a marketing system for hand tools involving complete lines of ap-
proved products carried in minitrucks. If the licensor enters into 
representation arrangements with retailer-servicemen in Salt Lake 
City and Boston and restricts each retailer's sales territory to 
within 50 miles of the metropolitan area in order to obtain inten-
sive cultivation of the urban market, the restraint is conglomerate. 
Yet, as more and more retailers enter into similar representation 
arrangements, a situation will inevitably occur where one or more 
60. Id. at 20766. 
61. Sandura Co. v. F.T.C., 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964); Snap-On Tools 
Corp. v. F.T.C., note 50 supra. 
62. A territorial allocation intended to prevent future competition is void 
per se. United States v. General Dyestuff Corp., 57 F. Supp. 642 
(S.D.N.Y. 1944). 
63. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 217 F. Supp. 110 (D. Del. 1963) 
rev'd on other grounds, 378 U.S. 158 (1964); cf. United States v. E.I. 
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 218-20 (D. Del. 1953), 
aff' d on other grounds, 351 U .s. 3 77 (1956); Foundary Services v. Bene-
flux Corp., 110 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 206 
F .2d 214 (2d Cir. 1953). See also George Hantscho Co. v. Miehle-
Goss-Dexter, Inc., 33 F.R.D. 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
64. See text accompanying note 207 infra for discussion of trademark li-
censing by nonmanufacturing "sponsors." 
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retailers could have competed for hand tool sales except for the 
territorial restrictions. In this event the territorial restrictions 
will become analogous to vertical restraints with regard to the 
retailers who are precluded from competing and should be tested 
by the antitrust standards applicable to vertical restraints on 
buyers. 
Territorial allocations accompanying joint ventures may fall 
into any of the categories previously discussed. A joint venture 
is an association of two or more persons to carry out a single 
undertaking for profit 65 and the participants may range from com-
petitors to firms with no other economic relationship than that 
represented by the joint venture. If territorial allocations between 
parties to a joint venture attend, but are collateral to, the joint 
venture, the territorial allocations will neither gain nor lose anti-
trust status because of the existence of the joint venture. 66 For 
example, a joint venture between two competing manufacturers in 
building a plant of sufficient size to efficiently process a common 
by-product should not affect, and should not be affected by, the 
validity of an allocation of territorial markets by the same manu-
facturers with respect to their primary product.67 On the other 
hand, in situations in which territorial allocations between the par-
ties to a joint venture are integral to the existence of the joint 
venture, the validity under the antitrust laws of the joint venture 
itse1f68 should influence appraisal of the territorial restrictions. 
A lawful joint venture supplies sufficient business purpose and 
justification so that ancillary territorial restrictions should ordi-
narily be tested by the rule of reason;69 conversely, territorial 
allocations ancillary to an illegal joint venture fall with it. 70 
65. See 2 Williston, Contracts § 318A (3d ed. 1959); Tractenberg, "Joint 
Ventures on the Domestic Front," 8 Antitrust Bull. 797, 798 (1963). 
66. See Kaysen & Turner, Antitrust Policy 137 (1959); Bork, "Ancillary 
Restraints and the Sherman Act," 15 A.B.A. Antitrust Section 211, 229 
(1959). 
67. See Bork, note 66 supra. 
68. The validity of joint ventures is a current cause celebre in antitrust 
law. See Handler, "Emerging Antitrust Issues-Diversification, Reci-
procity, and Joint Ventures," 49 Va. L. Rev. 433 (1963); Panel Discus-
sion, "Joint Ventures and the Sherman Act," A.B.A. Antitrust Section 
Transcript at 27 (1963); ATRR 35:X-4 (3/13/62) (remarks of Paul Rand 
Dixon). The Supreme Court has recently decided that § 7 of the Clay-
ton Act, the Celler-Kefauver AntFMerger Act, applies to joint ventures. 
United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964). 
69. See United States v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 
18 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) rev'd on other grounds, 371 U.S. 296 (1963); United 
States v. National Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953); 
see Bork, note 66 supra, at 224-34. 
70. E.g., United States v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 
(D. Mass. 1950). 
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It is clear that there is no single test for ascertaining the 
validity of all territorial allocations under the antitrust laws. 
Horizontal restrictions are generally invalid per se whereas ver-
tical restraints on sellers have been said to be virtually legal per 
se. 71 The status of vertical restraints on buyers is presently un-
clear though it is entirely possible that geographical customer al-
location may be placed in a per se category 72 while closed terri-
tories 73 and areas-of-primary-responsibility74 will continue to be 
evaluated by the rule of reason. To the extent that valid business 
purposes can be attributed to conglomerate restraints, they are 
probably valid simply because the antitrust issue is not ripe for 
decision. As soon as competition develops between the parties, 
conglomerate restraints assume either a vertical or a horizontal 
posture and become subject to the principles governing those clas-
sifications. Finally, a joint venture will materially affect the va-
lidity of ancillary territorial restrictions. 
B. The Assignment and Licensing Provisions of the Lanham Act 
The assignment and licensing provisions of the Lanham Act 
do not remove consensual territorial allocations involving trade-
marks from the sweep of the antitrust laws. Congress allayed 
the Justice Department's concern in this regard through section 
46(a) of the Lanham Act which provides: 
[NJ othing contained in this Act shall be construed as limit-
ing, restricting, modifying, or repealing any statute in force 
on the effective date of this Act which does not relate to 
trade-marks, or as restricting or increasing the authority 
of any Federal department or regulatory agency except as 
may be specifically provided in this Act. 75 
This section is not, however, fully dispositive of the Antitrust Di-
vision's contention. Conduct otherwise per se violative of the an-
titrust laws can become subject to the rule of reason if required 
or sanctioned by another federal statute. 76 Because of the per 
71. Oppenheim, "Antitrust Booms and Boomerangs," 59 Nw. L. Rev. 33, 
36 n,15 (1964). 
72. United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323 (1965) (out-
lawing geographical customer allocation with respect to stock purchased 
by a distributor). But see Sandura Co. v. F.T.C,, 339 F.2d 847 (6th 
Cir. 1964) (small manufacturer in a concentrated industry). 
73. Snap-On Tools Corp. v. F,T,C., note 50 supra. 
74. E.g., United States v. American Type Founders Co., 1958 Trade Cas. 
~ 69065 (D.N.J. 1958) (consent decree). 
75. Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 46(a), 60 Stat. 445. 
76. Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U .s. 341 (1963); see Loevin-
ger, "The Rule of Reason in Antitrust Law," 50 Va. L. Rev. 23, 31-32 
(1964). 
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se-rule of reason dichotomy is essentially a judge-made rule of 
evidence and not an express statutory provision, the Lanham Act 
could conceivably require a rule of reason test for all consensual 
allocations of territorial trademark rights that it authorizes de-
spite section 46(a). A sketch of the manner in which the Lanham 
Act condified the divergent common law decisions concerning as-
signment and licensing will further the assessment of this possi-
bility. 
The common-law shibboleth was that a trademark could only 
be validly assigned in conjunction with the good will that it repre-
sented. 77 "Good will" was an amorphous concept which was once 
defined as "that which makes tomorrow's business more than an 
accident. It is the reasonable expectation of future patronage based 
on past satisfactory dealings. 11 78 Despite abstruseness, the rule 
was easily enough applied if there was obviously no good will, for 
example, where the assignor had previously abandoned the assigned 
mark,79 or had never used the mark in connection with the goods 
or the area for which an assignment was made.SO Nor did assign-
ments of merchants' or selectors' marks cause the courts a great 
deal of trouble because the good will involved was generally re-
lated to the quality of the goods sold.81 But the common-law pre-
cept left the courts adrift without rudder and compass whenever 
good will did exist which was arguably derivative from productive 
facilities. Virtually the only judge-proof assignment by a manu-
facturer at common law was one accompanied by all of the physi-
cal assets used to produce the goods identified by an assigned 
mark.82 Assignments coupled with less tangible evidence of the 
transfer of good will were subject to greater or lesser degrees 
of risk with judicial condemnation being most likely if a manufac-
turer-assignor continued to sell the identical product under a dif-
ferent trademark.83 
77. See 1 Nims, Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks 85-95 (4th ed. 1947). 
78. Rogers, Goodwill, Trade-Marks, and Unfair Trading 13 (1919). 
79. E.g., Dietz v. Horton, Mfg. Co., 170 Fed. 865 (6th Cir. 1909) (alterna-
tive holding). 
80. See Restatement (Second), Torts § 756, comment _2 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 
1963). 
81. E.g., Schneider Brewing Co. v. Century Distilling Co., 107 F.2d 699 
(10th Cir. 1939); accord, Witthaus v. Mattfeldt & Co., 44 Md. 303 (1876). 
82. E.g., Kidd v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 617 (1879); accord, Emerson Elec. Mfg. 
Co. v. Emerson Radio & Phonograph Corp., 105 F.2d 908 (2d Cir.); 
cert. den., 308 U.S. 616 (1939). 
83. Eiseman v. Schiffer, 157 Fed. 473 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1907); accord, Calif-
ornia Packing Corp. v. Sun-Maid Raisin Growers, 81 F .2d 674 (9th Cir.),· 
cert. den., 298 U.S. 668 (1936); Independent Baking Powder Co. v. 
Boorman, 175 Fed. 448 (C .C.D.N.J. 1910) (alternative holding). See 
also Gehl v. Hebe Co., 276 Fed. 271 (7th Cir. 1921). 
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A related limitation on assignability was that no material 
public deception should result from an assignee's use of a mark.84 
This meant that the original connotation of a mark to the public 
had to remain substantially unaltered after a transfer unless the 
public was adequately informed of material changes. For example, 
a mark that identified a particular source was nonetheless assign-
able, unless it also denoted uniquely personal attributes of that 
source, 85 as long as an assignee gave notice of successorship in 
conjunction with his use of the mark. 86 There was some authority 
requiring transfer of the entire physical plant used to produce the 
goods on which a mark had been used if an assignor was a manu-
facturer; 87 but the sounder and more prevalent view was that only 
assets necessary to preserve the connotation of a mark had to ac-
company an assignment in order to avoid a probability of public 
deception.88 Typical examples were patents89 and secret formu-
las. 90 In general, an assignee had the same privilege to vary the 
composition of trademarked goods as an assignor;91 both were 
merely expected to disclose material alterations.92 
84. See Grismore, "The Assignment of Trade Marks and Trade Names," 
30 Mich. L. Rev. 489, 493-96 (1932); Isaacs, "Traffic in Trade Sym-
bols," 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1210, 1220-21 (1931). 
85. E.g., Lowell Lamb & Co. v. Herskovits, 204 App. Div. 407, 198 N.Y. 
Supp. 55 (1st Dep't 1923), appeal dismissed per curiam, 238 N.Y. 572, 
144 N.E. 897 (1924); see Restatement (Second), Torts § 756, comment 
g (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963). 
86. E.g., Symonds v. Jones, 82 Me. 302, 19 Atl. 820 (1890). Failure to 
give notice constituted unclean hands although not necessarily invali-
dating the assignment. E.g., Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Alaska Imp. 
Co., 60 Fed. 103 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1894). 
87. E.g., Mayer Fertilizer & Junk Co. v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 
35 App. D.C. 425 (1910); see 1939 House Hearings at 90-92 (especially 
remarks of Stewart L. Whitman). 
88. See Vandenburgh, Trademark Law and Procedure 189 (1959); Grismore, 
note 84 supra, at 498-500. 
89. E.g., Lewis v. Trinklein, 304 Mich. 542. 8 N. W.2d 631 (1943); see 
Dewees v. Schneider, 333 Pa. 401, 5 A.2d 174 (1939). 
90. E.g., Mulhens & Kropff, Inc. v. Ferd Muelhens, Inc., 43 F.2d 937 (2d 
Cir.), cert. den., 282 U.S. 881 (1930). 
91. See Isaacs, note 84 supra, at 1215-16; Restatement (Second), Torts 
§ 756, comment a (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963). In marketing parlance 
this is referred to as "trading-up" or "trading-down" as the case may 
be. See Phelps, Sales Management 44-45 (1951). 
92. Trademark rights may conceivably be forfeited by undisclosed changes 
in ingredients, e.g., Independent Baking Co. v. Boorman, 175 Fed. 448 
(C.C.D.N.J. 1910) (alternative holding) but denial of trademark protec-
tion because of unclean hands would be more likely. E.g., Renaud 
Sales Co. v. Davis, 22 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass 1938), mod. on other 
grounds, 104 F .2d 683 (1st Cir. 1939). The trademark user would 
also be subject to a Federal Trade Commission proceeding. E.g., 
Royal Baking Powder Co. v. F.T.C., 281 Fed. 744 (2d Cir. 1922). 
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An invalid assignment, called a "naked assignment" or an 
"assignment in gross," led to loss of an assignor's ability to pre-
vent use of his mark by third parties 93 and transferred no rights 
against third parties to an assignee,94 Nevertheless, an assignor 
was estopped to assert the invalidity of an assignment against an 
assignee 95 and the latter could acquire rights in the mark through 
use subsequent to the invalid assignment,96 
In marked contrast to the Act of 1905, which reiterated the 
common-law rule that a ma.i·k was assignable in connection with 
the good will of the business,97 the original version of the Lanham 
Bill declared that a registered mark was assignable "either with 
or without the goodwill of the business. 11 98 Proponents of free as-
signability explained that this language was intended to make clear 
that marks were assignable without the plant or premises where 
the goods identified by a mark had been produced.99 They argued 
that the common-law rule confused good will related to a business 
with good will related to a mark and that the transfer of a mark 
necessarily conveyed the latter type of good will because "the good-
will is appurtenant to the trade-mark, not the trade-mark to the 
goodwill." 100 More traditional views had equally eloquent spokes-
men, however,101 and the language finally accepted by Congress 
represented a dilution of both the common-law rule and the theory 
of free assignability. Section 10 of the Lanham Act provides: 
A registered mark or a mark for which application to 
register has been filed shall be assignable with the goodwill 
of the business in which the mark is used, or with that part 
93, E.g., Eiseman v. Schiffer, 157 Fed. 473 (C,C.S,D.N.Y. 1907), This is 
because the assignment is evidence of the assignor's intent to abandon 
the mark. See Restatement (Second), Torts § 756, comment £ (Tent. 
Draft No. 8, 1963). 
94. E.g., Avon Shoe Co, v. David Crystal, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 293, 300-01 
(S,D,N,Y, 1959) (alternative holding), aff'd on other grounds, 279 F.2d 
607 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 364 U.S. 909 (1960). The assignee could not, 
for instance, rely on the assignor's period of use in order to establish 
senior rights. See W. H. Childs & Son v. G. Sidenberg & Co., 11 F.2d 
463 (D,C, Cir. 1926), 
95, Holly Hill Citrus Grower's Ass'n v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 75 
F ,2d 13 (5th Cir. 1935); cf. Huber Baking Co. v. stroehmann Bros. Co., 
252 F.2d 945 (2d Cir,), cert, den. 358 U.S. 829 (1958). 
96. See, American Beauti Pleat, Inc. v. Judkins Co., 133 U.S.P,Q, 405 
(Tm. Bd. 1962). 
97. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 10, 33 Stat. 727. 
98. H.R. 9041, § 10, 75th Cong., 3d Sess, (1938). 
99. 1939 House Hearings at 80-81, 86 (remarks of Edward S. Rogers). 
100. 1939 House Hearings at 81 (remarks of Edward S. Rogers). 
101. 1939 House Hearings at 88-89 (remarks of Stewart L, Whitman). 
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of the goodwill of the business connected with the use of and 
symbolized by the mark, and in any such assignment it shall 
not be necessary to include the goodwill of the business con-
nected with the use of and symbolized by any other mark 
used in the business or bY. the name or style under which 
the business is conducted.102 
109 
Although the initial portion of section 10 is a verbatim re-
enactment of the Act of 1905, the phrase permitting partial assign-
ment of good will borders on the concept of free assignability out-
lined at the 1939 hearings. The new phrase, for instance, sanc-
tions assignment of one registered mark by a manufacturer who 
uses several marks for the same type of goods 103 and dissipates 
the compulsion that existed under the Act of 1905 to convey sym-
bolic tangible tokens, like labels and advertising mockups, in order 
to establish a "transfer of the business." 104 On the other hand, 
a manufacturer who uses a single mark for a distinctive product 
probably still cannot validly assign the mark and immediately 
adopt a new mark for the identical product,105 and assets neces-
sary to preserve a mark's connotation, like secret formulas and 
patents, shOuld still accompany transfer of the mark.106 In this 
connection it should be noted that the price enacted for liberali-
zation of section 10 was statutory acknowledgment of the policy 
against recognition of assignments that foster material deception. 
Registration is subject to cancellation in Patent Office proceedings 
whenever a mark is used by or with the permission of the regis-
trant to misrepresent source,107 and a mark that is so used is 
102. § 10, 60 Stat. 431 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1060 (1964); see 
generally Halliday, "Assignments Under the Lanham Act," 38 Trade-
mark Rep. 970 (1948), If the assignor's trade name is similar to the 
transferred mark, the name should also be transferred or discontin-
ued or the validity of the assignment may be jeopardized. See Rob-
ert, The New Trade-Mark Manual 27-28 (1947). 
103. See Gentry Canning Co. v. Blue Ribbon Growers, Inc., 138 U.S.P.Q. 
536 (Tm. Bd. 1963); 1944 Senate Hearings at 22-23 (remarks of Daphne 
Robert). However, if two marks are used on the same product, one 
cannot be assigned without the other. See Robert, note 102 supra, at 
28. 
104. See J. C. Hall Co. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 52 C.C.P.A, (Patents) 
340 F.2d 960 (1965); Hy-Cross Hatchery, Inc. v. Osbourne, 49 C.C.P.A. 
(Patents) 1163, 303 F .2d 947 (1962). 
105. See Halliday, note 102 ~ at 976. 
106. See ibid; Restatement (Second), Torts § 756, comment !_ (Tent. Draft 
No. 8, 1963). 
107. § 14(c), 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 U,S,C, § 1064(c) (1964). 
Registrant is defined to include both assignors and assignees. § 45, 
60 Stat. 443 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1127 (1964). Prior to 
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excepted from both the incontestable right to use and the conclusive 
evidence rule. 108 These Lanham Act provisions generally make it 
the greater part of wisdom for an assignee to display notice of 
successorship in conjunction with an assigned mark.109 
A license is an arrangement whereby a trademark user per-
mits another to use his mark but does not give up the exclusive 
right to its use. Although a trademark license is only legally 
necessary if a licensee's use would otherwise constitute trademark 
infringement, 110 one of the many fantasies concerning licensing is 
the practice of granting licenses that are unnecessary. 111 The 
resale of trademarked goods in their original containers does not, 
for instance, constitute infringement because the marks continue 
to identify exactly the same goods that were produced by the manu-
facturers who affixed the marks; 112 nevertheless, wholesalers and 
retailers are often granted superfluous licenses.113 An unneces-
sary license naturally has no effect whatsoever. On the other hand, 
where a mark is used to identify goods that are not produced by 
the possessor of rights to the mark, a valid license bars the licensor 
(Footnote continued) 
the 1962 Lanham Act amendments the cancellation provisions were 
reiterated in the section dealing with assignments. § 10, 60 Stat. 
432 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1958); H. H. Scott, Inc. v. Annapolis 
Electoacoustic Corp., 195 F. Supp. 208 (D. Md. 1961). Both of the 
original cancellation provisions referred solely to misrepresentation 
by, or with the permission of, assignees. The 1962 amendments 
broadened the ambit of the cancellation provision in § 14(c) to include 
misrepresentation of source by any "registrant" and deleted the du-
plicative language in § 10. See Hoge, "The Lanham Act's Housekeeping 
Amendments," 52 Trademark Rep. 1245, 1249-50 (1962). See Appen-
dix for a sketch of cancellation proceedings. 
108. § 15, 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1964); § 33(b) 
(3), 60 Stat. 438 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(3) (1964). 
109. See Halliday, note 102 supra, at 976-79. 
110. See Vandenburgh, Trademark Law and Procedure 176 (1959). 
111. See Statement of Daphne Leeds, 1961 Senate Hearings at 7-8; see 
generally Shniderman, "Trade-Mark Licensing-A Saga of Fantasy 
and Fact," 14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 248 (1949). 
112. See Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125 (1947); Pres-
tonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359 (1924). Exclusive distributors for 
the continental United States with long-term trademark licenses have 
a "special ownership" that entitles them to register the licensed 
marks, e.g., Scandinavia Belting Co. v. Asbestos & Rubber Works, 
Inc., 257 Fed. 937 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 250 U.S. 644 (1919); but this 
does not signify that the long-term license is necessary. Registra-
tion is allowed primarily to protect the exclusive distribution rights. 
See Amag Optik und Mechanik, A.G. v. Weinstein, 85 F. Supp. 631 
(S.D.N. Y. 1949). 
113. See Corral, Wodiska y Ca. v. Anderson, Thorson & Co., 95 F .2d 11 
(7th Cir.), cert. den., 305 U.S. 613 (1938). 
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from asserting that the licensee's use is an infringement114 and 
precludes the licensee from acquiring rights in the mark through 
his use.115 In contrast, an invalid license, called a "naked" or 
"bare" license,116 results in forfeiture of the licensor's trademark 
rights. He is denied relief for trademark infringement 117 and an 
erstwhile "licensee" can ordinarily acquire adverse rights.118 
Licensing was not permissible under the early common law119 
and the federal trademark acts of 1881 and 1905 did not allude to 
it. Arrangements akin to modern licensing eventually gained judi-
cial approval in situations where it was probable that the persons 
permitted to use a mark would vend substantially identical products 
under the common mark.120 Arrangements that did not satisfy this 
criterion were condemned as naked licenses.121 A transfer of 
property from the licensor to the licensee was usually present in 
the transactions which the courts sustained, but ascription of the 
validity of a license to this transfer, would lose sight of the in-
stances in which resale of a trademarked product does not require 
a license122 and emphasize form over substance. As in the case 
of assignments, it was the relation of the property transferred to 
the connotation of the mark that was crucial. 
114. See Martha Washington Creamery Buttered Flour Co. v. Martien, 44 
Fed. 473 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1890). 
115. E.g., Smith v. Dental Prods. Co., 140 F .2d 140 (7th Cir.) cert. den., 
322 U.S. 743 (1944); Vermont Maple Syrup Co. v. F. N, Johnson Maple 
Syrup Co., 272 Fed. 478 (D. Vt. 1921). 
116. See Vandenburgh, note 110 supra. An invalid license has also been 
called a "license in gross" in order to emphasize that the law of 
licensing derived from the law of trademark assignments. See Tag-
gart, "Trade-Marks and Related Companies," 14 Law & Contemp. 
Prob. 234, 241 (1949). 
117. Everett 0. Fisk & Co. v. Fisk Teachers' Agency, 3 F.2d 7 (8th Cir. 
1924); accord, Midwest Fur Producers Ass'n v. Mutation Mink Breeders 
Ass'n, 127 F. Supp. 217 (W .D. Wis. 1955) (alternative holding); Broeg 
v. Duchaine, 319 Mass. 711, 67 N.E.2d 466 (1946). 
118. E. F. Pritchard Co. v. Consumers Brewing Co., 136 F .2d 512 (6th 
Cir. 1943), cert. den., 321 U.S. 763 (1944); accord, Morse-Starrett 
Prods. Co. v. Steccone, 86 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1949), appeal dis-
missed, 191 F .2d 197 (9th Cir. 1951); Ex parte Teca Corp., 117 U .s. 
P.Q. 367 (Comm'r 1958). Estoppel may, however, preclude a partic-
ular licensee from challenging the licensor's rights. E. F. Pritchard 
Co. v. Consumers Brewing Co., supra. 
119. See Rogers, Good Will, Trade-Marks, and Unfair Trading 106 (1914). 
120. See Shniderman, note 111 supr:1., at 253. 
121. See id. at 257-58. 
122. Compare "Quality Control and the Antitrust Laws in Trademark Li-
censing," 53 Trademark Rep. 1130, 1145-46 (1963) with notes 111 and 
112 supra and accompanying text. -
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A mark which identified goods produced according to a patent 
or a secret process could be licensed in conjunction with license 
of the patentl23 or disclosure of the secret process;124 but it was 
sufficient if a licensor furnished components of a licensee's prod-
uct and there were adequate safeguards concerning the quality of 
the licensee's manufacture. The Coca-Cola casesl25 sustained the 
license of wholesaler-bottlers by the manufacturer of a soft-drink 
base where the manufacturer supplied the syrup which was the 
principal ingredient of the bottled drink and supervised the bottling 
process. Similarly, Crown Fabrics Corp. v. American Viscose 
Corp.126 upheld the licensing by a yarn manufacturer of fabric 
manufacturers who utilized the licensor's yarn to weave fabrics 
that were tested by an independent testing agency, and B. B. & R. 
Knight, Inc. v. W. L. Milner & Co. 127 allowed a cotton piece goods 
manufacturer to permit carefully selected clothing manufacturers 
to use the licensor's mark on garments made from his piece goods 
where the clothing manufacturers and the licensor jointly undertook 
to refund the purchase price to purchasers dissatisfied with the 
garments.128 The other major instance in which licensing was 
sustained involved companies subject to common control. Keebler 
Weyl Baking Co. v. J. S. Invins' Son129 upheld the licensing of 
manufacturing subsidiaries of a common parent by a co-subsidiary 
123. E.g., Smith v. Dental Prods, Co., 140 F.2d 140 (7th Cir.), cert. den., 
322 U.S. 743 (1944); Adam v. Folger, 120 Fed. 260 (7th Cir. 1903); 
Hoffman v. B. Kuppenheimer & Co., 183 Fed. 597 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1910). 
124. See Barcardi Corp. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150 (1940). In both the 
patent and secret formula situations there was a high probability that 
the licensor would lose his rights in the mark to the licensee if the 
license was exclusive and the licensor failed to adequately supervise 
the licensee. E.g., Replogle v. Air-Way Co., 287 Fed. 765 (D.C. Cir. 
1923) (patent); President Suspender Co. v. Macwilliam, 238 Fed. 159 
(2d Cir. 1916), cert. den., 243 U .s. 636 (1917) (patent); Montgomery 
v. Kalak Water Co., 196 F. Supp. 173 (S.D.N. Y. 1961) (secret formula). 
125. Coca-Cola Co. v. Bennett, 238 Fed. 513 (8th Cir. 1916); Coca-Cola 
Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 269 Fed. 796 (D. Del. 1920); Coca-
Cola Co. v. J. G. Butler & Sons, 229 Fed. 224 (E.D. Ark. 1916); 
Coca-Cola Co. v. State, 225 S.W. 791 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920). 
126. 32 C ,C.P .A. (Patents) 701, 145 F .2d 246 (1944). 
127. 283 Fed. 816 (N.D. Ohio 1922). 
128. The Knight case is one instance in which the literal implications of 
the "guarantee" function of trademarks cannot be disputed. See Brown. 
"Advertising and the Public Interest," 57 Yale L. J. 1165, 1186-87 
(1948). 
129. 7 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Pa. 1934); accord, United States Ozone Co. v. 
United States Ozone Co., 62 F .2d 881 (7th Cir. 1932); see Vermont 
Maple Syrup Co. v. F. N. Johnson Maple Syrup Co., 272 Fed. 478 (D. 
Vt. 1921). 
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which furnished instructions concerning the production of the goods 
identified by the licensed mark. 
The Lanham Act does not in terms advert to trademark li-
censing. Section 5 provides: 
Where a registered mark or a mark sought to be 
registered is or may be used legitimately by related com-
panies, such use shall inure to the benefit of the registrant 
or applicant for registration, and such use shall not affect 
the validity of such mark or of its registration, provided 
that such mark is not used in such manner as to deceive 
the public.130 
Section 45 defines a "related company" as follows: 
The term "related company" means any person who 
legitimately controls or is controlled by the registrant or 
applicant for registration in respect to the nature and qual-
ity of the goods or services in connection with which the 
mark is used.131 
These provisions were primarily intended to codify prior law con-
cerning trademark licensing,132 Avowed exceptions were several 
Patent Office decisions under the Act of 1905 denying a holding 
company the right to register a mark used by its operating sub-
sidiaries.133 In overturning these decisions through a declaration 
that use by a related company inures to the benefit of an applicant 
for registration, section 5 necessarily created an exception to the 
common-law fundamental that trademark rights derive solely from 
use.134 Moreover, the exception was apparently as broad as the 
definition of related company in section 45, which was intentionally 
inclusive of more than the parent-subsidiary relationship. 135 The 
Patent Office, however, has relied on the legislative history of 
section 5 to restrict derogation of the common law to the parent-
130. § 5, 60 Stat. 429 (1946), 15 U,S,C. § 1055 (1964). 
131. § 45, 60 Stat. 443 (1946), 15 U.S,C, § 1127 (1964). 
132. See Taggart, "Trade-Marks and Related Companies," 14 Law & Contemp. 
Prob. 234 (1949); "Quality Control and the Antitrust Laws in Trade-
mark Licensing," 53 Trademark Rep. 1130, 1141-42 & n. 66 (1963) 
(citing legislative history). 
133. 1938 House Hearings at 134-36. The decisions were Ex parte United 
States Steel Corp., 23 U.S.P,Q. 145 (Comm'r 1934) and Buergerliches 
Braeuhaus Pilsen v. Allied Brewing & Distilling Co., 31 U.S.P,Q. 26 
(Comm'r 1936). 
134. See Esso, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 98 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1938); 1944 
Senate Hearings at 94 (remarks of Henry J. Savage). 
135. 1944 Senate Hearings 1947-51; see Diamond, "Requirements of a Trade-
mark Licensing Program," 17 Bus. Law 295, 300-02 (1962). 
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subsidiary relationship 136 and closely analogous situations. 137 
Other licensors who introduce marks on particular goods through 
licensee use are required to have had pre-existing good will in 
the mark in order to obtain registration, 138 and persons who have 
merely conceived an idea for a trademark have been held to be 
incapable of acquiring registrable rights through a licensee's use,139 
In light of the Patent Office position even an established business 
would be well-advised to engage in use of a mark prior to licens-
ing.140 
Despite the technical question of the extent to which the Lan-
ham Act introduced the concept of acquisition of basic trademark 
rights through controlled use by another, the overriding significance 
of section 5 and 45 derives from the manner in which they codified 
prior law. 141 The salient features of this codification are the pre-
script that the licensor must control the licensee with respect to 
the nature and quality of the goods in connection with which the 
licensed mark is used, and the double requirement that there be 
"legitimately" related companies and a "legitimate" use. 
The guidelines to the interpretation of licensor control were 
laid down in E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Celanese Corp.,142 
136. In re C. B. Donald Co., 122 U .S.P .Q. 401, reconsideration denied, 122 
U.S.P.Q. 535 (Tm. Bd. 1959); see Zephyr American Corp. v. Ester-
brook Pen Co., 135 U.S.PoQ. 84 (Tm. Bd. 1962). 
137. See Clark v. Sanderson Films, Inc., 139 U.S.P.Q. 130 (Tm. Bd. 1963) 
(licensor and wife sole stockholders of licensee). 
138. In re C. B. Donald Co., 122 U .S.P .Q. 401, reconsideration denied, 122 
U.S.P.Q. 535 (Tm. Bd. 1959); see In re Joseph Bancroft & Sons, 129 
U.S.P.Q. 329 (Tm. Bd. 1961); see Diamond, note 135 supra, at 300-02. 
139. In re C. B. Donald Co., 122 U .S.P .Q. 401, reconsideration denied, 122 
U.S.P.Q. 535 (Tm. Bd. 1959); accord, Coahoma Chem. Co. v. Smith, 
113 u.S.P.Q. 413 (Comm'r 1957), aff'd, 46 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 801, 264 
F .2d 916 (1959); A. E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Scott, 118 U.S.P.Q. 312 
(Comm'r 1958); Ex parte Alexander, 114 U.S.P.Q. 547 (Comm'r 1957). 
Denial of registration in these cases may also have been justified by 
the inadequacy of the licensors' quality control. See Krayer, "Do-
mestic Trademark Licensing," 43 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 574, 579-80 (1961). 
140. See In re Joseph Bancroft & Sons, 129 U.S.P.Q. 329 (Tm. Bd. 1961): 
Vandenburgh, Trademark Law and Procedure, 179-80 (1959). A pos-
sible alternative would be for the contemplated licensee to introduce 
the mark, obtain common-law rights, and assign the mark to the li-
censor in exchange for a license. See Geo. A. Hormel & Co. v. Here· 
ford Heaven Brands, Inc., 52 C.C.P.A. (Patents), 341 F.2d 158 (1965): 
Vandenburgh, supra. 
141. See Reynolds, "Contemporary Problems in Trademark Licensing," 49 
Trademark Rep. 1141, 1144-45 (1959). 
142. 35 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1061, 167 F .2d 484 (1948). Celanese was tech-
nically decided under the Act of 1905 because the case was initiated 
before the effective date of the Lanham Act. 
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a Patent Office cancellation proceeding,143 in which du Pont al-
leged that a faulty licensing arrangement had invalidated the Cela-
nese Corporation's registration of "Celanese." The Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals affirmed dismissal of the petition for 
cancellation on two narrow grounds: (1) there was no allegation 
of breach of the license provisions specifying the nature and qual-
ity of the goods to be manufactured by the licensee, and (2) the 
alleged breach of the license provision requiring the licensee to 
include notice of the license in advertisements of the licensed 
mark was immaterial because of failure to allege resultant public 
deception. Judge O'Connell's dissent stressed that invalidation of 
a license could result from the failure of the licensor to police 
the licensee's manufacture and that there was no showing of actual 
quality control despite the detailed license provisions.144 Since 
the Celanese case it has become generally accepted that the burden 
of proof and the burden of going forward with the evidence are on 
the person attacking the validity of a license whether the claim of 
invalidity is raised by a plaintiff 145 or a defendant.146 As Cela-
nese further indicated, section 45 requires actual control by a li-
censor over both the nature and quality of the goods sold by a 
licensee. 147 Neither impeccable license provisions 148 nor control 
143. See Appendix for discussion of cancellation proceedings. 
144. 35 C.C.P .A. (Patents) 1061, 1069, 167 F .2d 484, 490 (1948). 
145. R. C. W., Supervisor, Inc. v. Cuban Tobacco Co., 220 F. Supp. 453 
(S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
146. American Foods, Inc. v. Golden Flake, Inc., 312 F .2d 619 (5th Cir. 
1963); accord, Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 
358 (2d Cir. 1959); see Friedman v. Sealy, Inc., 274 F.2d 255 (10th 
Cir. 1959). Contrarywise, if a licensor asserts rights derived from 
a licensee's use, the licensor must establish that there are sufficient 
controls to validate the license. Ex parte Pure Oil Co., 99 U.S.P.Q. 
19 (Comm'r 1953); see Krayer, note 139 supra, at 578-79. The li-
censor will seldom be allowed to attack the license at the licensee's 
expense. See Arthur Murray, Inc. v. Horst, 110 F. Supp. 678 (D. 
Mass. 1953). 
14 7. See Halliday, "Safeguarding the Integrity of Licensed Marks," 49 
Trademark Rep. 602 (1959); Lahart, "Control-The Sine Qua Non of 
a Valid Trademark License," 50 Trademark Rep. 103, 107 (1960); 
Shniderman, "Trade-Mark Licensing-A Saga of Fantasy and Fact," 
14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 248, 262-68 (1949). Control limited to 
the nature of the goods is insufficient. Baxter Laboratories, Inc. v. 
Don Baxter, Inc., 87 U.S.P.Q. 122 (Comm'r 1950), juris. retained, 38 
C.C.P.A. (Patents) 786, 186 F.2d 511 (1951); see American Junior 
Aircraft Co. v. L. M. Cox Mfg. Co., 107 U.S.P.Q. 260 (S.D. Cal. 1955) 
(alternative holding); Consolidated Dairy Prods. Co. v. Albers Milling 
Co., 104 u.s.P.Q. 407 (Comm'r 1955). 
148. Alligator Co. v. Robert Bruce, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Pa. 1959). 
Failure to include appropriate provisions in the license is likewise 
not determinative. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 
F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959); accord, Huber Baking Co. v. Stroehman Bros., 
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limited to display of the mark is enough.149 By the same token, 
a license will not necessarily be jeopardized by failure of the li-
censor to control the licensee's display of the mark.150 Although 
the Lanham Act does not particularize as to what constitutes ade-
quate control over the nature and quality of the goods, there is 
general agreement that the Coca-Cola program is an acceptable 
model. 151 The Coca-Cola Company specifies the nature of the 
goods on which licensees can use its mark, prescribes standards 
for both the bottling process and the bottled product, polices li-
censees' plants to ensure conformity with these standards, and in-
stitutes prompt corrective measures whenever deviations are dis-
covered.152 Appropriate license provisions have accordingly been 
described as including 
(Footnote continued) 
110 U,S.P.Q. 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 252 F.2d 
945 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 358 U.S. 829 (1958). 
149. Societe Comptoir v. Alexander's Dep't Stores, 299 F .2d 33 (2d Cir. 
1962); accord, Bellbrook Dairies Inc. v. Bowman Dairy Co., 114 U.S. 
P.Q. 450 (Comm'r 1957), rev'd on other grounds, 47 C,C.P,A.(Patents) 
763, 273 F.2d 620 (1960); Reddy Kilowatt, Inc. v. Mid-Carolina Elec. 
Co-op, Inc., 240 F .2d 282, 289 (4th Cir. 1957) (dictum). 
150. In 1958 the Assistant Commissioner of Patents took issue with Cela-
nese and ruled that display of notice of license was necessary ~ 
perfect a license under the Lanham Act. Ex parte C. B. Donald Co., 
117 U.S.P.Q. 485 (Comm'r 1958). However, the Trademark Trial and 
Appeal Board subsequently repudiated this gloss on the statute, Tetra 
Pak Co. v. Schneider, 125 U.S.P.Q. 460 (Tm. Bd. 1960); see Wood-
ward, "Some Observations on Legitimate Control of the Nature and 
Quality of the Goods," 49 Trademark Rep. 609, 613-15 (1959), and an 
effort to amend the Lanham Act in this respect failed of enactment. 
Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute, 1962 Senate Hearings at 194. 
Despite the reaffirmation of Celanese, it is better and common prac-
tice for the licensor to make sure that the licensee gives notice of 
license in order to avoid the twin dangers of public deception and 
loss of trademark rights to the license. See Vandenburgh, note 140 
supra, at 180-81; Diamond, note 135 supr::t, at 306. See "Develop-
ments in the Law-Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition," 68 Harv. 
L. Rev. 814, 872-73 (1955) for discussion of the possible loss of 
rights to the licensee. The basic proposition, echoed by the Assist-
ant Commissioner in the Donald case, 117 U.S.P.Q. 485 (Comm'r 
1958), is that failure to give notice of license leads to the mark's 
connoting the licensee, rather than the licensor. 
151. See Diamond, note 135 supra, at 298; Halliday, note 147 supra, at 
602-03; Lahart, note 147 supra, at 128-29. The Coca-Cola program 
was utilized as an example of what section 45 required during hear-
ings on the Lanham Bill. 1944 Senate Hearings at 150-51. See also 
Reynolds, note 141 supra, at 1145. 
152. For similar programs see Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co. v. Shelley 
Knitting Mills, Inc., 212 F. Supp. 715 (E.D. Pa. 1962); E. I. du Pont 
de Nemours & Co. v. Celanese Corp., 35 c.c.P.A. (Patents) 1061, 
167 F .2d 484 (1948). 
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1. A statement of the precise nature of the goods or 
services in connection with which the mark is to be used 
and a requirement that additional goods or services may 
not be introduced under the mark without the consent of, 
and quality standards promulgated by, the licensor in ad-
vance of production. 
2. The quality standards to be adhered to must be set 
forth. This may be specified as the quality of the same ar-
ticle or service of the licensor, or of other licensees, or of 
a designated competitor. 
3. A requirement that pre-production samples be sub-
mitted to the licensor for approval and that production sam-
ples be submitted at specified intervals. 
4. An agreement that the licensor has the right to enter 
the premises of the licensee without notice during business 
hours and inspect production. 
Other licenses include such provisions as the require-
ment by the licensor of the display of the mark on packages, 
labels, cartons and other containers and in advertising, so as 
to indicate singleness of responsibility for the goods. 
Ordinarily, the license contract contains a statement of 
the licensor's right to terminate the license for failure to 
comply with any of the provisions of the contract.153 
117 
The Lanham Act's dual control requirement has diminished 
the precedent value of the common-law decisions sustaining li-
censes. The fact that a licensor supplies a principal ingredient 
of the trademarked product or a formula or patent license neces-
sary for its production may indicate control over the nature of 
the goods sold by a licensee but does not necessarily establish 
control over quality.154 The existence of a parent-subsidiary re-
lationship or evidence of careful selection of licensees is similar-
ly no guaranty that both types of control in fact exist.155 These 
circumstances have greater continued utility, however, because in 
appropriate factual situations they may justify an inference that a 
153. Restatement (Second), Torts § 756A, comment a (Tent. Draft No. 8, 
1963); Diamond, note 135 supra, at 299-300. -
154. See, e.g., Lahart, note 147 supra, at 127-28 (patent licenses). See 
generally Halliday, note 147 supra. The Coca-Cola system implicitly 
assumes that ingredient control is not enough. 
155. See Halliday, note 147 supra, at 604-05. Cases involving the parent-
subsidiary relationship so indicating are R.C. W., Supervisor, Inc. v. 
Cuban Tobacco Co., 220 F. Supp. 453 (S.D,N.Y. 1963); Evelyn Wood 
Reading Dynamics Institutes v. Zimmerman, 134 U.S,P.Q, 475 (N.D. 
Cal. 1962); Johnson & Johnson v. Medicraft Pharmacal Co., 130 U.S. 
P.Q. 373 (Tm. Bd. 1961); cf. Huntington Nat'l Mattress Co. v. Cela-
nese Corp., 201 F. Supp. 938, 945 (D. Md. 1962) (dictum). 
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licensor controls both the nature and quality of the goods sold by 
a licensee.156 
The requirement that licensing involve both "legitimate" con-
trol and use is a latent Pandora's box. If the idea was to insert 
a remainder that a licensing arrangement must be legally permis-
sible and reconcilable with defined public policy, the "requirement" 
is a truism.157 On the other hand, if, as one commentator has 
suggested,158 the rationale was that a person who has used a mark 
to violate the antitrust laws should ipso facto be denied the privi-
lege of trademark licensing, the requirement would raise anew the 
bugbear of subsection 33(b) (7)159 with attendant possibilities of ir-
rational forfeiture of trademark rights at the expense of the con-
suming public.160 
The legislative history is uninformative beyond tracing the 
language to the Senate161 and disclosing the following cryptic state-
ments by the House Managers: 
This amendment makes clear that, under section 5 of the 
House Bill, the use by related companies of a registered 
mark or a mark sought to be registered must be legiti-
mate.162 
This amendment amends the definition of the term "related 
company" to exclude any person who does not legitimately 
control or is not legitimately controlled by the registrant 
or applicant for registration in respect to the nature and 
quality of the goods or services in connection with which 
the mark is used.163 
The very blandness of the legislative history is, however, perhaps 
the best guaranty that the "legitimate" terminology does not add 
156. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Lincoln Laboratories, Inc., 322 F .2d 968 (7th 
Cir. 1963) (parent-subsidiary relationship); Land 0 1 Lakes Creameries, 
Inc. v. Oconomowoc Canning Co., 221 F. Supp. 576 (E.D. Wis. 1963) 
aff'd, 330 F .2d 667 (7th Cir. 1964) (careful selection of licensee); see 
Lahart, note 147 supra, at 116-27. 
157. Cf. Hopkins, Trademarks, Tradenames, and Unfair Competition 4-9 
(4th ed. 1924); Restatement (Second), Torts § 715 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 
1963). This has been advanced as the intent of the requirement, 
Whitman, "You Can License Your Trade-Mark, If-," 38 Trademark 
Rep. 639 (1948), and as its practical result. Diggins, "The Lanham 
Trade-Mark Act," 37 Trademark Rep. 305, 322 (1947). 
158. Timberg, "Trade-Marks, Monopoly, and the Restraint of Competition," 
14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 323, 355-56 (1949). 
159. § 33(b) (7), 60 Stat. 439 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (7) (1964); see text 
accompanying notes 235-84 in Chapter II supra. 
160. Cf. Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 260 (1955). 
161. S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. at 1-2 (1946). 
162. H. R. Rep. No. 2322, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. at 4 (1946). 
163. Id. at 7. 
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automatic vitiation of trademark licensing to the sanctions for vio-
lation of the Sherman Act. Since the antitrust interpretation of the 
requirement derives solely from informal commentary,164 judges 
wary of the literal language of subsection 33(b) (7) are unlikely to 
adopt an extreme interpretation of a single word. The lack of au-
thoritative legislative history as well as the verdict of quiescent 
years indicate that if "legitimate" has any specific antitrust con-
tent, it is a simple declaration that trademark licensing will not 
immunize conduct otherwise violative of the antitrust laws.165 
C. Partial Territorial Assignments, Limited Territorial Licenses 
and the Antitrust Laws 
The major impact of the assignment and licensing provisions 
of the Lanham Act on consensual allocation of territorial trademark 
rights derives from the purported validation of partial territorial 
assignments and the vast increase in the number of limited terri-
torial licenses brought about by these provisions. Prior to the 
Lanham Act the feasibility of partial territorial assignments was 
in doubt as was the propriety of widespread licensing. 
The assertion has been made that assignment of trademark 
rights for a limited area was possible under the Act of 1905.166 
However, insofar as this contention is predicated upon cases up-
holding assignment of American trademark rights to exclusive dis-
tributors of foreign manufacturers, it is submitted that the state-
ment is incorrect. The platitude that trademark rights do not 
exist in gross is susceptible to many implications,167 but one that 
is often overlooked is that trademark rights are dependent upon 
legal protection for their existence.168 It follows that assignment 
in toto of American trademark rights, whether before or after the 
Lanham Act,169 is not a partial territorial assignment but a trans-
fer of all of the trademark rights accorded by the American legal 
164. E.g., Shniderman, note 147 supra, at 252 & n. 25; Taggart, note 116 
supra, at 242. 
165. See Taggart, "New Statutory Concepts of Trade-Mark Ownership," 38 
Trademark Rep. 125, 129 (1948). Cf. Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, 
§ 46(a), 60 Stat. 445; Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 
341 U.S. 593 (1951). 
166. Halliday, "Assignments Under the Lanham Act," 38 Trademark Rep. 
970, 975 (1948). 
167. See Grismore, "The Assignment of Trade Marks and Trade Names," 
30 Mich. L. Rev. 489 (1932). 
168. See Cohen, "Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach," 
35 Colum. L. Rev. 809, 814-15 (1935). 
169. E.g., A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923); Watson v. 
E. Leitz, Inc., 254 F .2d 777 (D,C. Cir. 1958). 
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system in the entire territory subject to that system,170 More-
over, cases involving the grant of exclusive territorial rights in 
part of the United States in conjunction with an exclusive distrib-
utorship1 71_ are equally inapposite because the grant is seldom 
more than a license which terminates with the distributorship. 172 
With the exclusive distributor cases excepted, the validity of par-
tial territorial assignments can hardly be regarded as a settled 
point of trademark law prior to the Lanham Act, 173 not withstand-
ing a few suggestive cases. In Griggs, Copper & Co. v. Erie Pre-
serving Co., 174 decided in 1904, plaintiff's predecessor, Griggs, 
had begun using "Home Brand" on canned fruits and jellies only 
to discover a prior use in a different trade area. Griggs there-
upon obtained an assignment of the prior user's rights in Grigg's 
own trade area subject to the assignor's right to use the mark in 
conjunction with a distinctive label. As there was no evidence that 
the assignor had acquired any good will in Grigg's trade territory, 
the assignment could only have been effective to estop the assignor 
from asserting rights in Griggs' trade area,175 a consequence pre-
cluded by the reservation of rights. In any event, the court en-
joined a third party from infringing the mark in Griggs' territory 
relying on both the assignment and the secondary meaning that the 
plaintiff's mark had acquired. The Griggs case is shorn of mean-
ingful precedent value, however, by its lack of analysis 176 and its 
early date. The assignment would have been doubly unnecessary 
after 1918 because Griggs would have qualified as a bona fide con-
current user under the Hanover and Rectanus cases. Another 
170. See Roger & Gallet v. Janmarie, Inc., 44 C,C.P,A. (Patents) 965, 245 
F.2d 505 (1957); Steed & Hunter, "Trademark Assignments and Re-
straints of Trade," 45 Trademark Rep. 886, 894 (1955). 
171. E.g., California Wine & Liquor Corp. v. William Zakon & Sons, 297 
Mass. 373, 8 N.E.2d 812 (1937). 
172. United States Ozone Co. v. United States Ozone Co., 62 F .2d 881 (7th 
Cir. 1932); accord, Progressive Welder Co. v. Collom, 1:25 F. Supp. 
307 (D. Minn. 1954). A license is not even necessary if the distrib-
utor merely resells the trademarked product. Cf. Rimmel, Inc. v. 
Nelson, 102 U.S.P,Q. 258 (Comm'r 1954); see Shniderman, note 147 
supra, at 252 n. 27 (1949). 
173. See 3 Callmann, Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks 1284-85 (2d ed. 
1950); Steed & Hunter, note 170 supra, at 894-95; Willcox, "Territorial 
Extent of Trademark Rights and the Partial Sale of a Business," 25 
Ill. L. Rev. 485-86 (1931). 
174. 131 Fed. 359 (C,C,W.D.N.Y. 1904). 
175. See note 95 supra and accompanying text. 
176. See Hopkins, Trademarks, Tradenames, and Unfair Com petition 59 
(4th ed. 1924). 
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suggestive case was Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 177 
which upheld a contract in which the Coca-Cola Company granted 
the exclusive right to use its mark on bottled "Coke" within a de-
fined territory. The arrangement was more akin to a license than 
an assignment, however, because the Coca-Cola Company manufac-
tured the syrup which was the basic component of the bottled prod-
uct and controlled the nature of the bottling process. 178 
Though the validity of partial territorial assignments was 
unadjudicated prior to the Lanham Act, commentators have assumed 
that partial territorial assignments were theoretically permissible 
at least in situations in which concurrent territorial rights could 
have been acquired under the doctrine of the Hanover and Rectanus 
cases and that the new language concerning partial assignment of 
good will in section 10 of the Lanham Act validated these assign-
ments.179 Neither proposition has yet been authoritatively resolved 
although there have again been suggestive decisions. In Huber 
Baking Co. v. Stroehmann Bros. Co.180 the plaintiff had used a 
component of a cooperative's registered collective mark 181 as his 
own mark until he joined the cooperative and adopted its mark. 
After joining the cooperative and participating in a quality control 
program, 182 the plaintiff had assigned his former mark to the co-
operative subject to a reservation of "full and unrestricted" rights 
within his trade area. The Second Circuit held that the terms of 
the assignment indicated that the plaintiff's license to use the col-
lective mark within his trade territory was meant to be exclusive 
or, alternatively, that the terms of the assignment estopped the 
assignee to dispute the plaintiff's rights within the reserved area. 
The territorial reservation in the assignment was found to have a 
legitimate business purpose consonant with the public interest be-
cause the reservation, in effect, preserved the connotation that the 
177. 269 Fed. 796 (D. Del. 1920). The Coca-Cola case has been referred 
to in dictum as establishing the validity of partial territorial assign-
ments. Holley Milling Co. v. Salt Lake & Jordan Mill & Elevator Co., 
58 Utah 149, 164, 197 Pac. 731, 736 (1921) (dictum). 
178. See Jones v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 223 F. Supp. 650 (D. Neb. 1963); Steed 
& Hunter, note 170 supra, at 893-94. 
179. Robert, The New Trade-Mark Manual 28 (1947); Vandenburgh, Trade-
mark Law and Procedure 190 & n. 23 (1959). 
180. 252 F.2d 945 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 358 U.S. 829 (1958). 
181. A collective mark is a trade or service mark used by members of 
a group to indicate that membership. § 45, 60 Stat. 644 (1946), as 
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1964). 
182. The cooperative analyzed samples of members' bread and flour, 
periodically inspected members' premises, and furnished advice on 
optimum baking methods. 
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plaintiff's former mark had acquired in his trade territory.183 
This is precisely the reason why Huber sheds little light on the 
validity of partial territorial assignments. Because the area that 
the plaintiff reserved in the assignment was slightly larger than 
the area in which he had used and advertised his mark, there was 
no good will outside of that area that the assignment could convey 
to the cooperative. At most, the "assignment" constituted a dec-
laration that the plaintiff would not thereafter expand territorial 
use of the mark.184 Maola Ice Cream Co. v. Maola Milk & Ice 
Cream Co., 185 on the other hand, did involve a potentially valid 
partial territorial assignment for good will did exist in the as-
signed territory. The assignor was an ice cream manufacturer 
who initially operated two plants, each plant supplying "Maola" 
ice cream to distinct but bordering trade territories in North 
Carolina. One plant was sold to the assignee with the understand-
ing that his use of the "Maola" mark would be restricted to the 
territory previously served by that plant. After the assignee be-
gan to sell "Maola" ice cream outside this territory the assignor 
sued to enforce the restrictive terms of the assignment, and the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the restrictions were 
unreasonable and unenforceable at common law because the as-
signee was not doing business in all of the reserved territory .116 
The court did not pass on the validity of the partial territorial as-
signment itself or on the effect that the illegality of the territorial 
restrictions would have on that validity, yet it seems obvious that 
the policy against purchaser deception should be considered. 
The inference in both Huber and the pre-Lanham Act Coca-
Cola case that partial territorial assignments with respect to com-
peting goods are nondeceptive is limited to a context of overall 
quality control which maintains a mark's ability to identify like 
183. The district judge had conversely held the plaintiff estopped to assert 
that the license was exclusive on the ground that the public would 
otherwise be misled into believing that the plaintiff's use of the col-
lective mark identified goods approved by the cooperative. Huber 
Baking Co. v. Stroehmann Bros., 110 U,S.P.Q. 349 (S.D.N.Y, 1956). 
He apparently considered that an exclusive license would exempt the 
plaintiff from the cooperative's quality control program. 
184. See Restatement (Second), Torts § 756, comment £ (Tent. Draft No. 
8, 1963). 
185. 238 N.C. 317, 77 S.E.2d 910 (1953). The Maola case is analyzed in 
Steed & Hunter, "Trademark Assignments and Restraints of Trade," 
45 Trademark Rep. 886 (1955). 
186. This was an alternative holding. The court also considered that the 
restrictions were invalid because (1) they were not in writing as re-
quired by North Carolina law and (2) they were a naked restraint of 
trade and void at common law. 
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goods despite multiple users. In the absence of quality control, a 
partial territorial assignment which results in the assignor and the 
assignee selling in adjacent markets may well be found to be in-
valid.187 Since both an assignor and an assignee have a privilege 
to vary the quality of their products, there is no assurance that 
the assigned mark will continue to identify like goods to consumers 
exposed to both brands.188 Unless dispelled by experience in the 
use of the marks, this probability of confusion should only be dis-
counted for a cogent reason. For example, a partial territorial 
assignment that is used in lieu of litigation to adjust the colorable 
territorial claims of rival concurrent users should generally be 
upheld regardless of the creation of a common border. This type 
of partial territorial assignment functions like those judicial de-
crees which accept a common boundary between concurrent users 
as a border of convenience in reaching an equitable accomodation 
of conflicting trademark rights.189 In both cases the common 
border is tolerated, not because some confusion of purchasers may 
not result, but because it would be inequitable and noncompetitive 
to foreclose a person who already has concurrent territorial rights 
from extending those rights to the utmost. These considerations 
do not exist with respect to a partial territorial assignment which 
creates initial concurrent territorial rights and the policy against 
assignments which produce deception can therefore be given greater 
weight. Partial territorial assignments used to create concurrent 
territorial rights should generally be restricted to situations where 
an assignor has used a mark in several remote markets and has 
transferred all of his rights in one or more of the markets to an 
assignee. 
Territorial restrictions on a partial assignee's area of use 
should not materially affect the validity of a partial territorial , 
assignment. Restrictions which forbid invasion of the assignor's .i 
markets are superfluous because the remedies for trademark in-
fringement are adequate to protect the assignor's and the public's 
interests in this regard.190 Moreover, it would be impolitic to 
encourage assignors to specify in an assignment the area in which 
their assignees cannot use the assigned mark due to the assignors' 
187. Snodgrass v. Welle, 11 Mo. App. 590 (1882) (mem.) (alternative hold-
ing); cf. Ex parte Chadbourn Hosiery Mills, Inc., 107 U.S.P.Q. 12 
(Commir 1955); Flintkote Co. v. Merriam & Co., 88 U.S.P.Q. 390 
(Comm 'r 1951). 
188. See Steed & Hunter, note 185 supra, at 895-96. The assignee's dis-
play of notice of successorship would be a questionable palliation 
where the assignor continued to use the mark. 
189. E.g., Tillman & Bendel, Inc. v. California Packing Corp, 63 F .2d 
498 (9th Cir.), cert. den., 290 U.S. 638 (1933). 
190. Cf. A Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923). 
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continued use. The contours of an assignor's market may change 
with the ebb and flow of trade so that territorial restrictions which 
initially accurately reflected an assignor's retained trade territory 
could eventually bar an assignee's expansion into an abandoned 
market. Should this occur, the territorial restrictions will have 
become mere restraints on the assignee's business activities which 
are unsupported by the policy against deception of purchasers and 
should be unenforceable at common law. As the Maola case sug-
gests territorial restrictions that mediately or immediately pre-
clude a partial assignee from entering areas unoccupied by the 
assignor should not be tolerated. 
Partial territorial assignment of trademark rights remains 
a questionable commercial expedient despite the theoretical valid-
ity of some partial transfers. A settlement of conflicting terri-
torial claims through a partial territorial assignment is probably 
unexceptionable but the potential validity at common law of certain 
partial territorial assignments used to create concurrent territor-
ial rights is not necessarily determinative of the validity of these 
transfers under the Lanham Act.191 It remains open to question 
whether a Congress that endeavored to stamp out the doctrine enun-
ciated in the Hanover and Rectanus cases through the constructive 
notice provision can reasonably be assumed to have authorized 
wholesale resurrection of concurrent territorial rights through the 
consent of the parties to a partial territorial assignment.192 The 
Justice department served notice during the hearings on the Lan-
ham Bill that partial territorial assignments sustainable under the 
Lanham Act would also have to pass muster under the antitrust 
laws. 193 Furthermore, the terse declaration in section 10 of the 
191. See contra, Robert, note 179 supra, at 28. 
192. The concurrent registration provisions do not necessarily raise a 
contrary inference since they were principally intended to apply to 
concurrent territorial use exempted from the constructive notice pro-
vision on equitable grounds, e.g., good faith use commenced prior to 
registration on the Principal Register. See Diggins, "The Lanham 
Trade-Mark Act," 37 Trademark Rep. 305, 316-17 (1947). The basic 
issue is whether Congress was opposed to concurrent territorial use 
because it was a noncompetitive as well as an inexpedient doctrine. 
193. 1944 Senate Hearings at 64. See also Restatement (Second), Torts 
§ 756, comment .f. (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963). The Justice Department 
recommended that the "accordion term good will," see Timberg, 
"Trade-Marks, Monopoly, and the Restraint of Competition," 14 Law 
& Contemp. Prob. 323, 357-58 (1949), be deleted from section 10 in 
order to preclude assignments unaccompanied by the physical assets 
associated with the assigned mark or marks. 1944 Senate Hearings 
at 146. The apparent purpose of this suggestion was to make assig-
nability sufficiently onerous to be an inconvenient cloak for conspira-
torial activity. It is interesting to note that the Justice Department 
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Lanham Act that "A registered mark. • .shall be assignable. 
with that part of the goodwill of the business connected with the 
use of and symbolized by the mark ••. "194 contains no discern-
ible dispensation from ordinary antitrust standards. Section 10, 
for instance, does not expressly condone territorial restrictions 
in partial territorial assignments nor should it be construed to do 
so implicitly in light of the noncompetitive potentialities of such 
restrictions. This means that section 1 of the Sherman Act 1s per 
se ban on horizontal market allocation should apply in full force 
to territorial restrictions which prohibit a partial assignee1s use 
on competing goods in areas unoccupied by the assignor .195 Par-
tial territorial assignments may have a function to perform as an 
alternative to litigation with respect to territory claimed by sev-
eral concurrent users, but the combined strictures of trademark 
and antitrust law confine other risk-free partial territorial assign-
ments to a narrow compass indeed. 
In contrast to the dubious status of partial territorial assign-
ments, territorial limitations in trademark licenses are both fre-
quent196 and unquestionably valid as a matter of trademark law.197 
A license with territorial limitations must, however, expressly 
forbid sales to third persons who intend to resell the goods out-
side the licensee's territory if that is the intent of the parties. 
The covenant will not ordinarily be implied or inferred due to the 
restraint imposed on trade.198 
The interaction between limited territorial licenses and the 
antitrust standards applicable to territorial restrictions is presently 
(Footnote continued) 
proposal was in line with the common-law view of assignments, e.g., 
Independent Baking Powder Co. v. Boorman, 175 Fed. 448 (C.C.D.N.J. 
1910) (alternative holding), and common law conditions for a reason-
able restraint of trade. See Bork, "Ancillary Restraints and the 
Sherman Act," 15 A.B.A. Antitrust Section 211, 219-24 (1959). 
194. § 10, 60 Stat. 431 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1964). 
195. Cf. Maola Ice Cream Co. v. Maola Milk & Ice Cream Co., 238 N.C. 
317, 77 S.E.2d 910 (1953). A bona fide partial territorial assignment 
would merely convey the good will in an area without limiting the 
assignee's ability to expand territorial use of the mark. 
196. See Restatement (Second), Torts § 756A, comment b (Tent. Draft No. 
8, 1963). -
197. Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 
1958); accord, Huber Baking Co. v. Stroehmann Bros. Co., 252 F.2d 
945 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 358 U.S. 829 (1958). 
198. Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., note 197 supra; nor 
will territorial limitations generally be inferred. Pacific Supply Corp. 
v. Farmers Union Central Exch., Inc., 318 F .2d 894 (9th Cir. 1963), 
cert. den., 375 U.S. 965 (1964). But see Huber Baking Co. v. Stroeh-
mann Bros. Co., 252 F.2d 945 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 358 U.S. 829 (1958). 
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the major point of friction between territorial trademark rights 
and the antitrust laws.199 The constructive notice provision sub-
stantially delivered business from the noncompetitive divisions of 
trade territory that could result from multiple good faith adoptions 
of a mark, but a noncompetitive principle of trademark law may 
have been replaced by an anticompetitive principle if the licensing 
provisions of the Lanham Act sanction territorial allocations that 
would otherwise violate the antitrust laws. The incidence of good 
faith concurrent territorial use was haphazard and coincidental, 
whereas the licensing provisions permit the broad territorial rights 
created by registration to be deliberately apportioned. Calculated 
manipulation of territorial trademark rights manifestly holds great-
er opportunities for anticompetitive abuse. 
Trademark licensing arrangements may be horizontal, verti-
cal, or conglomerate depending on the commercial relationship be-
tween a licensor and a licensee. If they are or become competi-
tors, the arrangement is horizontal. If the licensee is or becomes 
a customer or supplier of the licensor, the arrangement is verti-
cal. On the other hand, if there is no business relationship be-
tween the licensor and the licensee apart from that occasioned by 
the trademark license, the arrangement can be considered conglom-
erate. Conglomerate licensing typically extends use of a mark 
to new products or services 200 or into previously unexploited geo-
graphical areas. 201 
Proper characterization of a licensing arrangement is some-
times obscured by trademark licensing's intimate, yet indetermin-
ant, relationship to franchise selling-a generic term for contrac-
tual arrangements concerning the distribution of goods and services. 
Although franchise programs can involve all levels of distribution, 
there are three principal types: (1) manufacturer-wholesaler-re-
tailer exclusive sales outlet arrangements; (2) sponsor-retailer 
representation arrangements; and (3) retailer or manufacturer joint 
ventures.202 The traditional franchise, an exclusive sales outlet 
199. As the Justice Department representatives prophesied during the leg-
islative hearings, Cf. 1944 Senate Hearings at 143 (remarks of Eliott 
H. Moyer), the issue has been brought to a boiling point by the boom 
in trademark licensing induced by the Lanham Act. 
200. See Alligator Co. v. Robert Bruce, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Pa. 
1959); Finchley, Inc. v. George Hess Co., 24 F. Supp. 94 (E,D.N. Y. 
1938); cf. Panel Discussion, "New Frontiers in Section 7 Enforce-
ment," A.B.A. Antitrust Section Transcript at 9 (1963). 
201. See Medd v. Boyd Wagner, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 399 (N.D. Ohio 1955); 
Vermont Maple Syrup Co. v. F. N. Johnson Maple Syrup Co., note 
129 supra; cf. Panel Discussion, note 200 supra. 
202. See Hall, "Franchising-New Scope for an Old Technique," 42 Harv. 
Bus. Rev. 60, 62-63 (1964); statement of Daphne Leeds, 1961 Senate 
Hearings at 7. 
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arrangement between a manufacturer and a wholesaler or retailer ,203 
seldom requires a trademark license because the franchisee merely 
resells the manufacturer's product.204 However, if the franchisee 
participates in the processing of the product, like the wholesaler bot-
tlers in the soft-drink industry,205 a trademark license is necessary 
for the distributor to vend the processed product under the manufac-
turer's mark~06 In the typical sponsor-retailer representation ar-
rangement the sponsor develops an idea for marketing a distinctive 
product or service, establishes marketing standards, selects a trade-
mark or service mark, engages in advertising and promotional cam-
paigns, and authorizes businesses in different areas to market the 
product or service subject to the sponsor's quality contro1?07 The 
sponsor-retailer arrangement is the fastest growing type of franchis-
ing including operations like Howard Johnson restaurants, Hertz auto 
rentals, and Kelly Girl part-time employment agencies.208 In vari-
ants of the arrangement, a sponsor, like the Independent Grocers Al-
liance (IGA), may select goods and authorize certain wholesalers 
or retailers to sell them, or a sponsor-wholesaler, like Western 
Auto Supply Company, may authorize certain retailers to sell 
goods selected by the sponsor.209 These variants may or may 
not involve trademark licensing depending on whether the sponsor 
adopts a trademark to identify the goods which it selects. Finally, 
joint venture franchising customarily concerns a group of manu-
facturers or retailers who join forces to establish an umbrella 
corporation which in turn franchises the joint venturers.210 If manu-
facturers are participants, the umbrella corporation typically engages 
in product research, develops product specifications, selects a trade-
mark, engages in national advertising and licenses the joint venturers 
to use the mark in connection with the sale of the franchised product.211 
203. See Phillips & Duncan, Marketing 574 (3d ed. 1956). 
204. See statement of Daphne Leeds, 1961 Senate Hearings at 7. 
205. See Hall, note 202 supra, at 62-63. 
206. E.g., Coca-Cola Co~ennett, 238 Fed. 513 (8th Cir. 1916). Absent 
contractual restrictions a distributor would not, however, need a li-
cense to advertise that a bottled drink was made from trademarked 
syrup. Cf. Prestonnettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359 (1924). 
207. See 1961Senate Hearings at 7. 
208. See Hall, note 202 supra, at 63. 
209. Ibid. 
210. A joint venture exists where the following factors are present: (a) 
contribution by several persons of money, property, effort, knowledge, 
skill, or other assets to a common undertaking; (b) a joint property 
interest in the subject matter of the venture; (c) a right of mutual 
control or management of the enterprise; (d) expectation of profit; 
(e) a right to participate in profits; (f) customarily the objective is 
limited to a single undertaking. 2 Williston, Contracts § 318A (3d 
ed. 1959). 
211. See 1961 Senate Hearings at 7. 
128 TERRITORIAL TRADEMARK RIGHTS 
On the other ha¢, retailer joint ventures usually set up wholesale or-
ganization in order to aggregate the participants' purchasing power 
and may or may not adopt a trademark to identify goods purchased 
through the umbrella corporation.212 Aside the exclusive sales outlet 
arrangement, which primarily serves to inspire dealer loyalty and 
effort,213 the attractiveness of modern franchising lies in the econo-
mies of scale in advertising and purchasing made available to the 
franchisees. 
An exclusive sales outlet arrangement is usually vertical, 
whereas joint venture franchising is generally horizontal. Sponsor-
retailer arrangements may fall into the conglomerate category be-
cause they are widely used to obtain geographical dispersion of a 
hopefully unique marketing scheme, and the franchisees may be 
neither customers nor competitors of the sponsor apart from the 
franchising relationship. Whether horizontal, vertical, or conglom-
erate, combined with franchising or not, trademark licensing 
programs generally involve limited territorial licenses.214 
In the wake of White Motor Co. v. United States215 a number 
of persons have suggested that the existence of a limited territor-
ial trademark license should require application of the rule of rea-
son to vertical216 and __ even horizontal217 territorial allocations. 
These views contradict those expressed by other commentators 
shortly after the Supreme Court declared in the Timken case that 
"a trademark cannot be legally used as a device for Sherman Act 
violation." 218 Nevertheless, one present-day commentator asserts 
that "a solid front of precedents" prove that limited territorial 
trademark licenses do make a difference,219 Analysis of this 
212. See Hall, note 202 supra, at 63, 
213. See Phillips & Dwican, note 203 supra, at 574-75. Exclusive sales 
outlets may also reduce distribution costs by restricting the number 
of sales points to be serviced, minimizing risk of dealer insolvency, 
and providing more reliable estimates of future sales. See "Some 
Doubts About Franchising," 8 Cartel 61, 62 (1963), 
214. See Hall, note 202 supra, at 66; Restatement (Second), Torts § 756A, 
comment b (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963). 
215. 372 U.S. 253 (1963). 
216. See LeBlanc, "Antitrust Ramifications of Trademark Licensing and 
Franchising," 53 Trademark Rep. 519, 544 (1963); Stewart, "Exclusive 
Franchises and Territorial Confinement of Distributors," 22 A.B.A, 
Antitrust Section 33, 43-44 (1963). 
217. See Groen, "Trade-Marks and Copyrights," 7 Antitrust Bull. 249, 257 
(1962); Panel Discussion, 7 Antitrust Bull. 275, 278 (1962) (remarks 
of Robert Bork). 
218. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 599 (1951); 
e.g., Wortmann, "Trademark Licensing and Use by Related Companies," 
44 Trademark Rep. 1257, 1265-67 (1954). 
219. Stewart, "Franchise or Protected Territory Distribution," 8 Antitrust 
Bull. 447, 461-65 (1963). 
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"solid front of precedents" will reveal the effect that the licensing 
provisions of the Lanham Act have had upon the relatio~ip be-
tween territorial trademark rights and antitrust laws.flt?surprising-
ly.,__ the most unequivocal precedent concerns horizontal licensing 
arrangements. 
The 1964 decision of the Northern District of Illinois in Uni-
ted States v. Sealy, Inc., presently on appeal to the Supreme 
Court, 220 and the 1962 decision of the Fifth Circuit in Denison 
Mattress Co. v. Spring-Air Co.221 are the ranking authorities for 
the proposition that the rule of reason should be applied to limited 
territorial licenses involving competitors. Sealy, Inc., Spring-Air 
Co., and several other corporations were organized by small bed-
ding manufacturers in order to bolster their competition with the 
"majors" of the industry. These umbrella corporations designed 
uniform specifications for lines of branded bedding products to be 
manufactured by their stockholders, licensed the stockholders to 
manufacture and sell the trademarked goods in specified areas, and 
pooled stockholder funds in order to finance national advertising 
campaigns. The territorial restrictions on manufacture and sale 
applied only to products sold under the licensed marks. Licensees 
were free to sell goods under other marks whenever and wherever 
they chose. In 1960 the government filed civil antitrust complaints 
against four of the "mattress companies" engaged in trademark li-
censing, including Sealy and Spring-Air, alleging that the limited 
territorial trademark licenses constituted horizontal territorial al-
locations that were per se violative of the antitrust laws. Spring-
Air and one other mattress company signed consent decrees aban-
doning the territorial limitations on licensee sale and manufacture,222 
but the other two companies elected to go to trial. One case is 
still sub judice.223 In United States v. Sealy, lnc.224 the court 
found for the defendant. Judge Austin summarized his conclusions 
as follows: 
220. 1964 Trade Cas. ,r 71258 (N.D. Ill. 1964), juris. statement filed, ATRR 
205:A-2 (6/15/65). 
221. 308 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1962). 
222. United States v. Spring-Air Co., 1962 Trade Cas. 11 70402 (N.D. Ill. 
1962) (consent decree); United States v. Restonic Corp., 1960 Trade 
Cas. 11 69739 (N.D. Ill. 1960) (consent decree). 
223. United States v. Serta Associates, Inc., 29 F .R.D. 136 (N.D. Ill. 1961) 
(mem.) (motion to quash subpoena). 
224. 1964 Trade Cas. ,r 71258 (N.D. Ill. 1964). The Federal Trade Com-
mission dismissed a complaint against the Sealy group of bedding 
manufacturers in the halcyon days when the Commission was "soft" 
on territorial allocations. Sealy, Inc., 45 F, T ,C. 730 (1944). 
130 TERRITORIAL TRADEMARK RIGHTS 
Plain tiff's evidence, read as a whole, conclusively proves 
that the Sealy licensing arrangements were developed in the 
early 1920's for entirely legitimate business purposes, in-
cluding royalty income to Sugar Land Industries, which owned 
the Sealy name, trademarks and patents, and the benefits to 
licensees of joint purchasing, research, engineering, adver-
tising and merchandising. These objectives were carried out 
by successor companies, including defendant, whose activities 
have been directed not toward market division among licensees 
but toward obtaining additional licensees and more intensive 
sales coverage.225 
It seems evident from the foregoing statement that Judge Austin 
did not believe that the presence of a limited territorial trademark 
license in and of itself materially affected the antitrust status of 
the Sealy territorial restrictions. He considered that the rule of 
reason was applicable to the Sealy system because the territorial 
restrictions were reasonably ancillary to the joint venture of the 
small bedding companies in marketing a national brand. Although 
as an abstract proposition the pooling of funds to finance large-
scale advertising is possible without restricting the areas in which 
the advertised goods can be sold, 226 it has been forcefully main-
tained that joint venture licensing cannot attract adequate capital 
without the quid pro quo of territorial exclusively, 227 and Judge 
Austin specifically so found in Sealy. He stated: 
It is obvious that an essential inducement to prospective licensees-
to get them to undertake the obligations of a Sealy license-was 
the grant of exclusive rights in the territories in which Sealy 
asked them to manufacture, distribute, and pay royalties.228 
In sum, Sealy appears to be one of several instances in which 
the lower federal courts have, in effect, sustained a joint venture 
defense to an allegation of per se violation of the antitrust laws~29 
Denison Mattress Co. v. Spring-Air Co.230 was a private 
action which was sub judice at the time that the Spring-Air Co. 
225. 1964 Trade Cas. 11 71258, at 80083 (N.D. 111. 1964). 
226. See Moutoux v. Gulling Auto Elec., Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. 11 70639 
(S.D. Ind. 1962). 
227. 1961 Senate Hearings at 34 (remarks of Sigmund Timberg). 
228. 1964 Trade Cas. ,r 71258, at 80078 (N.D. 111. 1964). 
229. See United States v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 
18 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 371 U.S. 296 (1963); Uni-
ted States v. National Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 
1953); "Joint Ventures and Boycotts: Some Suggestions on Per Se," 
15 Stan. L. Rev. 638 (1963). 
23 0. 308 F .2d 403 (5th Cir. 1962). 
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conceded to the Justice Department and agreed to abandon its ter-
ritorial restrictions. In 1957 Denison attempted to withdraw from 
the Spring-Air group without paying accrued liabilities for adver-
tising and fees. When Spring-Air brought suit for the money due, 
Denison asserted that the license agreement was void under the 
federal antitrust laws. Several unlawful restraints of trade were 
alleged, including collusive division of markets. The trial court 
brushed aside this defense, and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed. The appellate court stressed the limitation of the ter-
ritorial restrictions to the sale of Spring-Air brand products and 
the duty of a trademark licensor to police his licensees in support 
of this result. Supreme Court precedents condemning horizontal 
territorial allocations were distinguished on the ground that divi-
sion of markets was not the central purpose of the Spring-Air 
contracts. This conclusion was supported by a mishmash of 
cases, the bulk of which applied the rule of reason to vertical 
territorial allocations.231 
The result of Denison seems correct. The Supreme Court 
has disavowed antitrust defenses to contractual obligations unless 
payment would involve "one of the very restraints forbidden by 
the Sherman Act," 232 and the legality of the territorial restric-
tions did not seem so intimately related to Denison's liability for 
advertising fees.233 However, the Fifth Circuit's rationalization 
of this result in terms of the rule of reason seems more ques-
tionable than the approach taken by the federal district court in 
Sealy. The crux of the matter is whether, as the Fifth Circuit 
held, the legal obligations imposed upon a trademark licensor pro-
vide a sufficient business purpose for territorial limitations in 
horizontal trademark licenses to justify a finding that division of 
markets was not the central purpose of the territorial restrictions. 
The limitation of the restraints to products sold under the Spring-
Air brand is immaterial if this business purpose fails to remove 
the incubus of per se illegality. 234 
231. 308 F .2d 403, 409-410. The Hanover case and Tricontinental Fin. 
Corp. v. Tropical Marine Enterprises, Inc., 265 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 
1959), which sustained a restrictive convenant accompanying the sale 
of a boat, were also cited. For criticism of Tricontinental see 
Bork, "Ancillary Restraints and the Sherman Act," 15 A.B.A. Anti-
trust Section 211, 219 (1959). 
232. Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 520 (1959). 
233. Compare Farbenfabriken Bayer, A.G. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 197 F. 
Supp. 613 (D.N.J. 1961), aff'd, 307 F.2d 207 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. den., 
372 U.S. 929 (1963) (the successor to a party to a contract which il-
legally allocated world markets can not bring an action for profits 
due under the contract). 
234. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). 
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The Fifth Circuit's conclusion was grounded on twin proposi-
tions: (1) a trademark license without territorial restrictions will 
be deemed coextensive with the whole country; (2) a licensor can 
lose rights in a mark that he permits others to misuse.235 The 
first proposition is reasonable but hardly a justification for allo-
cation of markets by competitors. The licensor's quality control 
should have adequately guaranteed the integrity of the licensed 
mark regardless of the number of licensees selling in the same 
territory.236 The second proposition was questionably analogized 
from cases which involved loss of trademark rights because of 
failure to institute prompt suits for trademark infringement. If 
the court intended on oblique reference to potential loss of a li-
censor's trademark rights through a licensee's improper display 
of the licensed mark, territorial restrictions are by no means 
necessary, or even adequate, antidotes. A commonly encountered 
license provision requiring the licensor's approval of the licensee's 
mode of display of the licensed mark seems more appropriate and 
effective.237 Denison's limited rationale does not, of course, ex-
haust the argument that the legal obligations of a trademark li-
censor warrant resort to the rule of reason. It can also be con-
tended that territorial restrictions are justified by a trademark 
licensor's duty to control the nature and the quality of the goods 
sold by a licensee.238 It is doubtful, however, that quality con-
siderations would ever in fact require restriction of the area in 
which a licensee may produce a product. The specification of 
production and product standards should almost invariably be 
enough. In the context of the "mattress cases," for instance, a 
quality mattress can presumably be made in any of the fifty states 
as long as adequate production and product standards are applied. 
By the same token, because purchasers from one licensee might 
resell the goods in another licensee's territory, 239 a system of 
exclusive sales territories would be of less assistance in tracing 
defective goods back to slipshod licensees than a simple require-
ment that every licensee place his individual trade name or trade-
235. Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403, 409-10 
(5th Cir. 1962). 
236. Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 154 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. 
Pa. 1957), aff'd, 255 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1958). 
23 7. See Restatement (Second), Torts § 756A, comment _!!: (Tent. Draft No. 
8, 1963). 
238. § 45, 60 Stat. 443 (1946), 15 u.s.c. § 1127 (1964); see "Quality Con-
trol and the Antitrust Laws in Trademark Licensing," 53 Trademark 
Rep. 1130, 1162 n. 188 (1963). 
239. E.g., Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 154 F. Supp. 823 
(E.D. Pa. 1957), aff'd 255 F .2d 641 (3d Cir. 1958). 
ASSIGNMENT AND LICENSING 133 
mark, in addition to the licensed mark, on goods produced under 
the license.240 Endeavoring to maintain the quality of a licensee's 
production through restricting the areas in which he can manufac-
ture and sell goods is akin to cutting down an elm in which a cat 
has been treed in order to prevent the cat from falling and being 
hurt. The desired result may or may not be achieved, and there 
are more direct and less drastic ways to achieve it. Justifications 
unique to licensing aside, a trademark user's interest in avoiding 
tarnishment of his mark's reputation might support a stipulation 
forbidding a licensee to locate in "low class" or nonprestiguous 
areas; but this is a far cry from prohibiting all licensee opera-
tions in blocks of territory where suitable locations exist as was 
done by the mattress companies. 
The weakness of the theory that the legal obligations of a 
trademark licensor justify territorial limitations in horizontal li-
censes is only exceeded by the inappropriateness of the other two 
cases billed as supporting territorial limitations in horizontal li-
censes. It has been contended that Hanover Star Milling Co. v. 
Metcalf 241 "in effect, allocated one territory for use of the trade-
mark "Tea Rose" for flour to one competitor, and assigned another 
territory for use of the same trademark on like goods to the 
other." 242 This interpretation, however, glosses over the "pecu-
liar facts" of Hanover.243 The case did not involve the calculated 
apportionment of trademark rights. Hanover merely held that where 
two person coincidentally adopt the same mark in different terri-
tories, the prior user has no common-law right to compel the jun-
ior user to abandon use of the mark. Moreover, in contrast to 
the typical limited territorial license, Hanover did not place any 
arbitrary limits on the territorial rights that the concurrent users 
could attain. Under Hanover, each concurrent could market his 
goods wherever he wished as long as he did not come into conflict 
with the other. Huber Baking Co. v. Stroehmann Bros. Co.,244 the 
other principal case advanced as sustaining limited territorial li-
censing among competitors, is equally inapposite. Quality Bakers 
of America, a bakers' cooperative, had a policy of granting non-
exclusive limited territorial licenses which ordinarily left the li-
censor free to authorize overlapping territories but prevented the 
240. This has been an aspect of the "Ban-Lon" quality control program. 
Joseph Bancroft & Sons v. Shelley Knitting Mills, 212 F. Supp. 715 
(E.D. Pa. 1962). 
241. 240 U.S. 403 (1916). The Hanover case is discussed in Chapter I 
in the text accompanying notes 24-28. 
242. Stewart, "Franchise or Protected Territory Distribution," 8 Antitrust 
Bull. 447, 464 (1963). 
243. 240 U.S. 403, 420. 
244. 252 F .2d 945 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 358 U.S. 829 (1958). 
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licensees from soliciting sales outside their territories without the 
licensor's permission,245 When the licensor allowed Stroehmann 
Bros. to sell in Huber's territory, Huber objected. The Second 
Circuit upheld the objection sustaining Huber's contentions that the 
licensor had granted Huber an exclusive territorial license or, al-
ternatively, that the licensor was estopped to authorize another 
licensee to sell in Huber's territory by the terms of a trademark 
assignment accepted from Huber. No antitrust issues were raised 
or discussed. The case turned on niceties of trademark law and 
the parole evidence rule, The court's comment that "the division-
of territory was not designed to, and in fact did not, work a fraud 
on the public .•. " but rather had "a legitimate business purpose" 246 
was limited to a trademark context-the idea being that granting 
Huber the exclusive right to sell "Sunbeam" bread in an area in 
which Huber had previously used a similar mark served the com-
mendable purpose of preserving the former connotation of the mark 
to the public. Laudable as this function may be when antitrust 
principles are not considered, this "business purpose" should not 
be entitled to as much weight in an antitrust suit as in a suit on 
a contract. A licensor's quality control should safeguard the in-
tegrity of a licensed mark regardless of the number of licensee's 
selling in the same territory,247 and confusion as to the identity 
of the trademark users can be adequately dispelled by requiring 
that licensees couple their individual trade names or trademarks 
with display of the licensed mark.248 
Inasmuch as Hanover dealt with an unrelated point of trade-
mark law and Huber was premised upon contract rights to which 
no antitrust challenge was raised, the case for application of the 
rule of reason to territorial limitations in horizontal licenses be-
cause of considerations derived from trademark law is based on 
Denison's faulty reasoning insofar as adjudications are concerned. 
Recognition of the deficiencies in this approach is evidenced by the 
mattress companies' abortive attempts to amend the Lanham Act so 
as to specifically require application of the rule of reason to limited 
territorial licenses.249 Sealy was on far sounder ground in holding 
245. The territorial restriction in Huber was the equivalent of a closed 
sales area. 
246. 252 F .2d 945, 956. 
247. Parkway Baking Co. v, Freihofer Baking Co,, 154 F. Supp. 823 (E,D. 
Pa. 1957), aff'd 255 F .2d 641 (3d Cir. 1958). 
248. The significance of the fact that each licensee. displayed his individ-
ual trade name in conjunction with the licensed mark was not dis-
cussed by the Second Circuit in the Huber case because the presence 
of likelihood of purchaser confusion was conceded by both parties. 
252 F .2d at 950-51. 
249. S. 1396, § 5(k), 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); S. 1396, § 5(b), 87th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). 
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that the joint venture of the small bedding manufacturers in mar-
keting a national brand, rather than a talismanic trademark license, 
merited application of the rule of reason. 
The assertion that territorial limitations in vertical licenses 
are invariably tested by the rule of reason has no clear-cut deci-
sional support. A number of older decisions cited for the propo-
sition either dismissed allegations of a plaintiff's antitrust viola-
tions as immaterial to the merits of a trademark infringement 
suit250 or applied the pre-White Motor Co. view that all vertical 
territorial restraints were tested by the rule of reason.251 The 
other cases, Vermont Maple Syrup Co. v. F. N. Johnson Maple 
Syrup Co.252 and Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co.253 
turned on points of trademark and contract law respectively. 
Vermont Maple Syrup held, without a passing reference to anti-
trust law, that trademark law did not prohibit the introduction of 
a mark into new territory through licensing. On the other hand, 
Parkway narrowly construed a territorial limitation in a trademark 
license because of antitrust considerations. The licensor urged 
the district court that a license which designated but did not ex-
pressly limit the licensee's sales territory should be interpreted 
to interdict sales within the licensee's territory if the licensee 
knew that the goods were to be resold elsewhere. The district 
judge flatly rejected this contention and indicated that an express 
provision for geographical customer allocation might raise an an-
titrust question.254 He also refused to imply the restriction from 
250. E.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Bennett, 238 Fed. 513 (8th Cir. 1916); accord, 
Coca-Cola Co. v. Gay-Ola Co., 200 Fed. 720 (6th Cir. 1912), c~ 
den., 229 U.S. 613 (1913); see Coca-Cola Co. v. J. G. Butler & Sons, 
229 Fed. 224 (E.D. Ark. 1916). See generally Nicoson, "Misuse of 
the Misuse Doctrine in Infringement Suits," 9 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 76, 
96 (1962). 
251. E.g., Brosious v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 59 F. Supp. 429 (M.D. Pa. 1945), 
affld, 155 F .2d 99 (3d Cir. 1946) (alternative holding); accord, Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 269 Fed. 796 (D. Del. 1920). 
252. 272 Fed. 478 (D. Vt. 1921). 
253. 154 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Pa. 1957), aff'd, 255 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1958). 
Parkway involved a sponsor-manufacturer representation arrangement 
with an independent sponsor. If the sponsor is not controlled by the 
franchisees, a sponsor-manufacturer representation arrangement is 
analogous to a vertical arrangement because restraints are imposed 
on persons- at the same level of manufacture or distribution by a 
person divorced from that level. On the other hand, if the sponsor 
is controlled by the franchisees, the arrangement is horizontal. Cf. 
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 267, 279-80 (1963). 
254. 154 F. Supp. 823, 826 citing United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical 
Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944), which invalidated a private licensing system 
used to fix resale prices. 
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the conduct of the parties because "courts are reluctant to con-
strue a contract in a way which would give it the effect of restrict-
ing the free and unlimited exchange or sale of commodities. "255 
The Third Circuit's affirmance of Parkway256 has been interpre-
ted by Judge Barnes of the Ninth Circuit as establishing that 
"where there is no express grant of exclusive territory in a con-
tract or franchise, none will be impliedly read into the cont:r:act, 
as a general rule." 257 
The dearth of federal authority suggesting that the existence 
of a trademark license affects the validity of vertical territorial 
restraints is not surprising. In most vertical relationships a 
trademark license is unnecessary because the purported licensee 
merely resells the "licensor's" products. Even if a license is 
required, control of a licensee's sales area is not essential to 
quality control however useful it may otherwise be to the licen-
sor. 258 Yet, hope springs eternal and Texas decisions upholding 
territorial limitations in vertical trademark licenses under the 
Texas antitrust laws 259 have been thrown into the potpourri of 
cases alleged to sustain a rule of reason test for territorial limi-
tations in vertical licensing arrangements. These cases are of 
considerable importance in Texas because that state's antitrust 
laws generally outlaw per se both horizontal and vertical terri-
torial allocations.260 The rationale, however, has little transfer 
value at either the federal or state level. In the leading Texas 
case of Coca-Cola Co. v. State 261 the Court of Civil Appeals pre-
mised its discussion upon the following principle: 
25,,. IlJid. 
256. Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F .2d 641 (3d Cir. 
1958). 
257. Pacific Supply Cooperative v. Farmers Union Central Exch., Inc., 318 
F .2d 894, 907 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. den., 375 U .s. 965 (1964). 
258. See note 238 supra and accompanying text. 
259. Coca-Cola Co. v. State, 225 S,W. 791 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920), Coca-
Cola was followed in Shaddock v. Grapette Co., 259 S.W,2d 231 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1953) (disallowing antitrust defense to a suit on a note and 
a chattel mortgage). 
260, E.g., Climatic Air Distrib. v. Climatic Air Sales, 162 Tex, 237, 345 
S. W.2d 702 (1961); 8 Baylor L. Rev. 295 (1961); see Hanson & Van 
Kalinowski, "Status of State Antitrust Laws with Federal Analysis," 
L, W. Res. L. Rev. 9, 26-27 (1963). The Texas Attorney General 
has ruled 1hat the exception is limited to legally required trademark 
licenses. 1940-43 Trade Cas. ,r 56112 (1941). 
261. 225 s.w. 791 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920). 
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The Constitution of the United States .•. expressly pro-
vides for the creation of monopolies in the matter of patent 
rights, trade-marks, and copyright. Article I, § 8. Con-
gress has legislated under this provision and no state can 
nullify its acts. "The very object of these laws is monopoly.11 262 
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Since the foregoing analysis has suggested that the federal trade-
mark laws do not include the privilege of imposing territorial lim-
itations in trademark licenses within the trademark "monopoly" 
conferred by registration, the propriety of territorial limitations 
should be as open to question under state antitrust laws as under 
the federal statutes. 263 Indeed, the principal virtue of the Texas 
cases is that they avoid conflict with the federal antitrust laws, 
not the federal trademark laws. The Sherman Act and the Federal 
Trade Commission Act do not parallel the Texas antitrust laws' 
blanket proscription of territorial restraints. 264 
D. Conclusion 
The Antitrust Division's concern that the assignment and li-
censing provisions of the Lanham Act could be used to facilitate 
collusive divisions of territorial markets was clearly exaggerated. 
Partial territorial assignments are of limited feasibility and there 
is nothing in the Lanham Act which should give them preferred 
antitrust status. Moreover, the "solid front of precedents" alleged-
ly validating limited territorial licenses under the antitrust laws 
is singularly insubstantial. The legality of these restrictions ap-
pears to be controlled by conventional antitrust factors, notably 
the horizontal, vertical, or conglomer·ate character of the licensing 
arrangement. Horizontal restrictions are generally invalid per se 
whereas it seems probable that stringent vertical territorial restraints 
on buyers will be difficult to justify. Conglomerate restraints for 
which business reasons can be evinced are probably valid as long 
as the possibility of market competition between a licensor and a 
licensee, or between licensees, is remote. Upon the development of a 
262. Id. at 793; accord, Shaddock v. Grapette Co., 259 S.W.2d 231, 235 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1953). The Court of Civil Appeals was, of course, 
erroneous in assuming that federal trademark legislation is based 
upon the patent and copyright clause of the Constitution. United 
States v. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82 (1879). 
263. Cf. Temperato v. Horstman, 321 S.W.2d 657 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1959). 
The problem does not arise with respect to state trademark legisla-
tion because statutory trademark licensing is a federal phenomenon. 
264. Application of the strict Texas rule to interstate trademark licenses 
might be invalid as a burden on interstate commerce. See Denison 
Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403, 413 (5th Cir. 1962); 
see generally Flynn, Federalism and State Antitrust Regulation (1964). 
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probability of competition these restrints assume either a horizon-
tal or a vertical character and should be tested by the antitrust 
principles applicable to those classifications. The Sealy case 
raises the problem of the extent to which a distributive joint ven-= 
ture should moderate the per se rule with respect to horizontal 
territorial allocations. Whatever answer the Supreme Court may 
give, the existence of limited territorial trademark licenses should 
not figure in the result. 
CONCLUSION 
The saga of territorial trademark rights with respect to com-
peting goods and the antitrust laws indicates that the debate between 
proponents and opponents of strong trademark protection has engen-
dered exaggerated claims and counterclaims which have obscured 
the basic legal problems. The doctrine of concurrent territorial 
rights expounded in the Hanover and Rectanus cases was noncom-
petitive, but it was also consonant with a respect for good faith 
conduct which is deeply ingrained in our law. The Lanham Bill 
was strong protectionist legislation, but the Justice Department 
permitted this fact to goad it into blind opposition to trademark 
law revision. Limited territorial licenses are in widespread use, 
but neither prevalence nor the Lanham Act immunizes territorial 
restrictions in trademark licenses from challenge under the anti-
trust laws. Amidst, perhaps because of, the welter of extreme 
positions, it is heartening to observe the development of a legal 
structure which facilitates procompetitive delineation of territorial 
trademark rights with respect to competing goods. 
The doctrine of the Hanover and Rectanus cases was a natural 
response by the Supreme Court to the plight of junior users who 
innocently adopted marks similar to those already in use. It was 
unfair to penalize these junior users for failure to discover the 
existence of prior rights for there was no reliable method by which 
they could do so. Nor was the protection of good faith junior use 
unduly burdensome to a senior user at the time that the doctrine 
of concurrent territorial rights was formulated. Before the advent 
of television, radio, and national magazines, territorial trademark 
interests were confined to smaller areas than was true after the 
revolution in commercial communication engendered by these phe-
nomena. Although chain operations were often embarrassed and an-
noyed by the discovery of good faith concurrent users, the absence 
of expensive conduits to mass markets meant that the advertising 
investment in a mark by a senior user was less substantial, the 
expense of popularizing a new mark to avoid concurrent territorial 
rights was less onerous, and the simultaneous use by a senior user 
of several marks for the same goods was less likely to require 
duplication of costly advertising, l It was not until the emergence 
1. E.g., General Baking Co. v. Gorman, 3 F .2d 891 (1st Cir.), cert. den., 
268 U.S. 705 (1925). 
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of mass media advertising that the latent noncompetitive potentiali-
ties of recognition of concurrent territorial rights became readily 
apparent. Thereafter, broad territorial markets were more easy 
to exploit and senior users were more apt to find that concurrent 
territorial rights were an obstacle that it was prohibitively costly 
to surmount. 2 Nevertheless, the advertising expenditures and good 
will of bona fide junior users could not be ignored so the courts 
contented themselves with expanding a senior user's territorial 
trademark rights where a junior user's good faith was doubtful, 
e.g., where a senior user's advertising, popular reputation, or 
steady expansion of operations made it unlikely that a junior user 
was unaware of the existence of the senior use when he adopted 
his mark. Because the courts would go no further, solution of the 
problem of concurrent territorial use was left to the legislature. 
Resolution of the problem by state legislation would have been 
cumbersome at best. Concurrent territorial rights could arise any- 1 
where in the United States so that a satisfactory solution to the 
problem had to take into consideration the interests of both senior 
and junior users throughout the length and breadth of the country. 
State trademark registration statutes might have constituted a ve-
hicle for providing notice of senior rights but the endeavors to 
enact substantive state registration statutes generally constituted 
attempts to abuse the state capacity for trademark law revision, 
and interstate commercial interests understandably favored a single 
federal registration statute. The ultimate result was the enactment 
of the Lanham Act. 
The Lanham Act provides an adequate framework within which 
to balance the legitimate interests of junior and senior users. A 
senior user who foregoes registration assumes the risk of concur-
rent territorial rights and is properly subjected to them. Converse· 
ly, a senior user who acquires registration has given junior users 
an opportunity to discover the fact of his use through examination 
of the records in the Patent Office and is entitled to the privilege 
of nationwide trademark rights made possible by the constructive 
notice provision. Utilization of the federal trademark registry is 
not unduly burdensome on either senior or junior users. Numerous 
law-firms in Washington, D.C. specialize in searching the federal reg-
istry and obtaining registration for local or out-of-town business-
men, and registration of a common-law trademark is possible after 
2. See "Trademarks in the Marketplace," 53 Trademark Rep. 687, 696-97 
(1963) (good faith concurrent user asks $1,000,000 settlement from Col-
gate-Palmolive). 
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nominal use plus token use in commerce.3 Although secondary-
meaning marks require a greater amount of use for registrability,4 
everyday language should not be as easily removed from unrestricted 
commercial usage as coined, arbitrary, or suggestive words. The 
frequency with which multiple adoptions of these marks occur and 
the potency of descriptive words as advertising devices dictate that 
the prize of registration should only be bestowed on a person with 
a substantial interest in the mark. If one is primarily interested 
in obtaining quick registration, he can adopt a common-law trade-
mark. 
As a general proposition, the existence of the federal trade-
mark registry makes it reasonable to penalize both senior users 
who fail to secure registration and junior users who fail to check 
the registry before adopting a mark. Nevertheless, "general propo-
sitions do not decide concrete cases. 115 Because the Lanham Act 
may trench hard upon unsophisticated local trademark users and 
because judges are reluctant to impose needless penalties, the Sec-
ond Circuit's interpretation of the Lanham Act definition of trade-
mark infringement in Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc. 6 
should figure prominantly in future attempts by senior users to in-
voke the constructive notice provision. The proposition that junior 
users are not to be deprived of their marks until market conflict 
develops with a registrant is a fair reading of section 32{1){a) which 
should have a wellnigh irresistable appeal to consequence-conscious 
judges. The other side of the coin is that junior users temporarily 
sheltered by the Dawn interpretation may be lulled into increasing 
their advertising investment in a mark in which they have subor-
dinate rights. This undesirable consequence can, however, be miti-
gated by realistic advice from trademark counsel, by senior users 
who warn junior users of the risk that they run in failing to adopt 
a new mark, and, when conflict does occur, by judicial decrees 
which temper the blow to junior users who have had no warning of 
a possible day of reckoning. 
The strong territorial trademark protection with respect to 
competing goods made possible by registration is in the public in-
terest insofar as persons who initiate use after constructive notice 
begins are concerned. Section 22 should have no effect on the 
3. E.g., Seiberling Rubber Co. v. Dayton Rubber Co., 110 U.S.P.Q. 556 
(Comm'r 1956). "Use in commerce" is a jursidictional prerequisite of 
the Lanham Act. § 1, 60 Stat. 427 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 
(1964). 
4. See Knox Gelatine, Inc. v. Gelatin-Plus, 143 U.S.P.Q. 72 (Tm. Bd. 1964). 
5. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (dissenting opinion of Mr. 
Justice Holmes). 
6. 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1958). 
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capacity of a person to extend already acquired concurrent terri-
torial rights. It is unduly restrictive of the development of com-
merce to consider that a person with an unquestionable right to 
use a mark cannot extend his area of protectable use where this 
does not produce a clash with a registrant, but the situation is 
radically different with respect to persons who start use following 
the applicability of section 22. The noncompetitive potentialities 
of the doctrine of concurrent territorial rights make it sound public 
policy to deny those rights to junior users who have had fair warn-
ing of senior use as long as there is no other practicable way to 
avoid a substantial likelihood of purchaser confusion. This is not 
to say that a registrant may not estop himself to challenge certain 
of these junior users through express or implied acquiescence in 
their continued use;7 nevertheless, every registrant should be en-
titled to an opportunity to expand in preference to a recognition of 
junior concurrent territorial rights to the extent that the registrant 
diligently endeavors to expand. 
The possibility of obtaining broad territorial trademark rights 
through federal registration has obvious implications for attempts 
to broaden territorial trademark rights through other federal or 
state legislation. The predication of strong territorial trademark 
protection on registration is in the public interest because poten-
tial junior users can discover the marks which qualify for nation-
wide protection by checking the federal registry. A statutory ex-
pansion of the territorial trademark protection accorded unregis-
tered marks would not give junior users an equivalent opportunity 
for notice of superior rights and might even discourage federal 
registration. Although it may be expected that the courts would 
narrowly construe this type of legislation in any event, the pres-
ence of the opportunity to obtain extensive territorial trademark 
rights through Lanham Act registration should give them an addi-
tional reason for doing so. 
Because territorial restrictions accompanying trademark li-
censes, partial territorial assignments, and concurrent registration 
can constitute an antitrust violation, it may superficially appear that 
the Justice Department properly opposed the Lanham Bill on this 
ground. On reflection, it seems clear that the substitution of con-
trolled for coincidental concurrent territorial use was a desirable 
modernization of the law. A highly integrated economy can ill af-
ford fragmentation of territorial trademark rights through happen-
stance. The law facilitates the efficient marketing of goods and ser-
vices by making possible nationwide trademark rights. To the extent 
that these right may be abused, the Lanham Act does not impinge on 
the operation of the antitrust laws. 
7. See Restatement (Second), Torts § 754 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963). 
APPENDIX 
It is necessary to have a general understanding of Patent 
Office practice in trademark cases in order to be able to evaluate 
Patent Office decisions respecting trademark rights. The following 
sketch should provide an adequate perspective. 
A. Basic Patent Office Proceedings 
When an application for registration on the Principal Register 
is received by the Patent Office, a trademark examiner initially 
determines ex partel whether the mark is registrable.2 The ex-
aminer may request additional information before coming to a de-
cision 3 or may finally dispose of the application on the first ex-
amination. 4 One of the most frequent grounds for rejection of an 
application is that the mark 
consists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a 
mark registered in the Patent Office or a mark or trade 
name previously used in the United States by another and 
not abandoned, as to be likely, when applied to the goods 
of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, 
or to deceive .... 5 
If an examiner believes that a likelihood of confusion exists between 
marks, final rejection will usually follow unless the applicant can 
dissuade the examiner. 6 However, if the likelihood of confusion is 
caused by a prior application or a prior registration that has not 
become incontestable 7 and the applicant alleges a date of use prior 
1. Ex parte Patent Office proceedings involve a single party and take 
place before a trademark examiner. 
2. 37 C.F.R. § 2.61(a) (1960). Ex parte issues generally involve the reg-
istrability of a mark under section 2 of the Lanham Act. Universal 
Overall Co. v. Stonecutter Mills Corp., 122 U.S.P.Q. 324 (Comm'r 
1959). 
3. 37 C.F.R. § 2.61(b) (1960). 
4. 37 C.F.R. § 2.64 (1960). 
5. § 2(d), 60 Stat. 428 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1964); see 
Vandenburgh, Trademark Law and Procedure 253 (1959). 
6. Vandenburgh, note 5 supra, at 253-56 suggests various arguments that 
may be essayed. 
7. The Lanham Act forbids declaration of an interference between an ap-
plication and an incontestable registration. § 16, 60 Stat. 434 (1946), 
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1066 (1964); Robert Hall Clothes, Inc. v. 
Comm'r of Patents, 145 U.S.P.Q. 256 (D.D.C. 1965). But see Koeppel 
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to the filing date of the ear lier application, the examiner, or in 
the case of a registration issued before the pending application was 
filed, the Commissioner, may declare an interference. 8 
An interference proceeding is an inter partes proceeding 9 
before the Patent Office Trademark Trial and Appeal Boardl0 em-
ployed to determine the right to registration as between two or 
more parties at least one of whom is an applicant. 11 Since the 
Commissioner will usually refuse to declare an interference, 12 as 
a practical matter interference proceedings are limited to inter-
ferences declared by an examiner between pending applications or 
between a pending application and a registration issued after the 
application was filed. Before an interference will be declared it 
must be determined that the relevant marks are registrable except 
for the issue of likelihood of confusion.13 If a junior applicant es-
tablishes superior rights in an interference proceeding, he is en-
titled to registration but must first obtain cancellation of any im-
pugned registrations.14 On the other hand, if a junior applicant 
cannot demonstrate superior rights or absence of confusing simi-
larity, his application will be rejected.15 This does not necessarily 
mean that the other party will obtain or retain registration. Al-
though a junior applicant must allege use of a mark before the 
filing date of a conflicting prior application in order to obtain a 
declaration of interference, the outcome of the proceeding does not 
(Footnote continued) 
Metal Furniture Corp. v. Dunleavy Co., 51 C.C.P .A. (Patents) 1221, 
328 F .2d 939 (1964) (failure to appeal erroneous declaration of inter-
ference constitutes waiver of objection). 
8. 37 C.F .R. § 2.91 (1960), as amended, (Supp. 1964). 
9. Inter partes proceedings involve more than one party and at least one 
applicant or registrant. See Vandenburgh, note 5 supra, at 259. The 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to inter partes proceedings to 
the extent that the Patent Office deems them appropriate. 37 C.F .R. 
§ 2.117(a) (1964); R.H. Macy & Co. v. Richter & Phillips Co., 115 
U.S.P.Q. 342 (Comm'r 1957). 
10. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, composed of the Commissioner 
of Patents, the Assistant Commissioners, and other Patent Office em-
ployees designated by the Commissioner, hears all inter partes pro-
ceedings. § 17, 60 Stat. 434 (194G), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1067 
(1964). Cases must be heard by at least three members of the board. 
Ibid; Foodland, Inc. v. Foodtown Super Mkts., Inc., 138 U.S.P,Q. 591 
(Tm. Bd. 1963). See generally Law, "The Trademark Trial and Appeal 
Board," 50 Trademark Rep. 1019 (1960). 
11. See Vandenburgh, note 5 suprl!-, at 295. 
12. In re Hot Shoppes, Inc., 141 U,S.P.Q. 302 (Comm'r 1963). 
13. Soule-Gibbs & Co. v. Hearn Bros. Super Food Mkts., 118 U.S.P.Q. 383 
(Comm'r 1958). 
14. 37 C. F .R. § 2.96 (1964). 
15. E.g., United States Plywood Corp. v. Trieb, 114 U.S.P.Q. 343 (Comm 1r 
195 7). 
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turn upon this factor alone but rather upon a determination of the 
respective rights of all the parties,16 Thus in United States Ply-
wood Corp. v. Trieb17 the junior applicant failed to establish a 
right to registration but introduced sufficient unrebutted evidence 
to cause denial of registration to the other applicant as well. 
If an examiner concludes that a mark is registrable on the 
Principal Register, the mark will be published for opposition in 
the Official Gazette of the Patent Office. IS Publication may take 
place even though an interference is to be declared or a concurrent 
use proceeding instituted, although the ultimate registrability of the 
mark is, of course, dependent on the outcome of those proceed-
ings.19 Anyone who believes that he would be damaged by regis-
tration of the published mark has thirty days from the date of 
publication to seek an opposition proceeding by filing a verified 
opposition in the Patent Office.20 An opposition proceeding is an 
inter partes proceeding before the Patent Office Trademark Trial 
and Appeal Board initiated by a person objecting to issue of reg-
istration on the Principal Register. An opposer is generally the 
user of a mark or trade name that is similar to the mark sought 
to be registered. An applicant whose application is opposed usual-
ly endeavors to establish prior use, absence of likelihood of con-
fusion, or an equitable defense.21 The validity of a conflicting reg-
istration asserted by an opposer22 can, however, only be attacked 
by a request for cancellation.23 If an opposition is sustained, the 
applicant will, of course, be refused registration;24 but dismissal 
16. 37 C,F,R. § 2.96 (1964); Grand Bag & Paper Co. v. Tidy-House Paper 
Prods., Inc., 109 U.S.P,Q. 395 (Comm'r 1956); accord, Bunny Bear, 
Inc, v. Dennis-Mitchell Indus., 104 U,S.P.Q. 116 (Comm'r 1955). 
17. 114 U.S.P.Q. 343 (Comm'r 1957). 
18. § 12(a), 60 Stat. 432 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1062(a) (1964). 
19. Ibid. 
20. 37 C.F.R. § 2.101 (1964). A request for extending the time for filing 
an opposition must be received in the Patent Office before the expira-
tion of the thirty-day period. 37 C.F .R. § 2.102 (1964). Grant of an 
extension is discretionary with the Commissioner. General Tire & 
Rubber Co. v. Petron Corp., 137 u.s.P.Q. 600 (Comm'r 1963). 
21. E.g., Motorola, Inc. v. Griffiths Electronics, Inc., 50 C,C.P.A. (Patents) 
1518, 317 F .2d 397 (1963); see Vandenburgh, note 5 supra, at 260. See 
generally Panel Discussion, "Trademark Oppositions," 52 Trademark 
Rep. 1053 (1962). 
22. An opposer can only rely upon his own registrations as grounds for 
opposition. He cannot champion the rights of third parties. Parke, 
Davis & Co. v. Diamond Laboratories, Inc., 139 U.S.P.Q. 551 (Tm. 
Bd. 1963). 
23. 37 C.F.R. § 2.106(b) (1964); Contour Chair-Lounge Co. v. Englander 
Co., 51 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 833, 324 F .2d 186 (1963). 
24. Trak Electronics Co. v. Rustrak Instrument Co., 141 U.S.P.Q. 841 
(Tm. Bd. 1964). 
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of an opposition does not ensure registration. Section 18 of the 
Lanham Act25 authorizes the Patent Office to refuse registration 
on the basis of evidence adduced in the opposition that would have 
led a trademark examiner to initially refuse registration ex parte.26 
If an ex parte ground of irregistrability appears to exist, the Trade-
mark Trial and Appeal Board will accordingly recommend that reg-
istration be withheld pending reexamination of the application by a 
trademark examiner who may thereupon refuse registration.27 
A published mark that survives all inter partes and ex parte 
challenges is registered in due course. 28 The certificate of reg-
istration is, however, subject to later cancellation in various pro-
ceedings: 29 an inter partes cancellation proceeding can be brought 
by a person who will be damaged by the continued existence of the 
registration;30 cancellation may be requested in a counterclaim in 
another inter partes proceeding;31 the Patent Office may cancel 
registration on an ex parte ground 32 or because the registrant fails 
to file an affidavit of continued use within six years after the is-
suance of registration,33 cancellation may be ordered by a court 
in an action involving a registered mark;34 or cancellation proceed-
ings may be brought by the Federal Trade Commission.35 The grounds 
25. § 18, 60 Stat. 435 ( 1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1068 (1964). 
26. Common ex parte grounds of irregistrability are found in the prohibi-
tions of section 2 of the Lanham Act. Universal Overall Co. v. Stone-
cutter Mills Corp., 122 U.S.P.(~. 324 (Comm'r 1959). The Patent Of-
fice may also raise ex parte objections to registration after the con-
clusion of other inter partes proceedings involving an application. 
37 C.F.R. § 2.131 (1964); e.g., La Jolla Sportswear Co. v. Maskuline 
Underwear Co., 114 U.S.P.Q. 130 (Comm'r 1957) (interference pro-
ceeding). 
27. 37 C.F.R. § 2.131 (1964); Polaroid Corp. v. Anken Chem. & Film Corp., 
138 u.s.P.Q. 327 (Tm. Bd. 1963). 
28. 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.82, 2.151 (1964). 
29. See generally Stoughton, "Cancellation of Trademarks," 50 Trademark 
Rep. 890 (1960). 
30. 37 C.F.R. § 2.112 (1960). 
31. 37 C.F .R. §§ 2.97, 2.106 (1964); e.g., Robert Hall Clothes, Inc. v. 
Stern-Slegman-Prins Co., 48 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 792, 285 F.2d 816 
(1961). 
32. See Stoughton, note 29 supra, at 894-95. The validity of ex parte can-
cellation of registration after dismissal of a cancellation proceeding has 
been questioned, Vandenburgh, note 5 supra, at 285 & n. 2 and the 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has recently scored the practice. 
Golden Gate Salami Co. v. Gulf States Paper Corp., 51 C.C.P,A. (Pat-
ents) 1391, 332 F .2d 184 (1964) (supplemental register registration). 
33. § 8(a), 60 Stat. 431 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1058(a) (1964). 
34. § 37, 60 Stat. 440 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1119 (1964); e.g., Proxite Prods., 
Inc. v. Bonnie Brite Prods. Corp., 206 F. Supp. 511 (S.D.N. Y. 1962). 
35. § 14, 60 Stat, 433 (1946), as amended, 15 U ,S,C. § 1064 (1964); Bart 
Schwartz Internat'l Textiles, Ltd. v. F.T.C,, 48 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 933, 
289 F.2d 665 (1961). 
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on which registration can be cancelled vary depending on the period 
of time that has elapsed since registration on the Principal Regis-
ter or republication.36 
B. Review of Patent Office Proceedings 
1. Patent Office Review 
The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board hears appeals from 
final decisions of trademark examiners in ex parte cases,37 As 
in the past when these appeals were heard by an Examiner-in-Chief 
or an Assistant Commissioner on behalf of the Commissioner of 
Patents, 38 the Board generally decides the case on the basis of 
the record made before the examiner ,39 Although most decisions 
of examiners in ex parte cases must be appealed to the Board, a 
petition for review may be filed with the Commissioner (1) if an 
examiner has persisted in course of conduct not subject to appeal 
to the Board, (2) if a statute or rule specifically provides for such 
review 40 or (3) if appropriate circumstances exist for invocation 
of the Commissioner's general supervisory authority,41 Failure 
of an examiner to follow a prior decision of the Board might, for 
instance, be a proper object of petition,42 but a petition for review 
addressed to the Commissioner cannot ordinarily be used as a sub-
stitute for an appeal from a decision of the Board itself,43 
Prior to August 8, 1958 an inter partes case was initially 
heard by the Examiner of Interferences44 and an administrative 
appeal could be taken to the Commissioner of Patents with the ac-
tual decision generally being rendered by an Examiner-in-Chief or 
an Assistant Commissioner.45 A 1958 amendment to the Lanham 
Act, however, vested the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board with 
36. See text accompanying notes 141-69 in Chapter II supra. 
37. § 20, 60 stat. 435 (1946), as amended, 15 U ,S,C, § 1070 (1964); a final 
decision is a decision stated to be final or a second refusal of an ap-
plication on the same ground. 37 C.F.R. § 2,141 (1960). 
38. Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 20, 60 Stat, 435, 
39. E.g., In re Flintkote Co., 128 U,S,P.Q. 12 (Tm. Bd. 1960), rev'd on 
other grounds, 132 U.S,P.Q, 295 (Tm. Bd, 1961). 
40. See Vandenburgh, note 5 supra, at 331-32. 
41. 37 C.F.R. § 2,146(a) (1960). The Commissioner also has authority to 
suspend certain rules in extraordinary situations. 37 C.F.R. § 2,148 
(1960); In re W. D. Byron & Son, 139 U ,S.P .Q. 550 (Tm. Bd. 1963). 
42. Cf. Ex parte Barley, 116 U.S,P .Q. 592 (Patent Bd. 1957). 
43. In re Celotex Corp., 121 U.S.P,Q. 44 (Comm'r 1959); accord, In re 
Celotex Corp., 120 U,S.P.Q. 493 (Comm'r 1959), ---
44. Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 17, 60 Stat. 434. 
45. Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 20, 60 Stat. 435, 
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original jurisdiction of inter partes proceedings,46 An appeal from 
a decision of the Board in an inter partes case must ordinarily be 
taken to the courts, 47 although the Commissioner continues to en-
tertain petitions for review of nonappealable interlocutory orders48 
and asserts statutory authority to pass on decisions of the Board 
approving concurrent registration. 49 Where the evidence in an 
inter partes case suggests to the Board that a mark is unregistra-
ble on an ex parte ground, the Board must recommend that a 
trademark examiner reexamine the application if the applicant fi-
nally prevails in the inter partes case.50 Should an examiner 
thereupon reject the application, an ex parte appeal may be taken 
to the Board.51 
2. Extra-Patent Office Review 
An applicant denied registration by the Board or a dissatisfiedj 
party52 in an inter partes proceeding can seek review of final Pat-
ent Office decisions 53 in either the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals or a federal district court.54 If a dissatisfied party in an 
inter partes case chooses to proceed in the Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals, an adverse party has twenty days to file with the 
Commissioner of Patents an election to have the review conducted 
in a district court. 55 The appellant must then commence a civil 
action within thirty days or the decision of the Board will govern 
further proceedings.56 The appeal to the Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals must ordinarily be dismissed after an election in 
46. § 17, 60 Stat. 434 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1067 (1964). Prior 
decisions by the Examiner of Interferences are not binding on the 
Board. Royal Crown Cola Co. v. Pure Spring (Canada) Ltd., 50 C.C. 
P.A. (Patents) 906, 311 F .2d 805 (1963). 
47. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Merritt Corp., 120 U.S.P.Q. 94 (Comm'r 1959). 
48. See Chicopee Mfg. Corp. v. Madison Research & Development Corp., 
134 U.S.P.Q. 261 (Comm'r 1962); Kroger Co. v. Country Club Ice 
Cream Co., 130 U.S.P.Q. 34 (Comm'r 1961). 
49. Coastal Chem. Co. v. Dust-A-Way, Inc., 139 U.S.P.Q. 208 (Comm'r 
1963). This authority has not been successfully challenged to date. 
Coastal Chem. Co. v. Hodges, 235 F. Supp. 1018 (D.D.C. 1964). 
50. 37 C,F .R. § 2.131 (1964). 
51. Ibid, 
52. A prevailing party may nonetheless qualify as a "dissatisfied" party. 
Frostie Co. v. Sun-Glo Packers, Inc., 49 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 983, 300 
F .2d 940 (1962) (per curiam). 
53. E.g., Seamless Rubber Co. v. Ethicon, Inc., 46 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 950, 
268 F .2d 231 (1959) (per curiam). 
54. § 21, 60 Stat. 435 (1946), as amended, 15 U,S.C. § 1071 (1964). 
55. § 21, 60 Stat. 435 (1946), as amended, 15 U,S.C. § 1071(a) (1) (1964). 
There is not corresponding provision authorizing transfer of an action 
begun in a district court to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. 
56. Ibid. 
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favor of a civil suit is made,57 However, if the appeal concerned 
both ex parte and inter partes questions, the Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals has held that the election transfers only the inter 
partes issues to a district court. 5S Since this permits two issues 
flowing from the same Patent Office decision to be litigated simul-
taneously in two different courts, the Patent Office has modified its 
procedure in an effort to avoid duplicative litigation. The Patent 
Office rule which requires the Board to refer ex parte matters in 
inter partes proceedings to a trademark examiner with a subsequent 
right of appeal back to the Board is intended to result in Board 
decisions on either ex parte or inter partes grounds but not on 
both.59 
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals considers only 
questions raised in the reasons for appeal concerning the record 
made in the Patent Office. 60 Issues that have not been passed on 
by the Patent Office will not be heard.61 Decision of the Court 
of Customs and Patent Appeals in trademark cases were not re-
viewable until 1962 when the Supreme Court acknowledged the con-
stitutional status of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and 
thus the existence of certiorari jurisdiction.62 A final decision in 
a case heard by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals governs 
subsequent Patent Office proceedings63 but is not necessarily 
57. Ibid. But see Frostie Co. v. Sun-Glo Packers, Inc., 49 C.C.P.A. (Pat-
ents) 983, 300 F .2d 940 (1962) (per curiam) (case can not be trans-
ferred piecemeal). 
58. Baxter Laboratories v. Don Baxter, Inc., 138 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 786, 
186 F .2d 511 (1951). 
59. 37 C.F .R. § 2.131 (1964); see Vandenburgh, note 5 supr:i,, at 337-39. 
60. § 21, 60 Stat. 435 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a) (4) (1964). 
Judicial notice may be taken of additional facts. E.g., Hancock v. 
American Steel & Wire Co., 40 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 931, 203 F.2d 737 
(1953). 
61. E.g., In re Retail Clerk's Internat'l Protective Ass'n. 32 C.C.P.A. 
(Patents) 1004, 149 F .2d 153 (1945). 
62. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962); see Stern & Gressman. 
Supreme Court Practice 56-59 (3d ed. 1962). The Judicial Code has 
provided for Supreme Court certiorari jurisdiction over trademark 
decisions of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals since 1948, 28 
U,S,C, § 1256 (1964), but until 1962 it was unclear whether these con-
troversies were justiciable in a constitutional sense, several prece-
dents indicating that these decisions were administrative rather than 
judicial. Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U.S. 693 
(1927); see Pacific Nw. Canning Co. v. Skookum Packers' Ass'n, 283 
U.S. 858 (1931); Vandenburgh, "Review of Decisions of the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals Under the Administrative Procedure Act," 
38 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 675 (1956). Despite implicit reccgnition of the 
justiciable nature of trademark controversies in Zdanok the Court has 
yet to grant certiorari. 
63. § 21, 60 Stat. 435 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1071(a) (4) (1964). 
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binding in infringement suits. 64 In contrast, district court review 
of a decision of the Board results in a trial de novo. 65 Although 
the Patent Office record can be introduced on motion and enjoys 
a presumption of validity, other evidence can be considered.66 
Both ex parte and inter partes issues can be reviewed67 and gen-
eral equitable relief may be obtained in inter partes cases in ad-
dition to appropriate directions to the Patent Office. 68 Any federal 
district court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of review 
proceedings;69 but only the District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia can serve process of parties residing anywhere in the Uni-
ted States or abroad. 70 A district court decision can be appealed 
to the appropriate court of appeals, 71 and a decision by the court 
of appeals is within the Supreme Court's certiorari jurisdiction.72 
64. E.g., Syncromatic Corp. v. Eureka Williams Corp., 174 F .2d 649 (7th 
Cir.), cert. den., 338 U.S. 829 (1949). Decisions of the Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals may be given greater weight in the wake of 
the Supreme Court's acknowledgement that they are judicial decisions. 
See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962); "Developments in the 
Law-Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition," 68 Harv. L. Rev. 814, 842 
(1955). 
65. Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 229 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
den., 351 U.S. 973 (1956); accord, Watkins Prods., Inc. v. Sunway Fruit 
Prods., Inc., 311 F.2d 496 {7th Cir. 1962), cert. den., 373 U.S. 904 
(1963). 
66. § 21, 60 Stat. 435 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b) (1) & (3) 
(1964). E.g., Royal Crown Cola Co. v. Crown Beverage Corp., 195 F. 
Supp. 130 (E.D.N.Y. 1961); accord, Wilson Jones Co. v. Gilbert & Ben-
nett Mfg. Co., 332 F .2d 216~(2d Cir. 1964) (dictum). 
67. § 21, 60 Stat. 435 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b) (1) (1964). 
68. See, e.g., Land O'Lakes Creameries, Inc. v. Oconomowoc Canning Co., 
330 F .2d 667 (7th Cir. 1964). 
69. Jean Patou, Inc. v. Societe Anonyme Technique de Parfumerie, 124 F. 
Supp. 145 {S.D.N. Y. 1954). 
70. § 21, 60 Stat. 435 {1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b) (4) (1964). 
71. E.g., Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 229 F .2d 37 (D.C. Cir.), 
cert. den., 351 U.S. 973 {1956). 
72. Cf. Hoover Co. v. Coe, 325 U.S. 79 (1945). 
